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“A good way to do econometrics  
is a look for good natural experiments  
and use statistical methods that can  
tidy up the confounding factors that  
nature has not controlled for us.”1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Context and objectives of the thesis 
Policymakers frequently use tax reforms to influence the decisions of companies.2 In 
particular, tax reforms are popular policy tools during economic downturns. For example, 
when introducing the US dividend tax cut in 2003 as part of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), the former US President Georg W. Bush stated that 
dividend taxation may “distort corporate dividend payout policy [as well as the financing] and 
investment decisions of firms”.3 During the economic crisis caused by the Coronavirus 
pandemic, the German legislative bodies passed the Coronavirus Tax Assistance Act in June 
2020, which contained among other things “accelerated depreciation options [for movable 
assets] that will boost incentives for investment”.4 The major objective of these reforms is the 
promotion of corporate investments, which are expected to be a key driver to foster economic 
growth (e.g., Keynes, 1936; De Long and Summers, 1991). 
Besides the predominant objective to promote investment, tax reforms also aim at meeting 
social goals. For example, when introducing the Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) as 
part of the EU Capital Requirements Directive in 2013, the European Commission argued that 
“[i]ncreased transparency regarding the activities of [financial] institutions, and in particular 
regarding profits made, taxes paid and subsidies received, is essential for regaining the trust 
of citizens of the Union in the financial sector. Mandatory reporting in that area can therefore 
be seen as an important element of the corporate responsibility of institutions towards 
stakeholders and society” (EU, 2013a, Recital 52). In addition to tax reforms having an 
economic or social goal, some changes in the taxation result from requirements imposed by 
                                                 
1 Quote by Daniel McFadden (co-winner of the 2000 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences).  
2 This thesis focuses on corporate decisions because, on the one hand, corporate investment promotes economic 
growth and employment (e.g., Keynes, 1936). On the other hand, sufficient data on companies is available to 
examine tax reforms. 
3 Economic Report of the President, February 2003, p. 203. 







administrative orders or case law, for example in response to rulings of the European Court of 
Justice.5 
However, most of the tax reforms described above are based on the assumption that taxes play 
a significant role in the decision-making process of companies. It is the task of empirical tax 
research to examine this underlying assumption and analyse the outcome of tax reforms. In 
this context, empirical studies can reveal intended but also unintended economic consequences 
of changes in taxation, which is particularly important for assessing tax reforms that do not 
have any economic or social objective. 
Therefore, the overall objective of this thesis is to examine the real effects of tax reforms (see 
Figure 1.1). Following Leuz and Wysocki (2016, p. 530), real effects are defined “as situations 
in which the [company] changes its behaviour in the real economy (e.g., investment) as a result 
of the [tax reform]”.6 Consequently, this thesis addresses the motivating question: Do tax 
reforms affect corporate behaviour in the real economy? 
Figure 1.1: Context of the thesis 
  
                                                 
5 Besides the listed reasons for tax reforms, there are other reasons such as simplification of the tax law, increasing 
tax justice and tax revenues etc. However, this thesis only distinguishes between tax reforms with a political or 
social goal and tax reforms resulting from requirements of administrative orders or case law. 
6 In general, a distinction is made between “real effects” and “capital-market effects”. The latter represent capital 
market outcomes that address the behaviour of capital market participants, such as financial analysts, based on 
information disclosed by entities (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Examples for capital market effects in tax research: 
book-tax differences and earnings forecasts (e.g., Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005), earnings management 
and tax accounts (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Krull, 2004), and transparency (e.g., Chen et al., 2018a; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2019).   
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Examining real effects of changes in the tax policy has already been an important stream in 
the empirical tax research over the past decades (for an overview, e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010; Bruehne and Jacob, 2019). Since taxes reduce firms’ after-tax cash flows and thereby 
influence the cost of capital, theoretical literature predicts that tax reforms affect corporate 
decisions (e.g., Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Poterba and Summers, 1985; Auerbach, 2002). A 
large body of the empirical literature provides evidence on the effect of corporate taxes on 
various decisions of companies, such as investment decisions (e.g., Patel et al., 2017; Giroud 
and Rauh, 2019), financing decisions (e.g., Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008), location 
decisions (e.g., Buettner and Ruf, 2007, Barrios et al., 2012), and employment (e.g., 
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky, 2018).  
In addition, empirical studies provide evidence that other types of taxes, such as shareholder 
taxes and consumption taxes, affect corporate investment decisions (e.g., Becker et al., 2013; 
Jacob et al., 2019) while shareholders taxes also impact dividend payouts (e.g., Blouin et al., 
2011; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). Further, changes in tax base elements, such as thin 
capitalisation rules (e.g., Overesch and Wamser, 2010; Buettner et al., 2012), loss offset 
restrictions (e.g., Dreßler and Overesch, 2013; Bethmann et al., 2018) and tax depreciation 
allowances (e.g., Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Maffini et al., 2019), also have an effect on 
corporate decisions. Finally, the disclosure of tax information can create real effects (e.g., 
Dyreng et al., 2016; De Simone and Olbert, 2020).  
Overall, the underlying goal of empirical tax researchers is to draw causal inference from 
changes in taxation (e.g., Gow et al., 2016). Tax reforms can provide settings that serve as 
“natural experiments” and “exogenous shocks” and thus can be examined by using quasi-
experimental methods, such as a differences-in-differences approach (e.g., Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). Given that the assumptions of quasi-experimental research designs are 
fulfilled, these methods generate credible estimates of causal effects (e.g. Gow et al., 2016). 
These econometric approaches are all the more important as policymakers and researchers are 
interested in the causal effects of tax reforms in order to evaluate them. Therefore, this thesis 
examines three tax reforms that represent “exogenous shocks”. By applying a quasi-
experimental method, this thesis identifies the causal effects of taxation on corporate 
decisions.7  
                                                 
7 However, it should be noted that the identification of purely causal effects is challenging, as assumptions of 
quasi-experimental research designs are very strict and hardly ever fulfilled in reality (see Section 5.2). 
Nevertheless, many approaches are applied in the three studies to address potential concerns about a wrong 






The three tax reforms examined in this thesis address three different features of taxation 
(Figure 1.1): (1) change in the tax rate, (2) change in the tax base, and (3) change in the 
disclosure requirements of tax information. To be more precise, the first study of this thesis 
examines the effect of a dividend tax reform on the payout decision of private firms and 
portfolio decision of their shareholders. The second study provides evidence on the investment 
response of finance lease firms to a change in tax depreciation allowances. The third and final 
study investigates the reaction of financial institutions to the disclosure of tax information. By 
examining tax reforms that address different features of taxation, it is possible to get a more 
comprehensive impression on the real effects caused by tax reforms. This is important as 
policymakers frequently initiate reforms on the three characteristics of taxation described 
above. Moreover, the first two tax reforms mentioned above allow for the study of potential 
unintended consequences resulting from tax reforms that have no economic or social goal. 
However, the third tax reform pursues a social goal so that intended and unintended outcomes 
can be examined.8       
This thesis contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it sheds more light on the real effects 
of tax reforms and thereby answers the call for research on real effects of taxation (e.g., Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010; Dyreng and Maydew, 2018; Bruehne and Jacob, 2019). It adds to the 
literature by providing additional evidence that companies alter their decisions when they face 
changes in the tax rate (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017), tax base (e.g., Ohrn, 2019) or 
disclosure of tax information (e.g., Eberhartinger et al., 2020). Exploiting tax reforms with 
quasi-experimental research designs increases the credibility that the results are causal effects 
of tax reforms.     
Second, the thesis examines intended and unintended consequences of tax reforms. On the one 
hand, it is important for politicians to know whether the goal of the tax reform has been 
achieved. On the other hand, policymakers also need to be informed about unintended 
economic consequences of tax reforms. This is particularly the case if the reform does not 
pursue an economic objective. However, prior literature on unintended consequences of 
reforms is scarce so far (e.g., Bethmann et al., 2018; Rauter, 2020).    
Third, the contribution of the thesis is also based on the identification of heterogeneity in the 
reaction of companies to changes in the taxation (e.g., Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Jacob and 
Michaely, 2017; Jacob et al., 2019). Examining cross-sectional variation in the response of 
companies to tax reforms informs policymakers and researchers about characteristics that 
                                                 






moderate firm decisions. This knowledge is important to evaluate the consequences of tax 
reforms.    
Finally, the three studies capture the reactions of certain types of companies that have not been 
the focus of the empirical tax research so far. Prior literature predominantly examined the 
effect of taxes on publicly listed firms and their shareholders (e.g., Blouin et al., 2011; Desai 
and Jin, 2011). The thesis contributes to the limited literature on the response of private firms 
and their shareholders to changes in taxes (e.g., Michaely and Roberts, 2011; Berzins et al., 
2018). Further, prior literature often excluded financial institutions from their analyses (e.g., 
Giroud and Rauh, 2019). However, this thesis extends the prior literature by investigating the 
reaction of finance lease firms and other financial institutions to tax reforms and thereby 
answers the call for research on taxation and financial institutions (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010).  
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis 
As outlined in Figure 1.2, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 present 
the three empirical studies on the real effects of tax reforms. The final chapter concludes 
(Chapter 5).  
Chapter 2: Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the 
Taxation of Corporate Minority Shareholders 
The first study examines whether a dividend tax increase, which only affects corporate 
shareholders owning a minority stake, has an effect on private firms’ payout decisions and on 
minority shareholders’ portfolio choices. The study exploits a German dividend tax reform in 
2013, which significantly increased the taxation of dividends received by German corporate 
shareholders owning a stake of less than 10% in a dividend-paying German corporation. 
Examining this plausible exogenous shock with my comprehensive and hand-collected data 
on the ownership structure of private firms in Germany for the period 2010 to 2015 reveals 
the following results. First, firms do not change their payout decisions if a dividend tax reform 
affects only a particular group of shareholders without significant voting power. This result is 
in line with prior literature, which shows that agency issues and shareholder conflicts mitigate 
the dividend tax responsiveness of private firms in particular. Second, corporate shareholders 
significantly reduce their minority stakes, confirming the prediction that they are incentivised 






Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that the reduction in corporate shareholders’ minority 
stakes is larger for those invested in firms with high dividend payouts and a majority 
shareholder. The dividend tax responsiveness is also larger for financially distressed corporate 
shareholders with a minority stake that do not belong to the same group as the firm in which 
they own a minority stake. The findings contribute to the very limited literature on the effects 
of dividend taxes on the payout decisions of private firms and the portfolio decisions of their 
shareholders. In addition, the study enriches the literature on the characteristics that affect the 
dividend tax responsiveness of shareholders. Furthermore, the results inform policymakers 
about the potential effects of the asymmetric taxation of dividends on private firms and their 
shareholders. 
Chapter 3: Tax Depreciation and Investment Decisions: Evidence from the Leasing Sector  
The second study focuses on a change in tax depreciation allowances. Using a German tax 
depreciation reform as an exogenous shock that applies to firms offering finance leases, the 
study examines whether this change impacts the investment decisions of finance lease 
companies. Since the beginning of 2014, the German tax authority has abolished the lease-
specific straight-line tax depreciation over the lease term. Since then, the lessor has been 
required to depreciate on a straight-line basis over the expected useful life of the asset. The 
latter depreciation method is less beneficial as the lease term is shorter than the expected useful 
life of an asset. The results suggest that finance lease firms significantly reduce their 
investments in tangible assets after the reform compared to rental firms, which are not affected 
by the reform.  
Finance lease firms are financial institutions and thus subject to regulatory requirements 
regarding liquidity and risk management. However, the increase in tax payments due to a shift 
to the less beneficial tax depreciation allowance reduces cash flow and hence liquidity. Since 
investment decisions of finance lease firms are tied to the regulatory requirements, a decline 
in liquidity negatively affects investments. In line with this prediction, cross-sectional analyses 
reveal that the exposure of finance lease firms to regulatory requirements moderates their 
investment response.  
Additional cross-sectional tests show that business model characteristics, such as a product 
focus on mobile assets, affect the responsiveness of finance lease firms to the change in tax 
depreciation allowances. The study adds to the literature on the effect of tax depreciation on 
firms’ investment behaviour. In addition, the study extends the scarce literature on the effect 






moderate the investment decision of finance lease firms. In this context, the study answers the 
call for research on the effect of taxation on financial institutions.  
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Chapter 4: The Effect of Public Country-by-Country Reporting on Real Activities of EU Banks 
The third and final study of this thesis uses a setting in the EU to examine whether public 
disclosure of tax information creates real effects. The European Union’s Capital Requirements 
Directive IV mandates that banks in the EU disclose annual financial and tax information by 
geographical location and type of activity. The so-called Country-by-Country Reporting 
(CbCR) was first required by banks in July 2014. Using CbCR as an exogenous shock in the 
disclosure of tax information, the study finds that EU multinational banks decrease their tax 
avoidance behaviour after the reform compared to EU domestic banks, which cannot employ 
cross-border tax planning strategies. This result is in line with the prediction that CbCR 
disclosures raise costs for banks due to an increase in detection and enforcement risks or 
reputational concerns.   
The study uses banks’ total assets, earning assets and the number of employees as proxies for 
their economic activities. Results indicate that EU multinational banks reduce their real 
economic activities after the CbCR disclosure reform compared to EU domestic banks. The 
findings confirm the prediction that a decline in tax avoidance negatively affects real economic 
activities when banks include the costs and benefits of tax avoidance in their decision to 
maximise their after-tax profits. In this case, a reduction in the optimal level of tax avoidance 
adversely affects the optimal level of the input factors such as labour and investments.     
Additional cross-sectional tests reveal that not only detection and enforcement risks but also 
reputational concerns moderate the treatment effect on banks’ tax avoidance. Further, both 
channels capture the variation in the treatment effect on banks’ economic activities.  Therefore, 
the cross-sectional tests additionally underline that banks’ economic activities decline after 
the CbCR disclosure because their tax avoidance activities decrease. The study adds to the 
emerging literature on the effects of private and public CbCR by providing evidence that the 
disclosure of tax information reduces tax avoidance and thereby adversely affects economic 
activities, indicating that tax avoidance creates real effects. Further, it answers the call for 
research on the impact of public disclosure of tax information on firms’ behaviour.   
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This paper examines the response of private firms and their shareholders to a dividend tax 
increase, which only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using this 
exogenous shock in Germany, my results suggest that firms do not change their payout policy 
but corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. 
Additional cross-sectional tests indicate a larger reduction of corporate shareholders’ minority 
stakes for those invested in firms with high dividend payouts and a majority shareholder. The 
dividend tax responsiveness is also larger for financially distressed corporate shareholders 
with minority stakes that do not belong to the same group as the firm in which they own a 
minority stake. My findings add to the very limited literature on the effects of dividend taxes 
on payout decisions of private firms and reactions of their shareholders. 
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Theory suggests that dividend taxation affects the payout policy of firms (e.g., Poterba and 
Summers, 1984; Chetty and Saez, 2010) and the portfolio decision of investors (e.g., Brennan 
and Thakor, 1990; Allen et al., 2000). Consistent with theoretical predictions, recent empirical 
literature confirms that the payout decision of listed firms is responsive to changes in dividend 
taxes and provides some evidence that the portfolio decision of their investors is affected by 
shareholder taxes (e.g., Blouin et al., 2011; Desai and Jin, 2011). However, prior studies 
provide less evidence on the effect of dividend taxes on the payout decision of private firms 
(e.g., Yagan, 2015; Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins et al., 2019). In addition, it remains an 
open empirical question whether dividend taxes affect shareholders of private firms. In this 
paper, I examine the response of private firms11 and their shareholders to a dividend tax 
increase in Germany, which only affects a particular group of shareholders – corporate 
shareholders with a minority stake12. This unique setting allows me to investigate whether a 
special dividend tax regime creates direct and indirect effects on the firm and shareholder 
level.  
Since March 2013, dividends received by German corporate shareholders owning a stake of 
less than 10% (hereafter “minority stake”) in the dividend-paying German corporation are 
subject to corporate and business taxes, amounting to a total dividend tax burden of around 
30%. Prior to the reform, dividends received by those shareholders were 95% tax-exempt 
under the Corporate Income Tax Act, resulting in a smaller dividend tax burden of around 
14% (business taxes). In contrast, capital gains from the sale of shares that a German corporate 
shareholder owns in another German corporation are not subject to this dividend tax reform. 
They are 95% tax-exempt, regardless of the corporate shareholder’s ownership stake.  
Previous empirical studies, which predominantly examined the US dividend tax cut in 2003, 
provide empirical evidence on the effect of dividend taxes on the payouts of listed and unlisted 
firms (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2005; Blouin et al., 2011; Hanlon and Hoopes, 2014; Yagan, 
2015). However, some studies question the economic relevance of dividend taxes on payouts 
(e.g., Brav et al., 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Yagan, 2015). 
Recent empirical studies show that agency issues and shareholder conflicts, such as conflicts 
between owners and managers or between majority and minority shareholders, mitigate the 
                                                 
11 I define private firms as unlisted separate legal entities, which are taxed under the German Corporate Income 
Tax Act. Throughout the paper, I use “firm”, “corporation” and “company” interchangeably. 
12 I define corporate shareholders owning a minority stake as German corporate shareholders owning a stake of 
less than 10% in another German corporation. 
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dividend tax responsiveness (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins et al., 2019). In addition, 
prior literature suggests that firms’ responses to dividend tax changes are stronger when 
shareholders with a large stake are affected by the reform (e.g., Pérez-González, 2002). I thus 
posit that the special German dividend taxation regime, which only affects corporate 
shareholders owning a minority stake, does not have an impact on a firm’s payout policy 
because minority shareholders do not have sufficient voting power to influence payouts. 
With regard to shareholders, theory suggests that shareholders affected by an increase in 
dividend taxes should switch to non-dividend-paying firms, if dividend-paying firms do not 
change their dividend payouts and if capital gains taxes are smaller than dividend taxes 
(Dhaliwal et al., 1999). However, shareholders of private firms are highly affected by 
transaction costs because private firms operate on illiquid markets and generally have a small 
number of owners that could be potential buyers for minority stakes (e.g., Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000). Therefore, prior studies that have examined the effect of dividend tax 
reforms on the payout decision of private firms reveal stable ownership structures over time 
(e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins et al., 2018). Nevertheless, a large dividend tax 
increase for one particular group of shareholders that cannot influence the firm’s dividend 
payout decision incentivises them to rebalance their portfolios. I thus predict that corporate 
shareholders reduce their minority stakes in German companies as a response to the dividend 
tax increase. 
To investigate both hypotheses, I exploit the exogenous shock setting by applying a difference-
in-differences (DiD) approach. My treatment group is defined as German corporate 
shareholders owning a stake of less than 10% in another German corporation in the period 
prior to the reform. The control group includes German corporate shareholders owning a stake 
of at least 10% but less than 20% in another German corporation during the pre-reform period. 
I test the first hypothesis by comparing the payout of firms with treated corporate shareholders 
before and after the reform with firms having corporate shareholders in the control group. For 
the second hypothesis, I compare the ownership stake of treated corporate shareholders before 
and after the dividend tax reform with the ownership stake of corporate shareholders in the 
control group.   
I use a panel of private corporations in Germany to examine the effect of a dividend tax 
increase on these firms and their respective corporate shareholders. My dataset has two main 
advantages. First, in comparison to recent empirical studies, which use rather static ownership 
structures (e.g., Michaely and Roberts, 2011; Nagar et al., 2011),  I can hand-collect the exact 
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ownership structure of private corporations in Germany for the period 2010 to 2015, to 
precisely examine the effect of the dividend tax reform on the ownership structure of German 
corporations. Second, I have financial data on the shareholder level, which allows me to also 
include shareholder characteristics in my tests.    
The results of my main DiD analyses show that after the dividend tax increase firms do not 
change their payouts but corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes. Both effects are 
consistent with my predictions that firms do not alter their payouts if a dividend tax reform 
affects only a particular group of shareholders without significant voting power. Instead, 
corporate shareholders adjust their minority stakes when they face changes in dividend taxes. 
My results are robust when using alternative dependent variables, controlling for repurchases 
and employing a simultaneous equations approach. 
In addition to these analyses, I perform four cross-sectional tests to examine whether the 
dividend tax responsiveness of corporate shareholders with minority stakes varies with firm- 
and shareholder-level characteristics. First, I posit that the response of corporate shareholders 
after the dividend tax increase is larger if they own minority stakes in firms with a high 
dividend payout. Second, potential shareholder conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders can increase agency costs for treated minority shareholders (e.g., Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). I thus predict that the reduction in minority stakes of 
corporate shareholders after the dividend tax reform is larger if they own minority stakes in 
firms with a majority shareholder.  
Third, the affiliation of the firm and corporate shareholder to the same group could affect the 
behaviour of the corporate shareholder owning a minority stake. On the one hand, if the firm 
and the corporate shareholder have the same global ultimate owner, the group could adjust the 
ownership structure with lower transaction costs because the internal purchase and sale of 
holdings are more efficient than external trades on illiquid markets. On the other hand, the 
same group might employ tax-planning strategies to avoid the dividend tax burden at the 
corporate shareholder level, resulting in no reaction of the corporate shareholder with a 
minority stake. My prediction therefore varies. Finally, I expect that the reduction of minority 
stakes after the dividend tax reform is larger for financially distressed corporate shareholders 
because they are in particular reliant on after-tax cash flows from their investments in minority 
stakes.   
Results of my empirical tests are consistent with my cross-sectional predictions, indicating 
that firm and shareholder characteristics as well as the relation between the shareholder and 
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the firm affect the dividend tax responsiveness of corporate shareholders with minority stakes. 
The reduction of corporate shareholders’ minority stakes is larger for those invested in firms 
with a high dividend payout and a majority shareholder. The dividend tax responsiveness is 
also larger for financially distressed corporate shareholders with minority stakes that do not 
belong to the same group as the firm in which they own a minority stake. 
Additional analyses support the validity of my inferences and extend my main results. In the 
first set of additional tests, I examine whether other shareholders are indirectly affected by the 
dividend tax reform because they could buy the minority stakes, which corporate shareholders 
want to sell after the dividend tax reform. My results indicate that potential new shareholders 
do not purchase the minority stakes and therefore are not indirectly affected by the reform. 
Instead, corporate shareholders primarily sell their minority stake to the shareholder with the 
largest ownership stake in the firm. In addition, the dividend tax increase might prevent other 
German corporate shareholders from reducing their ownership stakes to less than 10% after 
the reform. However, my results reveal that shareholders do not adjust their ownership stakes 
regularly. To mitigate the concern that my DiD approach may not be valid because my control 
group could be indirectly affected by the reform, I use foreign corporate shareholders resident 
in the EU and owning a stake of less than 10% in a German corporation as an alternative 
control group. My findings are fully consistent with my main results, thus supporting the 
validity of my DiD approach.     
Further, I employ entropy balancing matching and re-estimate my baseline regressions on the 
matched sample. My findings are fully consistent with my main results, suggesting that 
observable differences across treated and control observations do not confound my results. In 
addition, I conduct placebo tests to assess the validity of the parallel trend assumption. I find 
insignificant reactions of corporate shareholders with minority stakes in my two placebo 
reform dates, which increase the confidence that my findings are attributable to the dividend 
tax reform.  
In further additional analyses, I examine alternative reactions of German corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes. First, I address the possibility of delayed responses of 
treated corporate shareholders to the dividend tax reform by estimating yearly treatment 
effects over the sample years. The results suggest that treated corporate shareholders respond 
immediately or with a delay of one year. Finally, I discuss why an increase in ownership stakes 
does not seem to be the predominant reaction of treated corporate shareholders. 
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




My paper contributes to the very limited literature on the effects of dividend taxes on the 
payout decisions of private firms and the portfolio choices of their shareholders (e.g., Michaely 
and Roberts, 2011; Berzins et al., 2018). While the existing literature provides some evidence 
that dividend taxes affect the payout decisions of private firms, prior studies generally consider 
the ownership structure of a private firm as being stable over time (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 
2017; Berzins et al., 2018). I extend the literature by providing first evidence that minority 
shareholders of private firms affected by the dividend tax reform react to the increase in 
dividend taxes by reducing their ownership stakes. My setting is advantageous because it 
overcomes the major limitations of prior studies (e.g., Desai and Jin, 2011; Blouin et al., 2011; 
Berzins et al., 2019) by offering only a change in the dividend taxation of a particular 
shareholder group that generally cannot influence the firm’s payout policy. Therefore, I can 
estimate the shareholder response to the dividend tax increase more precisely.   
Second, my study enriches the literature on the characteristics that affect the dividend tax 
responsiveness of shareholders (e.g., Desai and Jin, 2011; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). My 
unique dataset allows me to examine important characteristics on three different levels: firms, 
shareholders and the relation between the firm and its shareholders. My results demonstrate 
that besides firm-specific payout decisions and the financial position of the treated 
shareholder, the dividend tax response is also conditional upon potential agency issues and the 
affiliation of the treated shareholder and the firm to the same group. The heterogeneity in the 
dividend tax responsiveness suggests that each of these different levels should be considered 
to fully understand the decisions of shareholders.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the institutional background. Section 
2.3 develops my predictions. Section 2.4 outlines the research design and data. In Section 2.5, 
I present empirical findings. Section 2.6 provides additional analyses. Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2 Taxation of dividends received by corporate shareholders in Germany 
The taxation of dividends that a German corporation receives from another German 
corporation is similar to a dividends-received-deduction system, which is also used in other 
countries such as France, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States (Erickson and 
Maydew, 1998; IBFD, 2013).  
In general, a corporation’s dividend income is subject to withholding taxes. In Germany, the 
dividend-paying German corporation is obliged to withhold 25% of the dividends paid out to 
its German corporate shareholders. The dividend-receiving German corporate shareholder is 
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allowed to effectively exempt 95%13 of the received dividends from its corporate income tax 
base, regardless of its ownership stake in the dividend-paying German corporation. In 
addition, the German corporate shareholder can fully deduct the withholding tax from its 
corporate income tax burden, when filing the corporate tax return. Consequently, if the 
corporate shareholder and the dividend-paying corporation both are resident in Germany, the 
dividend income is almost fully exempt from corporation taxes and not affected by 
withholding taxes. Under the Corporate Income Tax Act, only 5% of the dividends received 
are taxed at the corporate shareholder level with a corporate income tax rate of 15%. In 
addition, dividends are subject to business taxes (approx. 14%14) if the ownership stake is less 
than 15%. Under consideration of an additional surtax of 5.5% on the corporate income tax, 
the effective inter-corporate dividend tax burden is thus 14.8% for corporate shareholders with 
an ownership stake of less than 15%, and 1.5% if the ownership stake is at least 15% (see 
Table 2.1). In general, the same system applies to capital gains that German corporate 
shareholders receive when they sell their shares in German corporations, except that the 
overall tax burden is always 1.5%, regardless of the shareholding quota.     
Compared to the taxation of inter-corporate dividends in Germany, profit distributions from a 
German corporation to corporate shareholders in foreign countries are also subject to 
withholding taxes.15 Nevertheless, the German withholding tax is final for foreign 
corporations because they do not have the possibility to receive a tax credit or reimbursement 
in Germany. However, this final withholding tax burden does not occur if the EU Parent-
Subsidiary Directive applies. The EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive (EU, 2011) abolishes 
withholding taxes on dividends that are distributed to foreign corporate shareholders resident 
in the EU if their ownership stake is at least 10%.     
On October 20, 2011, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared that the German dividend 
tax regulation violates the principle of the free movement of capital because dividends 
distributed to companies that are resident in other Member States and that hold less than 10% 
of the shares in the German corporation have a higher German dividend tax burden than 
dividends distributed to German companies (EU, 2011).  
                                                 
13 Dividends that a corporate shareholder receives from another corporation are fully tax-exempt under the 
Corporate Income Tax Act. However, 5% of the tax-exempt dividends are classified as non-deductible expenses. 
Therefore, dividends are effectively 95% tax-exempt.  
14 Business taxes are local taxes, which are levied by municipalities. I assume that the average rate of assessment 
at the municipality level is 400%, resulting in an average business tax rate of 14% (= 3.5% * 400%). 
15 The withholding tax rate equals the minimum of the German withholding tax rate and the withholding tax rate 
specified in the double tax treaty with Germany (in general, a tax rate of 15%). 
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The German parliament had the choice of two options to change the national taxation of inter-
corporate dividends in order to comply with the EU law. The first option was that EU corporate 
shareholders could receive dividends from German corporations, which would be exempt from 
withholding taxes, regardless of their ownership stake. In this case, dividends distributed to 
foreign corporate shareholders resident in the EU as well as dividends distributed to German 
corporate shareholders would be, in general, exempt from corporate and withholding taxes in 
Germany. The second option proposed that German corporate shareholders owning a stake 
below 10% in a German corporation would have to pay corporate taxes on the total amount of 
dividends received from the minority stake. In this case, foreign corporate shareholders 
domiciled in the EU as well as German corporate shareholders would receive dividends, which 
are fully taxable in Germany. The German legislative bodies discussed both options 
thoroughly.  
On February 26, 2013, the German parliament and German Federal Council agreed on the 
latter proposal. Consequently, on March 21, 2013, the German parliament passed a law that 
dividends are subject to corporate taxes (= 15%) if a German corporate shareholder has a direct 
ownership stake of less than 10% in another corporation. This law had a retroactive 
application, which means that the ownership stake at the beginning of the year 2013 was 
decisive for the 10%-threshold in 2013. If, for example, a German corporate shareholder owns 
a stake of less than 10% in another German corporation on January 1, the total amount of 
dividends received in that year is subject to corporate and business taxes. In order to achieve 
the threshold of 10% in a particular year, the Corporate Income Tax Act requires corporate 
shareholders owning a stake of less than 10% to buy an additional 10% stake in that particular 
year. The increase in the stake to ensure that the sum of previous and additional stakes equals 
in total 10% is not sufficient in order to benefit from the 95% dividend tax exemption in the 
year of the additional acquisition of shares.  
Overall, German corporate shareholders are obliged to tax the total amount of dividends 
received from their minority stakes after February 28, 2013, resulting in a total dividend tax 
burden of around 30%. Table 2.1 outlines the dividend tax burden before and after the tax 
reform.  
Notably, the legislative reform did not change the 95% tax exemption for capital gains. Taken 
together, German corporate shareholders have to pay corporate (and business) taxes on the 
total amount of dividends received from their minority stakes, but capital gains derived from 
the sale of shares they own in other corporations are 95% tax-exempt.  
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Table 2.1: Dividend tax burden of a corporate shareholder for the years 2010-2015 
 
Years 
 Dividend tax burden 
  
Ownership stake  
< 10% 
10% ≤ Ownership stake  
< 15%  
Ownership stake  
 15% 
      
Pre-reform 2010-2012  14.8% 14.8%  1.5% 
      
Post-reform 2013-2015  29.8% 14.8% 1.5% 
      
Notes: The dividend tax burden is the sum of a corporate tax burden (15%), a surcharge of 5.5% on the corporate 
tax burden and a business tax burden (on average 14%). The ownership stake determines the combined tax 
burden. The total dividend tax burden is as follows: (1) 29.8% = 15% + 15% x 5.5% + 14%, (2) 14.8% = 5% x 
15% + 5% x 15% x 5.5% + 14%, (3) 1.5% = 5% x 15% + 5% x 15% x 5.5% + 5% x 14%.  
This unique setting has some valuable advantages. First, prior studies generally exploit reform 
settings with changes in dividend tax rates and capital gains tax rates, which obfuscate the 
pure dividend tax effect (e.g., Blouin et al., 2011). However, the German intra-corporate 
dividend tax reform exclusively alters the taxation of intra-corporate dividends, while capital 
gains from selling shares in other corporations remain 95% tax-exempt. This setting thereby 
allows me to estimate precisely the effect of the change in dividend taxation.  
Second, although the ECJ decided at the end of 2011 that the German intra-corporate dividend 
taxation legislation contradicts EU law, the German legislative bodies thoroughly discussed 
two potential changes of the intra-corporate dividend taxation regulation and could only agree 
on one option in February 2013, before the law was subsequently passed in March 2013. In 
addition to the ongoing discussions about the two proposals before February 2013, one of the 
two proposals discussed did not include a change in the taxation of German corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes. I therefore do not expect that the ECJ decision led to 
anticipation effects. Third, the German government was obliged to adjust the dividend tax 
regulation to comply with EU law. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes perceived this dividend tax reform as permanent.      
Fourth, the change in dividend taxes was significant for corporate shareholders owning a 
minority stake as the dividend tax burden increased from 14.8% to 29.8% after the reform, 
which is equal to a doubling of the initial tax burden. Finally, the dividend tax reform was not 
confounded by other events in the years 2013 and 2014, which could have affected the payout 
policy of corporations and the portfolio decision of shareholders. 
In sum, this setting provides a significant and unanticipated change in the taxation of dividends 
received by German corporate shareholders from their minority stakes in other corporations. 
Furthermore, I cannot identify potential confounding events, which could affect my analyses. 
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Therefore, I can exploit this exogenous shock to examine the effects of changes in dividend 
taxation on the payout policy of firms and the minority stakes of their corporate shareholders.  
2.3 Empirical predictions 
2.3.1 Dividend taxation and dividend policy  
Theory suggests that dividend taxes have a large effect on a firm’s payout policy (e.g., Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961; Poterba and Summers, 1985; Auerbach, 2002; Poterba, 2004; Chetty 
and Saez, 2010). Previous empirical studies, which predominantly examined the US dividend 
tax cut in 2003, confirm this theoretical prediction by providing empirical evidence on the 
effect of dividend taxes on the payouts of listed and unlisted firms (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 
2005; Blouin et al., 2011; Hanlon and Hoopes, 2014; Yagan, 2015). However, some studies 
question the economic relevance of dividend taxes on payouts. For example, Brav et al. (2008) 
find a larger increase in repurchases compared to dividends after the US dividend tax cut in 
2003, although the tax rate on qualified dividends was reduced to the long-term capital gains 
tax rate. In addition, the economic magnitude of the payout response in dollar terms seems to 
be small for unlisted firms (Yagan, 2015). Due to the rather mixed results, shareholder taxes 
do not appear to be a first-order determinant of firms’ payout policies (DeAngelo et al., 2008; 
Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  
Recent empirical studies provide evidence that frictions, such as agency issues and shareholder 
conflicts, are a possible explanation for the weak dividend tax responsiveness. Jacob and 
Michaely (2017) find that heterogeneity in owners’ tax preferences and conflicts between 
owners and managers mute the effect of dividend taxes on payouts. Berzins et al. (2019) show 
that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders also have a mitigating 
effect on the dividend tax responsiveness. In addition, Pérez-González (2002) provides 
evidence that the response of listed firms to dividend tax changes is much stronger when large 
shareholders are affected by the reform because, as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) note, large 
shareholders may have sufficient controlling rights to influence the firm’s decision. 
I supplement this field of research in my first hypothesis. Since the German dividend tax 
reform impacts only corporate shareholders owning minority stakes, I can examine whether a 
firm’s payout policy is affected by a change in the taxation of dividends received by a group 
of shareholders that does not have sufficient voting power to influence the payout decision. In 
line with prior literature, I state my first hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms with a corporate shareholder owning a minority stake do not alter their 
payouts after the dividend tax reform in 2013. 
2.3.2 Dividend taxation and shareholder response 
According to the theoretical and empirical literature, dividend policies and shareholder 
portfolio choices are simultaneous decisions (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Allen et al., 2000). 
Especially in the finance literature, shareholders with different tax preferences present tax 
clienteles that favour different dividend policies (e.g., Graham, 2003). Dhaliwal et al. (1999) 
document that institutional holdings increase when firms initiate dividends because dividends 
are, in general, tax-disadvantaged for individual investors compared with institutional 
investors. Desai and Jin (2011) report that “dividend-averse” institutions are significantly less 
likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. Using the US dividend tax cut in 
2003, Desai and Dharmapala (2011) document based on country-level data that U.S. equity 
investments shifted from foreign countries, where companies did not qualify for lower 
dividend tax rates, to foreign countries, where companies did qualify for lower dividend tax 
rates. Blouin et al. (2011) find for the same tax reform that firms increased their dividend 
payouts. However, insiders such as directors and officers are the only individual investors who 
appear to have rebalanced their portfolio in order to increase their dividend income.   
The German dividend tax reform increased the taxation of dividends received by corporate 
shareholders from their minority stakes. According to the tax clientele theory, corporate 
shareholders affected by an increase in dividend taxes should rebalance their portfolios, to 
maximise their after-tax returns, by switching to non-dividend-paying firms if dividend-
paying firms do not adjust their dividend payouts and if capital gains taxes are smaller than 
dividend taxes (Dhaliwal et al., 1999). After the German reform, dividends received by 
corporate shareholders from their minority stakes were taxed at around 30%, while capital 
gains remained 95% tax-exempt, resulting in a total tax burden of only 1.5% (see Section 2.2). 
Although this large difference in the dividends and capital gains tax burden should have 
incentivised corporate shareholders with minority stakes to rebalance their portfolios, 
Eberhardt et al. (2019) document that the free float of those German shareholders in German 
listed corporations remained almost constant, despite the tax reform in 2013. The authors 
assume that the treated shareholders of listed firms did not react to the dividend tax reform 
because the positive performance of the German stock market index outweighed the additional 
tax burden.  
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However, the focus of my study is on the reaction of private firms and their shareholders to 
the dividend tax reform. In this setting, shareholders face additional transaction costs and 
restrictions because private firms do not act on liquid markets such as a stock market (e.g., 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). In addition, private companies are typically closely held, 
which means they are characterised by a small number of owners. Thus, if corporate 
shareholders want to sell their minority stake, the existing owners of the company are, in 
general, the only group of potential buyers for their minority stakes. Because of this situation, 
prior studies that examined the effect of dividend tax reforms on the payout decision of private 
firms identified stable ownership structures over time (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins 
et al., 2018). However, I expect that a large dividend tax increase for one particular group of 
shareholders, that cannot influence the firm’s dividend payout decisions, essentially 
incentivises these shareholders to rebalance their portfolios. 
Thus, corporate shareholders could decrease their dividend taxes payable by reducing their 
minority stakes or avoid the higher dividend tax burden by increasing their ownership stake 
above the threshold of 10%. However, an increase in the ownership stake is very unlikely for 
two reasons. First, corporate shareholders owning a stake of less than 10% would have to buy 
an additional 10% stake in the corporation in order to benefit from the 95% tax exemption in 
2013, which would represent, for example, a threefold increase of their shareholding if they 
owned a 5% stake prior to the reform. Second, since closely held firms only have a small 
number of owners, it is unlikely that minority shareholders can buy stakes from other 
shareholders, which would in effect reduce the latter shareholders’ voting power in the firm. 
Therefore, I state my second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate shareholders decrease their minority stakes in firms after the 
dividend tax reform in 2013. 
In addition to this hypothesis, I formulate four cross-sectional predictions based on firm- and 
shareholder-level characteristics to investigate the intensity of the responsiveness of corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes to the dividend tax reform. First, since minority shareholders 
do not have the voting rights to influence important firm decisions, they are predominantly 
interested in dividends as cash flow, resulting from their investment in a firm (e.g., Rozeff, 
1982; Jensen, 1986). However, an increase in dividend taxes reduces the after-tax cash flow 
from dividends. Therefore, I make the cross-sectional prediction that the response of corporate 
shareholders is larger if they own minority stakes in firms with a high dividend payout.  
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Second, I expect that a firm’s ownership structure can influence the behaviour of corporate 
shareholders owning minority stakes. Since private corporations are characterised by a small 
number of owners, conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are an important 
agency issue (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; De Cesari, 2012; Berzins 
et al., 2018). A majority shareholder can in principle solely decide about the payout policy and 
capture private benefits16, but has to share potential capital gains, e.g., from an increase in the 
firm value and dividends, proportionally with minority shareholders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). In contrast, this 
potential agency problem will not occur if the firm does not have a majority shareholder. 
Previous literature shows that the dilution of power is an appropriate instrument to reduce 
conflicts between majority and minority shareholders (e.g., Pagano and Roell, 1998; Gomes 
and Novaes, 2005; Nagar et al., 2011). By diluting the power, single shareholders are restricted 
to take actions that yield them private benefits and might come at the expense of other 
shareholders (e.g., Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Faccio et al., 2001). I thus posit in my 
second cross-sectional prediction that the dividend tax response of corporate shareholders is 
larger if they own minority stakes in firms with a majority shareholder. 
Third, the affiliation of the firm and treated corporate shareholder to the same group17 can be 
another characteristic affecting the dividend tax responsiveness. On the one hand, a group can 
employ tax-planning strategies to avoid the dividend tax burden at the corporate shareholder 
level, e.g., via debt-financing, transfer pricing, licensing and the appropriation of profits and 
losses (e.g., Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Buettner and Wamser, 2013; Rünger, 2019; Amiram 
et al., 2019).18 Under this scenario, I do not expect a change in the corporate shareholder’s 
minority stake. On the other hand, the group could adjust the ownership structure with lower 
transaction costs because the internal purchase and sale of holdings are more efficient than 
external trades on illiquid markets. Since the prediction is ambiguous, the cross-sectional 
reaction of corporate shareholders with minority stakes should be tested empirically. 
Finally, characteristics of corporate shareholders with minority stakes might also affect their 
responsiveness to changes in dividend taxes. Minority shareholders may especially be reliant 
on dividends as cash flow from their equity investment in a company if they are cash-
                                                 
16 Examples and discussions regarding the incentive of large shareholders to capture private benefits can be found 
in, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (2000), and Nagar et al. (2011).  
17 A firm and corporate shareholder belong to the same group if they have the same global ultimate owner. I 
define the “same global ultimate owner” as the ultimate parent company that owns directly or indirectly more 
than 50% of the shares in the firm and the corporate shareholder. 
18 For an overview of important studies over the past decade, see Wilde and Wilson (2018), and Dharmapala 
(2014).  
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constrained (e.g., Altman, 1968). To serve their financial needs, it is plausible to expect that 
after the dividend tax increase corporate shareholders sell their minority stakes to receive 
capital gains, which are almost tax-exempt (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Hence, I 
predict as my fourth cross-sectional prediction that the reduction of minority stakes after the 
dividend tax increase is larger for financially distressed corporate shareholders. 
2.4 Research design and data 
2.4.1 Estimation strategy 
To test my empirical predictions, I apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation method. 
The application of the DiD approach requires the determination of a treatment and control 
group. Since the dividend tax reform applies only to German corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes, my treatment group consists of German corporate shareholders that held a 
stake of less than 10% in a German corporation during the pre-reform period (2010-2012). My 
control group includes German corporate shareholders that owned a stake of at least 10% but 
less than 20% in a German corporation during the same pre-reform period (2010-2012).  
This control group has several advantages. First, shareholders from the control group as well 
as shareholders from the treatment group cannot take part in the decision-making process of a 
firm or build a blocking minority, for which, in general, an ownership stake of at least 25% 
would be necessary. Second, since both shareholder groups are generally excluded from a 
firm’s decision-making process, they should have similar incentives to invest in a firm, e.g., 
receiving cash flow or following strategic interests. Third, shareholders from the treatment as 
well as shareholders from the control group are German corporations. Thus, different country-
specific factors (e.g., cultural differences of shareholders regarding their portfolio decisions) 
do not drive my results. Fourth, the dividend tax reform did not capture German corporate 
shareholders that own a stake of at least 10% but less than 20% in a German corporation, hence 
my control group should not be affected by the dividend tax reform.  
To test the effect of the dividend tax reform on firms’ payout decisions (Hypothesis 1), I 
estimate the following DiD model: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡  = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑗,𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable Payout of corporation j at the end of year t is defined as profit/loss 
after tax net of changes in other equity relative to prior year’s total assets (following Bethmann 
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et al., 2018). My sample captures the period from 2010 to 2015.19 I use this relatively narrow 
sample period to reduce the likelihood that other events unrelated to the dividend tax reform 
affect firms’ payout policy. I exploit the dividend tax reform, which was passed in March 2013 
and is retroactively effective from the beginning of 2013, as an exogenous event. Therefore, 
Post equals 1 for 2013-2015 and 0 for 2010-2012.  
The indicator variable Treatment distinguishes between observations belonging to the 
treatment and control group, respectively. Treatment equals 1 for firms with at least one 
corporate shareholder that owned a stake of less than 10% in the pre-reform period, and 0 for 
firms with at least one corporate shareholder that owned a stake of at least 10% but less than 
20% in the pre-reform period (2010-2012). I exclude firms that are part of the treatment and 
control group, i.e., firms with at least one corporate shareholder owning a minority stake and 
one corporate shareholder with an ownership stake of at least 10% but less than 20%, to avoid 
identification issues in my DiD approach. In line with my prediction, I expect an insignificant 
estimate of my DiD coefficient (Post x Treatment). 
I estimate Eq. (1) using OLS regression and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). Following recent literature, I control for firm-level 
characteristics that capture the firm value and the ability to pay dividends (e.g., Blouin et al., 
2011; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). I include total assets (Size) because size can be a proxy for 
firm value. Leverage and Cash control for the capital structure and internal funds, which 
influence the payout decision. In addition, I include firm and year fixed effects to control for 
general time trends in payouts and time-invariant unobservable differences in firm 
characteristics.  
To test the effect of the dividend tax reform on the minority stake of corporate shareholders 
(Hypothesis 2), I base my analyses on firm-shareholder-level observations. This detailed 
observation level is appropriate to investigate the effect of the dividend tax reform on a single 
corporate shareholder’s decision to invest in minority stakes, as I can track the decision of a 
specific corporate shareholder i to invest in the ownership stake of a specific corporation j over 
time. By using these detailed firm-shareholder-year observations, I estimate the following 
baseline DiD model:  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 
+ 𝛾𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
(2) 
                                                 
19 If variables are constructed using prior year’s values, I include data from 2009 to calculate variables in 2010. 
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The dependent variable Shareholdings is defined as the ownership stake of the corporate 
shareholder i in the corporation j at the end of year t. Again, my sample captures the narrow 
period from 2010 to 2015, to reduce the likelihood that other events unrelated to the dividend 
tax reform affect corporate shareholders’ ownership stakes. Post equals 1 for 2013-2015 and 
0 for 2010-2012. The indicator variable Treatment equals 1 if the corporate shareholder i 
owned a minority stake in the corporation j in the pre-reform period, and 0 if the corporate 
shareholder i owned a stake of at least 10% but less than 20% in the corporation j in the pre-
reform period (2010-2012). In line with my prediction, I expect a negative and significant 
estimate of my DiD coefficient (Post x Treatment).  
I estimate Eq. (2) using OLS regression and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm-shareholder level (Petersen, 2009). I include the same firm controls as described 
for Eq. (1). In addition, I control for shareholder characteristics to capture the ability of 
shareholder i to invest in stakes of corporation j (e.g., Blouin et al., 2011; Jacob and Michaely, 
2017). Since firms and shareholders are corporations in my sample, I control for the same 
variables on the firm and shareholder level. I include shareholders’ total assets (Size) because 
size can be a proxy for investment opportunities. Shareholders’ Leverage and Cash control for 
the capital structure and internal funds, which affect shareholders’ investments in stakes. 
Finally, to control for general time trends in ownership stakes and time-invariant unobservable 
differences in firm-shareholder characteristics, I use firm-shareholder and year fixed effects.   
The applied DiD approach may raise general concerns. First, the validity of the DiD analyses 
is based on the assumption that the reform was not anticipated by corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes. Although German policymakers were obliged to change the taxation of intra-
corporate dividends after the ECJ decision at the end of 2011, the German legislative bodies 
discussed each of the two possible options extensively and could finally agree on one option 
in February 2013 (see Section 2.2). Thus, the anticipation of a dividend tax increase seems 
very unlikely because of the differing opinions of the German legislative bodies. To mitigate 
this concern even further, I check the parallel trend assumption of my DiD analyses by 
providing yearly treatment effects and conduct placebo tests (see Section 2.4.3 and 2.6.3).  
Second, shareholders in my control group could be indirectly affected by the dividend tax 
reform for two reasons. On the one hand, they could potentially buy the minority stakes, which 
corporate shareholders want to sell after the dividend tax increase. On the other hand, the 
dividend tax increase could discourage them from reducing their ownership stakes to less than 
10% in the future. However, I mitigate these concerns about my control group by providing 
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evidence that: (i) shareholders from the control group do not buy the minority stakes, (ii) 
shareholders do not seem to adjust their ownership stakes regularly, and (iii) my results are 
robust when re-estimating my baseline regressions (Eq. (1) and (2)) with an alternative control 
group of foreign corporate shareholders owning minority stakes in German corporations (see 
Section 2.6.1 and Appendix 2.C (Appendix)).  
2.4.2 Data and sample overview 
The primary data source used in this study is the Amadeus database, provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. Amadeus contains accounting statements (e.g., balance sheets and income statements) 
for private firms in Europe. Table 2.D1 (Appendix) outlines the sample selection process. I 
restrict the sample to active German corporations that were established before the year 2007 
in order to exclude start-up companies.20 Furthermore, I focus on corporations that are not 
stand-alone21 and have current financial data. After restricting my data further to firms with 
unconsolidated German-GAAP financial data, I exclude all types of partnerships that the 
Amadeus database wrongly identified as corporations, to ensure that my sample includes only 
companies, which determine and tax their profits according to the German Corporate Income 
Tax Act.22  
After selecting the firms, I hand-collect data on ownership structures from the Amadeus 
database and the commercial register entries for each corporation.23 Recent empirical studies 
exploit static ownership structures, which depend on the latest database updates (e.g., 
Michaely and Roberts, 2011) or the date of the survey (e.g., Nagar et al., 2011). Data on 
comprehensive and detailed ownership structures are rare (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017). 
The hand-collected data allow me to observe dynamic ownership structures for every year of 
my sample so that I can precisely observe changes in the ownership structure and hence the 
reaction of corporate shareholders with minority stakes to the dividend tax reform. 
To be part of my sample, the previously selected German corporations had to have at least one 
German corporate shareholder with a directly held ownership stake of less than 20% during 
                                                 
20 The overall data collection process lasted from the mid of 2018 until the mid of 2019. 
21 The corporation has a corporate global ultimate owner in the EU. This characteristic allows me to employ my 
third cross-sectional test. I restrict my sample to global ultimate owners, which are resident in the EU because 
EU regulations and the common market support the comparability between my observations. 
22 In addition, I verify whether my sample includes tax group structures as then a minority shareholder receives 
a compensation payment instead of dividends. To mitigate this issue, I check all corporations with a profit of 
zero, which can be an indicator for a profit transfer agreement and hence a tax group (Oestreicher and Koch, 
2010). However, my sample does not include potential tax group structures. 
23 The Amadeus database only provides the most recent ownership structure. However, the download of the 
ownership history per company is possible but requires a single export per company.  
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the years 2010 until 2012 (pre-reform).24 I exclude observations with missing ownership 
stakes. To avoid confounding events and reactions, I check for restructuring processes25 (e.g., 
mergers and takeovers) during the sample period, as well as potential bankruptcies by 
requiring that firms and shareholders were active for three years after the sample period ends 
(from 2016 to 2018). In addition, I exclude corporate shareholders that are non-profit 
corporations, public institutions, banks, holding and insurance companies because the 
dividend tax reform did not apply to them. Further, I also exclude firms and shareholders that 
are listed on a stock exchange to ensure that all of the firms and shareholders operate on illiquid 
markets. Finally, I check for indirect ownership stakes of shareholders and exclude 
shareholders with a total ownership stake above 20% to enhance the comparability between 
shareholders from the treatment and the control group and hence avoid any misspecifications 
in my identification strategy.   
The final sample comprises 4,074 firm-shareholder-year observations for the years 2010 to 
2015. Table 2.2 provides information about the sample distribution. The 4,074 firm-
shareholder-year observations comprise 2,970 treated observations and 1,104 observations 
from the control group (Panel A). Panel B reveals that my sample consists of 495 observations 
from the treatment group and 184 observations from the control group per year. In Panel C, I 
provide the sample distribution of firm-shareholder-year observations per firm-level and 
shareholder-level industry. Panel C shows that industries are, in general, evenly distributed 
between not only firms and shareholders but also between the treated and control observations.  
  
                                                 
24 I employ a rather restrictive identification strategy to ensure that shareholders from the treatment and control 
group are comparable and do not only follow short-term investment incentives. However, I test the robustness of 
the results for my two hypotheses by employing an identification strategy, which requires that the German 
corporations had at least one German corporate shareholder with a directly held ownership stake of less than 20% 
in 2012 (the year before the reform). I use the less restrictive sample over a period from 2012-2015 and re-
estimate my two baseline DiD regressions (Eq. (1) and (2)). The results are fully consistent with my main 
findings, indicating that my restrictive identification strategy does not affect my results (see Table 2.D2 
(Appendix)).  
25 I check for restructuring processes by using the database Northdata, which provides company information on 
German firms. 
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Table 2.2: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample distribution  
  Number of firm-shareholder- 
year observations 
 Number of 
firms 
 Number of 
shareholders 
Treatment group  2,970   311  360 
      
Control group  1,104   159  136 
      
Total  4,074   470  496 
Panel B: Sample distribution of firm-shareholder observations per year  
  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Total  
Treatment group  495  495  495  495  495  495  2,970  
                
Control group  184  184  184  184  184  184  1,104  
                
Total  679  679  679  679  679  679  4,074  
Panel C: Sample distribution of firm-shareholder-year observations per industry 
 Firm industry  Shareholder industry 
 Treated Control  Treated Control 
 Obs. % Obs. %  Obs. % Obs. % 
1) Agriculture, forestry, fishing 78 2.63 24 2.17  168 7.45 36 4.17 
2) Mining, quarrying 0 0.00 24 2.17  12 0.53 18 2.08 
3) Manufacturing 390 13.13 144 13.04  180 7.98 90 10.42 
4) Electricity, gas, steam  156 5.25 102 9.24  180 7.98 66 7.64 
5) Water, waste management, sewerage 108 3.64 36 3.26  66 2.93 12 1.39 
6) Construction 72 2.42 30 2.72  108 4.79 18 2.08 
7) Wholesale, retail, repair of vehicles 306 10.30 120 10.87  204 9.04 84 9.72 
8) Transporting, storage 174 5.86 54 4.89  84 3.72 48 5.56 
9) Accommodation, food service 42 1.41 0 0.00  0 0.00 0 0.00 
10) Information, communication 246 8.28 120 10.87  48 2.13 54 6.25 
11) Finance, insurance 84 2.83 30 2.72  0 0.00 0 0.00 
12) Real estate activities 324 10.91 84 7.61  384 17.02 24 2.78 
13) Professional, technical activities 588 19.80 144 13.04  642 28.46 282 32.64 
14) Administrative, support service 222 7.47 72 6.52  114 5.05 102 11.81 
15) Education 12 0.40 24 2.17  0 0.00 0 0.00 
16) Healthcare, social work 36 1.21 12 1.09  18 0.80 18 2.08 
17) Arts, entertainment 30 1.01 30 2.72  0 0.00 6 0.69 
18) Other services activities 102 3.43 54 4.89  48 2.13 6 0.69 
Total 2,970 100 1,104 100  2,256 100 864 100 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample distribution (Panel A), which is divided into the sample 
distribution of firm-shareholder observations per year (Panel B) and the sample distribution of firm-shareholder-
year observations per industry (Panel C). The industry classification in Panel C is based on NACE codes. While 
the total number of firm industry observations in Panel C is 4,074, the number of shareholder industry 
observations is 3,120 because I do not observe the NACE code for every shareholder in my sample.     
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Table 2.3: Sample statistics 
Panel A: Firm-shareholder observations     
Sample: 2010-2015 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group 
Shareholdings 2,970 3.51 2.76 1.00 3.06 5.50 
Size 2,643 8.90 2.07 7.64 8.68 10.10 
Cash 2,643 0.20 0.25 0.01 0.09 0.34 
Leverage 2,643 0.41 0.95 0.11 0.29 0.52 
Size_SH 1,480 10.07 2.73 7.93 9.93 11.82 
Cash_SH 1,480 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.12 
Leverage_SH 1,480 0.41 0.84 0.13 0.33 0.57 
       
Control group 
Shareholdings 1,104 12.95 3.07 10.00 12.50 15.00 
Size 988 8.54 2.16 7.10 8.60 9.61 
Cash 988 0.17 0.23 0.01 0.06 0.25 
Leverage 988 0.42 0.46 0.16 0.34 0.59 
Size_SH 523 9.90 2.87 7.58 9.38 11.73 
Cash_SH 523 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.15 
Leverage_SH 523 0.32 0.28 0.09 0.24 0.48 
Panel B: Firm-level observations 
Sample: 2010-2015 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group       
Av_SH 1,532 3.80 2.74 1.00 4.34 5.68 
Size 1,532 9.03 2.24 7.54 9.00 10.36 
Cash 1,532 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.04 0.18 
Leverage 1,532 0.46 1.22 0.11 0.29 0.58 
Payout 761 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.07 
Own holdings 1,532 0.57 3.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large_SH 1,532 82.12 20.53 69.90 94.00 95.00 
Number of owners 1,532 4.46 6.88 2.00 2.00 4.00 
       
Control group       
Av_SH 736 13.07 3.11 10.00 12.50 15.00 
Size 736 8.33 2.21 6.86 8.35 9.32 
Cash 736 0.18 0.23 0.01 0.06 0.26 
Leverage 736 0.42 0.50 0.14 0.34 0.59 
Payout 347 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.10 
Own holdings 736 0.29 2.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large_SH 736 68.01 19.84 51.42 74.95 85.00 
Number of owners 736 3.63 2.26 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the period 2010-2015 for different samples: Panel A is based 
on firm-shareholder-year-level observations, and Panel B is based on firm-year-level observations. All variables 
are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). 
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics separately for treatment and control group observations 
based on firm-shareholder-level (Panel A) and firm-level data (Panel B).26 Table 2.D3 
                                                 
26 Since my final sample with controls is not balanced due to missing data, I test the robustness of the results for 
my two hypotheses if I force the sample to be balanced. I use the balanced sample to re-estimate my two baseline 
DiD regressions (Eq. (1) and (2)). The results are fully consistent with my main findings, indicating that missing 
observations do not affect my results (see Table 2.D4 (Appendix)).   
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(Appendix) lists detailed variable definitions. The results of the summary statistics in Table 
2.3 show that corporate shareholders have on average a minority stake of 3.51% in a German 
corporation and that corporate shareholders from the control group own on average a stake of 
12.95% in a German corporation. This implies that shareholders from the control group do not 
own sufficient shares to be involved in the firm’s decision-making process and as a result, are 
comparable to treated corporate shareholders. With regard to the firm and shareholder control 
variables, observations from the treatment and control group are very similar in terms of size, 
cash and leverage.   
2.4.3 Parallel trends 
One crucial assumption of my identification approach using DiD analyses is the parallel trend 
in my treatment and control group. I test for the parallel trends of my two main dependent 
variables by estimating a version of my baseline models (Eq. (1) and (2)), in which I replace 
the DiD indicator (Post x Treatment) with a series of five separate DiD indicator variables, 
each marking one year over the period between 2010 and 2015. I omit the indicator for the 
year 2012 because this year serves as the benchmark. The purpose of these tests is to check 
whether my dependent variables are trending and to observe whether the differences in the 
outcome variables between the treated and control group are significant in the pre-reform 
period. Since the parallel trend assumption requires that my dependent variables remain 
parallel between both groups, I expect the point-estimates in the pre-reform period to be 
insignificant.  
Figure 2.1 provides point-estimates and two-tailed 95% confidence intervals for my treated 
versus control observations when using Payout (Panel A) and Shareholdings (Panel B) as the 
dependent variable, respectively. The results suggest that the pre-reform treatment effects 
(2010-2012) are insignificant for each of the dependent variables. Overall, Figure 2.1 provides 
support for the parallel trends in my sample and supports my expectation that neither firms 
nor corporate shareholders were able to anticipate the inter-corporate dividend tax reform. In 
addition to the test of parallel trends in the pre-reform period, Figure 2.1 provides first insights 
into the post-reform effects (2013-2015). The treatment effects in Panel B are significantly 
negative, indicating that treated corporate shareholders reduce their ownership stakes relative 
to corporate shareholders from the control group. Panel A reveals that firms with at least one 
corporate shareholder owning a minority stake do not significantly change their payout relative 
to the firms in my control group. These first indications are further examined in the next 
section.  
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Figure 2.1: Parallel trends 
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Panel B  










Notes: This figure provides statistical evidence that pre-reform trends in payout (Panel A) and ownership stakes 
(Panel B) are similar, even though the dividend tax reform results in a significant decrease in the shareholdings 
of affected shareholders but does not significantly change the payout of affected firms. In Panel A, the point-
estimators are generated by estimating the following regression model: Payoutjt = β0 + β12010t x Treatmentj + 
β22011t x Treatmentj + β32013t x Treatmentj + β42014t x Treatmentj + β52015t x Treatmentj + 𝛿Firm_Controlsjt + 
αj + εjt (Eq. (1)). In Panel B, the point-estimators are generated by estimating the following regression model: 
Shareholdingsijt = β0 + β12010t x Treatmentij + β22011t x Treatmentij + β32013t x Treatmentij + β42014t x 
Treatmentij + β52015t x Treatmentij + 𝛿Firm_Controlsjt + 𝛾Shareholder_Controlsit + αij + εijt (Eq. (2)). Since I 
omit the DiD indicator for the year 2012 in both regression models, this year serves as the benchmark year. The 
solid points indicate point-estimates and the lines represent 95% confidence intervals.    
2.5 Main results 
2.5.1 Dividend payout  
In my first set of analyses, I examine whether firms with at least one corporate shareholder 
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Hypothesis 1 using my DiD approach based on firm-level data (Eq. (1)). Since I do not have 
data on dividends (and repurchases), I use a Payout proxy, which is defined as profit/loss after 
tax net of changes in other equity scaled by the prior year’s total assets (see Bethmann et al., 
2018). Panel A of Table 2.4 reports OLS regression results for my baseline model. I estimate 
two specifications: DiD model with fixed effects but without controls (Column 1), and a fully 
specified DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2 as defined in Eq. (1)).  
Table 2.4: Effect of dividend taxation on payout 
Panel A: Payout 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Payout 
Post x Treatment -0.00370  -0.00148 
 (0.0124)  (0.0119) 
Size   -0.0303** 
   (0.0143) 
Cash   -0.0323 
   (0.0851) 
Leverage   0.00337 
   (0.00710) 
Firm controls None  Included 
Firm FE Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.537  0.549 
N 1,108  1,036 
Panel B: Alternative dependent variables 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable: Payout1  Payout2  Own holdings 
Post x Treatment -0.0152  -0.00419  0.0643 
 (0.0450)  (0.0119)  (0.0980) 
Firm controls Included  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.268  0.546  0.906 
N 1,036  1,036  2,268 
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is Payout. Panel A reports two different specifications: (1) regression 
with fixed effects but without firm controls, and (2) regression with fixed effects and firm controls. The dependent 
variable in Panel B is Payout1 in Column 1, Payout2 in Column 2, and Own holdings in Column 3. Panel B 
reports regressions with fixed effects and firm controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models 
of both panels is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The 
interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firms in the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 
otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that 
are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and 
*** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
Overall, the findings in Panel A of Table 2.4 provide the following insights. First, the estimated 
average treatment effect is (as predicted) insignificant for both specifications. Second, the 
magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are very small and close to zero. Third, the p-values 
are extremely high (p-value of 0.766 and 0.901 in Column 1 and 2, respectively). All three 
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findings indicate that, on average, the payouts of firms with corporate shareholders owning 
minority stakes do not change after the dividend tax reform relative to the payout of firms with 
corporate shareholders that own a stake of at least 10% but less than 20% in the pre-reform 
period. These results confirm my first hypothesis and are consistent with my prediction that a 
dividend tax increase, which affects a particular group of shareholders without sufficient 
voting power, does not influence a firm’s payout decision.27, 28 
Next, I test the robustness of my results by using alternative dependent variables. Since my 
dependent variable can only approximate dividend payouts but does not allow for a separation 
between dividends and repurchases due to data limitations in the Amadeus database, I employ 
three alternative dependent variables to test the robustness of my proxy and to mitigate any 
concern that repurchases might affect my results. First, I calculate Payout1 as profit/loss after 
tax net of the change in other equity scaled by the sum of profit/loss after tax and the prior 
year’s other equity (Oestreicher et al., 2014). Second, I define Payout2 as profit/loss after tax 
net of the change in total equity scaled by the prior year’s total assets (Bethmann et al., 2018). 
Third, I employ Own holdings as a dependent variable to approximate repurchases, which are 
not affected by the dividend tax reform. If firms do not replace dividend payments with 
repurchases after the dividend tax reform, I expect the average treatment effect to be 
insignificant.  
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports the results from OLS regressions with my three alternative 
dependent variables: Payout1 (Column 1), Payout2 (Column 2), and Own holdings (Column 
3). Overall, the results reveal that the estimated average treatment effect is insignificant across 
all specifications, which is consistent with the results in Panel A of Table 2.4. The robustness 
checks suggest that my payout proxy is robust to alternative variable definitions. In addition, 
own holdings are not significantly affected by the dividend tax reform, indicating that firms 
do not predominantly replace dividends with repurchases.  
2.5.2 Corporate shareholder’s minority stake  
In the next step, I examine whether corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes after 
the dividend tax reform. I test Hypothesis 2 by using my DiD approach based on firm-
shareholder-level data (Eq. (2)). Panel A of Table 2.5 reports OLS regression results for my 
                                                 
27 This result should be interpreted carefully because an insignificant result only means that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. It does not mean that the null hypothesis is confirmed. However, my results show very small 
coefficients of around zero and very high p-values, which suggest a small type 2 error. 
28 I discuss alternative explanations for my results in Appendix 2.A (Appendix). 
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baseline model. I estimate three specifications: DiD model with fixed effects but without 
controls (Column 1), DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2), and a fully 
specified DiD model with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls (Column 3 as defined 
in Eq. (2)). 
Overall, the findings in Panel A of Table 2.5 provide the following insights. First, the estimated 
average treatment effect is (as predicted) negative and significant at conventional levels (p-
value < 0.01), which confirms my second hypothesis. Second, the statistical significance and 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates are similar across the three specifications, indicating 
that my results are robust against changes in the composition of the sample. Third, the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates is economically significant. Column 3 (Column 2) 
reveals that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stake in a German corporation by 
about 0.53 (0.7) percentage points relative to corporate shareholders in the control group. 
Given that the average minority stake of corporate shareholders in the pre-reform sample is 
about 3.89%, minority shareholdings of corporate shareholders decrease by 13.6% (18%).29 
To test the robustness of my results, I use alternative dependent variables based on firm-
shareholder-level and firm-level data, respectively, to mitigate any concern that the 
distribution of ownership stakes could influence my results. First, I replace the dependent 
variable Shareholdings with SH_change, which is defined as the change in the ownership stake 
scaled by the prior year’s ownership stake. Second, I conduct firm-level tests of my baseline 
model (Eq. (1)) and use Av_SH and Av_SH_change as dependent variables, respectively. 
Av_SH is the average stake of all German corporate shareholders that own a minority stake in 
a treated firm. If the firm belongs to the control group, Av_SH is the average ownership stake 
of all German corporate shareholders that own a stake of at least 10% but less than 20% in the 
control firm. Av_SH_change is then defined as the change in the average ownership stake 
scaled by the prior year’s average ownership stake.   
                                                 
29 Table 2.D5 (Appendix) contains descriptive statistics of the pre-reform sample.   
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Table 2.5: Effect of dividend taxation on corporate shareholders’ ownership stakes 
Panel A: Minority stakes of corporate shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.673*** -0.699*** -0.533*** 
 (0.123) (0.133) (0.135) 
Size  -0.295*** -0.324*** 
  (0.0992) (0.103) 
Cash  -0.128 0.443* 
  (0.263) (0.234) 
Leverage  0.0255 0.0150 
  (0.0409) (0.0401) 
Size_SH   0.304* 
   (0.167) 
Cash_SH   -0.413 
   (0.551) 
Leverage_SH   -0.122*** 
   (0.0157) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None Included 
Firm-shareholder FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.955 0.954 0.965 
N 4,074 3,631 2,003 
Panel B: Alternative specifications 
 Firm-shareholder-level tests  Firm-level tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: SH_change SH_change  Av_SH Av_SH_change 
Post x Treatment -0.114*** -0.100***  -0.810*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0351)  (0.166) (0.0142) 
Firm controls Included Included  Included Included 
Shareholder controls None Included  None None 
Firm FE None None  Included Included 
Firm-shareholder FE Included Included  None None 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.033 0.027  0.954 0.037 
N 3,563 1,976  2,268 2,226 
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is Shareholdings. Panel A reports three different specifications: (1) 
regression with fixed effects but without controls, (2) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (3) 
regression with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls. All regressions in Panel A are based on firm-
shareholder-level observations. The dependent variable in Panel B is SH_change in Column 1 and 2, Av_SH in 
Column 3, and Av_SH_change in Column 4. The regressions in Column 1 and 2 are based on firm-shareholder-
level observations and include (1) fixed effects and firm controls, and (2) fixed effects, firm and shareholder 
controls. The regressions in Column 3 and 4 are based on firm-level observations and include fixed effects and 
firm controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models of both panels is the interaction term Post 
x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. When conducting firm-level (firm-shareholder-level) 
tests, the interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firms (for firm-shareholder observations with 
treated corporate shareholders) in the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined 
in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the firm-shareholder level in Panel A and Column 1 and 2 of Panel B or at the firm level in Column 
3 and 4 of Panel B. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 
1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the results from OLS regressions based on firm-shareholder-level 
tests (Column 1 and 2) and firm-level tests (Column 3 and 4) with three alternative dependent 
variables: SH_change (Column 1 and 2), Av_SH (Column 3), and Av_SH_change (Column 4). 
Overall, the results reveal that the estimated average treatment effect is negative and 
significant across all specifications, which is consistent with my results in Panel A of Table 
2.5.30  
In a further robustness test, I address the concern that observable firm and shareholder 
characteristics can potentially vary before and after the reform and across the treatment and 
control group. I therefore estimate a fully interacted model with additional interactions for 
each control variable with the Post and the Treatment dummy, respectively. I test two 
specifications: DiD model with fixed effects, firm controls and additional interactions with 
firm controls, as well as a DiD model with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls, and 
additional interactions with firm and shareholder controls. The results are reported in Table 
2.D7 (Appendix).31 Again, the findings are fully consistent with my baseline estimates.  
In addition, I split my control group into two separate groups: (1) corporate shareholders with 
an ownership stake of at least 10% but less than 15% in another corporation in the pre-reform 
period, and (2) corporate shareholders with an ownership stake of at least 15% but less than 
20% in another corporation during the pre-reform period. I split the control group at the 
ownership stake of 15%, as this threshold affects the dividend tax burden (see Table 2.1). 
Results are reported in Table 2.D8 (Appendix). My findings are consistent with my baseline 
results, indicating that the difference in the dividend tax burden across both control groups 
does not affect my baseline results.  
Finally, I test the robustness of my results by using a simultaneous equations approach 
following Blouin et al. (2011). A simultaneous equations approach permits a joint estimation 
of firm and corporate shareholder responses to the dividend tax reform. This econometric 
approach addresses the potential identification problem that both corporate shareholders and 
firms can change their behaviour after a change in dividend taxes. Appendix 2.B provides the 
                                                 
30 To mitigate the concern that the average negative treatment effect is concentrated among corporate 
shareholders with small minority stakes, I re-estimate my OLS regression (Eq. (2)) with SH_change as the 
dependent variable and investigate whether the treatment effect varies with the average minority stake in the pre-
reform period (see Table 2.D6 (Appendix)). The results show that the coefficient estimates across all 
specifications are, in general, statistically significant, indicating that corporate shareholders with small and 
corporate shareholders with large minority stakes react to the dividend tax reform. However, shareholders with 
large minority stakes have a smaller treatment effect than shareholders with small minority stakes. The difference 
in coefficient estimates is statistically significant for the median and 75th percentile split. 
31 Table 2.D7 (Appendix) also reports the results for a fully interacted model of Eq. (1) with Payout as the 
dependent variable. The finding is fully consistent with my baseline result in Section 2.5.1. 
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empirical strategy of my simultaneous equations approach and reports the results. Consistent 
with my findings above, the results of the simultaneous equations approach suggest that 
corporate shareholders reduce their minority stake after the dividend tax increase while firms 
do not alter their payouts. 
In sum, the results from my two baseline analyses (Hypothesis 1 and 2 in Section 2.5.1 and 
2.5.2) reveal the following insights. First, firms do not change their payout if a dividend tax 
reform affects only a specific shareholder group without significant voting power. Second, 
corporate shareholders reduce their minority stake when they face an increase in dividend 
taxes.   
2.5.3 Heterogeneity in the dividend tax response of shareholders   
In addition to the two hypotheses, I examine the cross-sectional variation in the effect of the 
dividend tax increase on the response of corporate shareholders with minority stakes. Since I 
have data on firms, corporate shareholders and the direct ownership stake of the corporate 
shareholder in the firm, I can examine important characteristics on all three levels. In Section 
2.3.2, I identify the following four characteristics: the payout policy of the firm, the ownership 
stake of the firm’s largest shareholder, the group affiliation of the firm and the corporate 
shareholder with a minority stake, as well as the financial position of the corporate shareholder 
owning a minority stake.  
Table 2.6 reports the results of the four cross-sectional tests. I use my baseline DiD approaches 
(Eq. (1) and (2)) but interact binary conditional variables with the DiD estimator Post x 
Treatment in order to capture the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. I 
estimate DiD models with fixed effects and controls. 
Column 1 of Table 2.6 reports the result of my first cross-sectional test, distinguishing between 
firms with treated corporate shareholders that have a high and low payout in the pre-reform 
period. This regression aims at testing a firm-level characteristic (Eq. (1)). Therefore, I use the 
average ownership stake of treated shareholders or control shareholders in each firm as the 
dependent variable (Av_SH). I define high payout (low payout) as an indicator equal to 1 for 
treated firms with an average payout in the pre-reform period, which is above (below) the 
mean of treated firms’ payouts in the pre-reform period. Consistent with my prediction, I find 
that the treatment effect for firms with a high payout in the pre-reform period is significant 
and larger than the insignificant coefficient for firms with a low payout in the pre-reform 
period. The difference in coefficient estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
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 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable: Av_SH Av_SH  Shareholdings  Av_SH 
Post x Treatment x high payout -0.642***      
 (0.181)      
Post x Treatment x low payout 0.414      
 (0.435)      
Post x Treatment x maj_SH  -0.852***     
  (0.176)     
Post x Treatment x no maj_SH  -0.481***     
  (0.186)     
Post x Treatment x same GUO    -0.0788   
    (0.165)   
Post x Treatment x different GUO    -0.559***   
    (0.142)   
Post x Treatment x financial distress      -0.629*** 
      (0.190) 
Post x Treatment x no financial distress      -0.151 
      (0.167) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.025] [0.061]  [0.004]  [0.017] 
Firm controls Included Included  Included  None 
Shareholder controls None None  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None  None 
Shareholder FE None None  None  Included 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included  None 
Year FE Included Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.967 0.954  0.971  0.976 
N 1,574 2,268  1,752  1,216 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-level observations (Column 1 and 2), firm-
shareholder-level observations (Column 3), and shareholder-level observations (Column 4). The dependent 
variable is Av_SH in Column 1, 2 and 4, and Shareholdings in Column 3. Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high (low) payout equals 1 if the average payout proxy 
of a treated firm in the pre-reform period is above (below) the mean across all treated firms in the pre-reform 
period, (2) maj_SH (no maj_SH) equals 1 if the treated firm has a (no) majority shareholder in the year prior to 
the reform, (3) same (different) GUO equals 1 if the treated shareholder and firm have the same (a different) 
global ultimate owner, and (4) (no) financial distress equals 1 if the treated shareholder has an Altman z-score 
below (above) the 75th quartile in the year prior to the reform. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). 
All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in 
Column 1 and 2, firm-shareholder level in Column 3 or shareholder level in Column 4. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
Second, Column 2 of Table 2.6 reports the result of my second cross-sectional test. I 
distinguish between treated firms with a majority shareholder and treated firms without a 
majority shareholder prior to the reform. Since the regression once again aims at testing a firm-
level characteristic (Eq. (1)), I use the average ownership stake of treated shareholders or 
control shareholders in each firm as the dependent variable (Av_SH). I define maj_SH (no 
maj_SH) as an indicator variable equal to 1 for treated firms with (without) a majority 
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




shareholder in the year before the reform. Consistent with my prediction, the result shows a 
significant treatment effect for treated firms with a majority shareholder, which is larger 
compared to treated firms without a majority shareholder. The difference in coefficient 
estimates is statistically significant at a conventional level. The result suggests that potential 
shareholder conflicts between majority and minority shareholders increase the responsiveness 
of corporate shareholders with minority stakes to the dividend tax increase.          
Column 3 of Table 2.6 reports the result of my third cross-sectional test. I compare the 
dividend tax responsiveness of corporate shareholders that have the same global ultimate 
owner as the firm in which they own a minority stake with corporate shareholders that have a 
different global ultimate owner than the firm in which they own a minority stake. The 
regression is based on firm-shareholder-level observations to exploit every single firm and 
shareholder relation (see Eq. (2)). I define different GUO (same GUO) as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the treated corporate shareholder and the firm have a different (the same) global 
ultimate owner in the pre-reform period.32 The strong and significant result shows that 
corporate shareholders are more responsive to the dividend tax increase if they are not 
affiliated to the same group as the firm in which they own a minority stake. The difference in 
coefficient estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels. The result indicates that 
a group might employ tax-planning strategies to avoid the dividend tax burden at the minority 
shareholder level without adjusting the ownership structure. 
Finally, Column 4 of Table 2.6 reports the result of my fourth cross-sectional test, which 
compares the dividend tax responsiveness of financially distressed with non-financially 
distressed corporate shareholders owning minority stakes. This regression aims at testing a 
shareholder-level characteristic. I therefore use the corporate shareholder-specific average 
ownership stake of treated shareholdings and shareholdings from the control group as the 
dependent variable (Av_SH). I use Altman’s z-score for private firms as a proxy for financial 
distress (Altman, 2000).33 I define financial distress (no financial distress) as an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for corporate shareholders with an Altman z-score below (above) the 75th 
percentile of all treated shareholders in the year prior to the reform. The result is consistent 
with my prediction. I find evidence that financially constrained corporate shareholders have a 
                                                 
32 One drawback of this binary variable is that I only have information on the global ultimate owner based on the 
latest update in Amadeus. I therefore assume in this specification that the global ultimate owner is constant 
(Michaely and Roberts, 2011). I mitigate the concern that the global ultimate owner changed over time by 
controlling for restructuring processes (M&As) at the firm and shareholder level. 
33 Because I do not observe retained earnings in my data, I have to modify the original Altman’s z-score for 
private firms. This modification should not affect my results because I split the treatment sample according to 
the 75th percentile and not the critical value of 1.23, as suggested by Altman (2000).   
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strong and significantly larger response to the dividend tax increase compared to corporate 
shareholders in a better financial position. The difference in coefficient estimates is 
statistically significant at conventional levels.    
Overall, the results of my cross-sectional tests are consistent with my predictions, indicating 
that firm and shareholder characteristics as well as the relation between the shareholder and 
the firm affect the dividend tax responsiveness of shareholders. Besides firm-specific payout 
decisions and the financial position of the treated shareholder, the dividend tax response is 
also conditional upon potential agency issues and the affiliation of the treated shareholder and 
firm to the same group. The heterogeneity in the dividend tax response implies that different 
characteristics have to be considered to understand the reaction of shareholders.34   
2.6 Additional analyses  
2.6.1 Indirect effects of the dividend tax reform  
In this section, I examine the indirect effects of the dividend tax reform. Although corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes are directly affected by the increase in dividend taxes, other 
shareholders are indirectly affected for at least two reasons. First, other shareholders can buy 
the minority stake, which corporate shareholders want to sell after the dividend tax reform. 
Second, the dividend tax increase might prevent other German corporate shareholders from 
reducing their ownership stakes to less than 10% to avoid the higher dividend tax burden.   
Since my main results in Section 2.5.2 indicate that, on average, corporate shareholders reduce 
their minority stakes, it is still not clear who purchases the minority stakes. On the one hand, 
the firm itself could repurchase the minority stake from the corporate shareholder. 
Nevertheless, my analysis in Section 2.5.1 suggests that firms do not significantly increase 
their own holdings after the dividend tax increase. On the other hand, new or existing 
shareholders could also buy the minority stake from the corporate shareholder. However, since 
private firms do not have a market for their shares, new investors do not have an easily 
accessible way to purchase shares in a private firm (e.g., Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; 
Nagar et al., 2011). Therefore, I predict that the sale of minority stakes results, on average, in 
a decrease in the number of owners, indicating that new shareholders do not purchase the 
                                                 
34 In an additional test, I examine which of the characteristics prevail when shareholders completely sell their 
minority stakes instead of only reducing their stakes. Therefore, I restrict my treatment group to shareholders 
without a minority stake in at least one year of the post-reform period. I re-estimate the four cross-sectional tests 
with the restricted sample (see Table 2.D9 (Appendix)). My results show that corporate shareholders have a 
significantly larger response to the dividend tax reform if they have a minority stake in a firm with a majority 
shareholder and do not belong to the same group as the firm in which they own the minority stake.    
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minority stakes. In contrast, existing shareholders could purchase the minority stakes. 
However, since the number of owners in private firms is, in general, small and the power is 
concentrated by the controlling shareholder, I expect that the shareholder with the largest 
ownership stake, and hence the most voting rights and power, purchases the minority stake. 
I test my predictions by re-estimating my baseline firm-level regression (Eq. (1)) and employ 
#Owner (Column 1 and 2) and Large_SH (Column 3 and 4) as dependent variables. I define 
#Owner as the natural logarithm of the number of owners of a firm. Large_SH is the largest 
ownership stake that a shareholder owns in the firm. Table 2.7 reports the results from OLS 
regressions with two specifications: DiD model with fixed effects but without firm controls 
(Column 1 and 3), and DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2 and 4). The 
results in Table 2.7 provide two main insights. First, the number of owners decreases 
significantly (p-value < 0.01) after the dividend tax reform, indicating that new shareholders 
do not purchase the minority stakes and hence are not indirectly affected by the reform. 
Second, the ownership stake of the shareholder with the largest ownership stake in the pre-
reform period increases significantly (p-value < 0.05) after the dividend tax reform, indicating 
that corporate shareholders primarily sell their minority stakes to the shareholder with the 
largest ownership stake in the firm.         
Table 2.7: Indirect effects of the dividend tax reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: #Owner #Owner Large_SH Large_SH 
Post x Treatment -0.121*** -0.130*** 1.764** 1.823** 
 (0.0231) (0.0248) (0.735) (0.776) 
Firm controls None Included None Included 
Firm FE Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.910 0.909 0.925 0.925 
N 2,520 2,268 2,520 2,268 
Notes: The dependent variable is #Owner in Column 1 and 2, and Large_SH in Column 3 and 4. The table reports 
two different specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects but without controls (Column 1 and 3), and (2) 
regression with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2 and 4). All regressions are based on firm-level 
observations. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, 
capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firms in 
the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported 
values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
A potential concern of my DiD approach is that shareholders from the control group are 
indirectly affected by the reform because they could potentially buy the minority stakes and 
hence are not appropriate counterfactuals to my treated shareholders. However, the 
identification strategy for my firm-level tests prohibits that shareholders from the control 
group own a stake in the same firm as shareholders from the treatment group, which means 
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that a firm is not part of the treatment and the control group in my firm-level sample (see 
Section 2.4.1). Therefore, if corporate shareholders from the control group want to purchase 
the minority stakes, they would become new investors in the firm. However, the results in 
Table 2.7 suggest that new investors do not buy minority stakes and hence are not indirectly 
affected, which indicates that my control group contains appropriate counterfactuals in this 
context.            
In addition, my control group could also be indirectly affected by the reform as the dividend 
tax increase might prevent other German corporate shareholders from reducing their 
ownership stakes to less than 10%. However, prior studies show that the ownership structure 
of private firms is, in general, stable (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins et al., 2018). In 
Figure 2.2, I track the average ownership stakes of corporate shareholders with minority stakes 
(blue line) and corporate shareholders in the control group (red line) over time in order to 
verify whether the average ownership stakes of my control and treated shareholders are stable.  





















Notes: This figure provides graphic illustrations of pre- and post-reform trends in ownership stakes (in %). The 
figure plots the average ownership stake of corporate shareholders that own less than 10% (blue line) and 
corporate shareholders that own at least 10% but less than 20% of another corporation’s shares in the pre-reform 
period (red line). Ownership stake is the stake that a German corporate shareholder owns in another German 
corporation in year t. The dashed vertical line highlights the year prior to the reform.    
Figure 2.2 shows that prior to the reform, corporate shareholders’ minority stakes and non-
affected corporate shareholders’ ownership stakes are parallel and do not change over time. 
However, minority stakes of corporate shareholders drop after 2012 while the average 
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ownership stake of corporate shareholders from the control group remains at the same level. 
The almost constant average ownership stake of shareholders in my control group over time 
indicates that shareholders do not adjust their ownership stakes regularly.   
To further mitigate this concern, I use foreign corporate shareholders resident in the EU that 
owned a minority stake in a German corporation during the pre-reform period as an alternative 
control group. This control group has two main advantages. First, foreign corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes have the same small ownership stake (less than 10%) as 
treated shareholders. Second, since the dividend tax reform affects only German corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes, the German withholding tax burden of foreign corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes is not affected by the reform.35 In addition, after the dividend 
tax reform, German corporate shareholders with minority stakes are, in general, subject to the 
same German corporate tax burden on dividends compared to foreign corporate shareholders 
resident in the EU. However, a drawback of this control group is the missing comparability 
with German corporate shareholders based upon country-specific factors (e.g., cultural 
differences of shareholders regarding their portfolio decisions). I mitigate this concern by 
employing a thorough fixed effects structure and controlling for the dividend tax system in the 
shareholder’s country of residence. I re-estimate my baseline models (Eq. (1) and (2)) with 
my alternative control group. Appendix 2.C provides summary statistics and reports my 
results. The findings are fully consistent with my main results in Section 2.5, indicating that 
my DiD approach is valid.   
2.6.2 Matching 
My econometric approach could raise the concern that observations from the treatment and 
control group are not comparable because differences in observable characteristics in the pre-
reform period across treated and control observations could drive unobserved differences in 
                                                 
35 In addition, the ECJ decided that Germany contradicts EU law by comparing foreign corporate shareholders 
resident in the EU with German corporate shareholders both owning a minority stake (see Section 2.2), which 
supports the comparability of both groups. However, it should be noted that foreign corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes in German corporations were allowed to apply for a withholding tax refund after the ECJ decision 
at the end of 2011 until the German law was passed at the beginning of 2013. Despite this possibility, I do not 
expect that foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes reacted to the ECJ decision for the following 
reasons. First, the withholding tax refund for foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes was only a 
temporary possibility to achieve comparability with German corporate shareholders owning minority stakes until 
the German government changed the taxation of inter-corporate dividends. Second, my identification process 
requires that foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes made their decision to invest in a German 
corporation before the ECJ decision. Third, administrative burdens and compliance hurdles, e.g., extensive 
reporting requirements and lengthy processes, complicate the reimbursement of withholding taxes (e.g., Jacob 
and Todtenhaupt, 2020).       
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payout decisions and decisions to invest in shares. Although my DiD design already mitigates 
this concern by employing time-varying controls as well as firm or firm-shareholder and year 
fixed effects, I further re-estimate my baseline regressions (Section 2.4.1) based on an entropy-
balanced sample to ensure that treated and control observations are comparable in observable 
characteristics (e.g., Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). 
I apply the matching procedure by matching on all of the covariates included, i.e., firm and/or 
shareholder controls (Size, Cash and Leverage), in the year prior to the reform and set the 
balancing constraint to the first moment (i.e., the mean). The entropy balancing method is used 
to calculate weights, which I use to re-estimate my baseline regression models (Section 2.5.1 
and 2.5.2). Table 2.8 reports the results from re-estimating Eq. (1) and (2) using entropy 
balancing. First, I test two specifications for the firm-level tests with Payout as the dependent 
variable: DiD model with fixed effects but without controls (Column 1), and DiD model with 
fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2). Second, I test three specifications for the firm-
shareholder-level tests with Shareholdings as the dependent variable: DiD model with fixed 
effects but without controls (Column 3), DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls 
(Column 4), and DiD model with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls (Column 5).  
Table 2.8: Entropy balancing 
 Firm-level tests  Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Payout Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.00991 -0.00652  -0.535*** -0.482*** -0.470*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0130)  (0.161) (0.176) (0.177) 
Firm controls None Included  None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None  None None Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.534 0.540  0.976 0.977 0.977 
N 1,028 1,028  1,935 1,935 1,935 
Notes: This table reports regressions based on a matched sample. I employ entropy balancing matching. The 
dependent variable is Payout in Column 1 and 2, and Shareholdings in Column 3 to 5. The firm-level tests report 
two specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects but without firm controls, and (2) regression with fixed 
effects and firm controls. The firm-shareholder-level tests report three specifications: (3) regression with fixed 
effects but without controls, (4) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (5) regression with fixed 
effects, firm and shareholder controls. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models 
have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in Column 1 and 2 or firm-
shareholder level in Column 3 to 5. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate 
significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
The results for my firm-level tests with Payout as the dependent variable (Column 1 and 2) 
show insignificant treatment effects across the two specifications, which are in line with my 
baseline findings (Table 2.4). Column 3 to 5 show the results from my firm-shareholder-level 
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




tests with Shareholdings as the dependent variable. I find significant treatment effects with 
similar economic magnitudes across all three specifications (p-value < 0.01). The results are 
in line with my baseline findings (Table 2.5). Overall, the results in Table 2.8 do not suggest 
that observable differences across observations from the treatment and control group confound 
my baseline findings. In Table 2.D10 (Appendix), I re-estimate my cross-sectional tests (see 
Section 2.5.3) based on entropy balancing weights. The results are fully consistent with my 
findings in Table 2.6.   
2.6.3 Placebo tests 
To test the robustness of my results and challenge the validity of my exogenous shock 
empirically, I conduct placebo tests (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2016). My rather restrictive 
identification strategy requires that firms have at least one corporate shareholder with an 
ownership stake of less than 20% during the pre-reform period (2010-2012) (see Section 
2.4.2). Therefore, I can track whether the ownership stake changes in the pre-reform period 
(see Figure 2.1). However, my identification strategy does not account for corporate 
shareholders that could completely sell their stakes during the pre-reform period. To mitigate 
the concern that firms and corporate shareholders anticipated the dividend tax reform after the 
ECJ decision at the end of 2011, I extend my identification strategy and re-estimate my 
baseline regressions (Eq. (1) and (2)) for two restricted sample periods (2010-2011 and 2011-
2012). Thus, the placebo treatment date is defined as the year 2011 (2012) for the sample 
period 2010-2011 (2011-2012).  
For the placebo test with 2011 (2012) as the treatment year, I require that a firm has at least 
one corporate shareholder with an ownership stake of less than 20% in the year 2010 (2011). 
The less restrictive identification strategy results in 8 additional shareholders (equal to 16 firm-
shareholder observations) in the sample period from 2010 to 2011, and 6 additional 
shareholders (equal to 12 firm-shareholder observations) in the sample period from 2011 to 
2012. The purpose of the placebo tests with the less restrictive identification strategies is to 
examine whether my dependent variables reveal reactions before the actual treatment effect in 
2013. I expect the DiD coefficient estimates during the pre-reform period (2010-2012) to 
remain insignificant. 
The results of both placebo tests are reported in Panel A and B of Table 2.9. I test each of the 
placebo treatment dates with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 1 in Panel A and B) on 
the dependent variable Payout. In addition, I examine the effect of each placebo treatment date 
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with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2 in Panel A and B), and with fixed effects, firm 
and shareholder controls (Column 3 in Panel A and B) on the dependent variable 
Shareholdings. The results show that the placebo treatment effects are not statistically 
significant and therefore support the validity of my exogenous shock. Moreover, the results of 
the placebo tests complement my earlier analyses on the parallel trend assumption (see Section 
2.4.3 and Figure 2.1) and further indicate that the change in minority shareholdings of 
corporate shareholders in 2013 was not anticipated and could be attributed to the dividend tax 
reform.  
Table 2.9: Placebo analysis 
Panel A: Sample period 2010-2011 
 Firm-level 
test 
 Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings 
2011 x Treatment 0.00251  -0.0236 -0.00146 
 (0.0272)  (0.0396) (0.0305) 
Firm controls Included  Included Included 
Shareholder controls None  None Included 
Firm FE Included  None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None  Included Included 
Year FE Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.400  0.996 0.995 
N 330  1,236 722 
Panel B: Sample period 2011-2012 
 Firm-level 
test 
 Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings 
2012 x Treatment 0.0585  0.00703 -0.0334 
 (0.0384)  (0.0848) (0.0247) 
Firm controls Included  Included Included 
Shareholder controls None  None Included 
Firm FE Included  None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None  Included Included 
Year FE Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.276  0.989 0.998 
N 354  1,230 704 
Notes: This table reports placebo tests for two sample periods (2010-2011 and 2011-2012) in which I define a 
placebo treatment date as the year 2011 (Panel A) and 2012 (Panel B). The dependent variable is Payout in 
Column 1 of Panel A and B, and Shareholdings in Column 2 and 3 of Panel A and B. The firm-level test reports 
a regression with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 1 in Panel A and B). The firm-shareholder-level tests 
report two specifications: (2) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (3) regression with fixed effects, 
firm and shareholder controls. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in Column 1 of Panel A and B or 
at the firm-shareholder level in Column 2 and 3 of Panel A and B. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 
and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.   
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2.6.4 Alternative dividend tax responses of shareholders 
In this section, I discuss and examine two alternative responses of corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes to the dividend tax reform in 2013: (1) delayed response to the dividend tax 
increase, and (2) increase in ownership stakes after the dividend tax reform. First, I test for a 
delayed response of corporate shareholders with minority stakes. Since the new dividend tax 
regulation was passed very spontaneously on March 21, 2013, not all corporate shareholders 
with minority stakes might have reacted immediately to the tax reform for several reasons. On 
the one hand, treated minority shareholders have limited possibilities to adjust their ownership 
stakes immediately as private companies operate on illiquid markets. On the other hand, as 
many firms usually make decisions about their profit appropriation at the beginning of the year 
or in early springtime, this coincided with the new law in 2013, making it plausible that some 
treated shareholders had already received their dividends. Therefore, a reduction of minority 
stakes could not have resulted in lower dividends and hence lower dividend tax payments in 
2013. Given these reasons, corporate shareholders with minority stakes might have reacted at 
the end of 2013 or at the beginning of 2014. 
Table 2.10: Yearly treatment effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
2011 x Treatment 0.0431 -0.0240 -0.0257 
 (0.0562) (0.0454) (0.0416) 
2012 x Treatment 0.00226 -0.0406 -0.0388 
 (0.0688) (0.0570) (0.0448) 
2013 x Treatment -0.449*** -0.517*** -0.363*** 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.113) 
2014 x Treatment -0.750*** -0.831*** -0.742*** 
 (0.162) (0.173) (0.177) 
2015 x Treatment -0.774*** -0.824*** -0.584*** 
 (0.160) (0.171) (0.182) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None Included 
Firm-shareholder FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.955 0.954 0.964 
N 4,074 3,631 2,003 
Notes: The dependent variable is Shareholdings. I estimate the baseline model (Eq. (2)) for the entire sample 
period from 2010-2015, in which I replace the DiD indicator (Post x Treatment) with a series of five separate 
DiD indicator variables, each marking one year over the period between 2011 and 2015. I omit the indicator for 
the year 2010 (2010 x Treatment) because this year serves as the benchmark. I estimate the yearly treatment 
effects for three specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects and without controls, (2) regression with fixed 
effects and firm controls, and (3) regression with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls. All variables are 
defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust 
and clustered at the firm-shareholder level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) 
indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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I test this presumption by re-estimating my baseline regression of the corporate shareholder’s 
reaction to the dividend tax reform (Eq. (2)). However, I replace the DiD indicator (Post x 
Treatment) with a series of five indicator variables, each marking one year over the period 
from 2011 to 2015. I omit the indicator for the year 2010 (2010 x Treatment), which serves as 
a benchmark. Column 1 to 3 of Table 2.10 report the results for the yearly treatment effects 
with fixed effects but without controls (Column 1), with fixed effects and firm controls 
(Column 2), and with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls (Column 3). The results 
show a reduction in minority stakes of corporate shareholders in 2013 and 2014. However, the 
results do not suggest an additional decrease in minority stakes of corporate shareholders in 
2015. This finding is consistent with the graphic evidence in Figure 2.2. Overall, these results 
restrict my main results in Section 2.5.2 to a lower boundary.         
Second, although I predict that corporate shareholders reduce on average their minority stakes 
after the dividend tax reform, which my empirical results confirm (see Section 2.3.2 and 2.5.2), 
corporate shareholders with minority stakes could alternatively avoid the dividend tax burden 
by increasing their ownership stake above the threshold of 10%. However, this latter 
shareholder reaction is not very likely for several reasons. On the one hand, shareholders of 
private firms face restrictions when they want to increase their ownership stake because private 
firms only have a small number of owners and therefore a restrictive source of potential sellers 
of stakes, e.g., the average number of owners in my sample is four. If, however, large 
shareholders sell their shares to minority shareholders, they would reduce their voting power 
and potential influence over the firm. Therefore, it is more likely that corporate shareholders 
with minority stakes reduce rather than increase their stakes after the dividend tax reform. 
On the other hand, the Corporate Income Tax Act stipulates that corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes could only avoid the higher dividend tax burden in the year 2013 if they 
purchased an additional 10% stake in the firm. However, the average treated corporate 
shareholder in my sample owns a minority stake of less than 4% in another German 
corporation. To benefit from the dividend tax exemption in the year 2013, the average treated 
corporate shareholder would have had to more than triple its minority stake in 2013 (increase 
the stake by 10 percentage points from 4% to 14%). Therefore, it is not plausible that corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes could have immediately increased their ownership stakes 
by 10% in 2013. Nevertheless, an increase of a minority stake above the threshold of 10% in 
2013 was sufficient to benefit from the dividend tax exemption in the year after 2013, even 
though the average treated corporate shareholder in my sample still have had to more than 
double its stake (increase the stake from 4% to 10%).   
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In line with this argument, my sample includes only 18 observations (equal to three 
shareholders over six years) that could have increased their ownership stake after the dividend 
tax reform.36 This small number of observations only represents 0.4% of the total number of 
observations in my sample, which indicates that the majority of corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes did not purchase more stakes to exceed the threshold of 10%. Therefore, an 
increase of the ownership stakes is not the predominant reaction of treated corporate 
shareholders.   
2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the response of private firms and their shareholders to a dividend tax 
increase, which only affects a particular group of shareholders. I find that firms do not adjust 
their payout policy but that corporate shareholders with minority stakes, the only shareholder 
group affected by an increase in dividend taxes, reduce their minority stakes in corporations 
after the dividend tax reform in 2013. This suggests that minority shareholders without 
sufficient voting power cannot influence a firm’s payout policy. Cross-sectional tests further 
indicate that firm and shareholder characteristics as well as the relation between the 
shareholder and the firm affect the dividend tax responsiveness. I find a larger reduction of 
corporate shareholders’ minority stakes for those invested in firms with a high dividend payout 
and a majority shareholder. The dividend tax responsiveness is also larger for financially 
distressed corporate shareholders with minority stakes that do not belong to the same group as 
the firm in which they own a minority stake. 
My results are subject to limitations. First, my inferences rely on the parallel trend assumption 
and the choice of the control group. Although I plot yearly treatment effects and conduct 
placebo tests, which neither suggest a violation of the parallel trend assumption, I cannot 
completely rule out that confounding effects might affect my inferences. However, my fixed 
effects structure and thorough sample selection should increase the confidence that my 
identification strategy mitigates time trends as well as firm- and shareholder-specific 
confounding effects (e.g., mergers and takeovers) in my setting. In addition, the use of an 
alternative control group should further support the validity of my DiD approach. 
Second, the generalisability of my results is limited because I examine a German tax reform. 
Thus, internal validity increases at the expense of external validity. However, Germany has 
                                                 
36 All three shareholders could only increase their ownership stake slightly above 10%. One shareholder could 
immediately increase the ownership above 10% in 2013. The other two shareholders increased their stakes in 
2014.  
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




well-developed institutions, corporate governance and shareholder protection mechanisms as 
well as a tax system that is comparable to many other developed countries, allowing my results 
to be at least generalisable for developed countries (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002). 
Despite these limitations, my findings contribute to the very limited literature on the effects of 
dividend taxes on the payout decisions of private firms and the portfolio choices of their 
shareholders. I extend the literature by providing evidence that minority shareholders of 
private firms affected by a dividend tax increase reduce their ownership stakes, which has not 
been identified so far. In addition, my study enriches the literature on the characteristics that 
affect the dividend tax responsiveness of shareholders by examining important traits at the 
firm, shareholder and firm-shareholder level. Overall, my results should inform politicians 
about the potential effects of the asymmetric taxation of dividends on private firms and their 
shareholders.  
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Appendix 2.A: Alternative explanation for firms’ payout decisions   
There are contrasting views of whether dividend taxation affects firms’ payout decisions. 
Under the “old view”, marginal investments are financed by new equity issues. A dividend tax 
increase would increase the cost of capital, resulting in lower corporate investments and 
dividend payouts (e.g., Poterba and Summers, 1984). The “new view” notes instead that 
dividend taxation has no effect on the cost of capital and, as a result, does not affect corporate 
investments and dividend payout decisions because in this model retained earnings are used 
to finance marginal investments (e.g., Auerbach, 1979; Bradford, 1981).37 Besides these 
neoclassical theories, agency models extend explanations of firms’ reactions to changes in 
dividend taxes (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Chetty and Saez, 2010). Depending on 
the ownership structure of firms and conflicts between shareholders and managers over payout 
policies, firms react heterogeneously to changes in dividend taxes (e.g., Gordon and Dietz, 
2008; Chetty and Saez, 2010). 
My results in Table 2.4 indicate that firms do not alter their payouts after the dividend tax 
reform because only corporate shareholders with minority stakes are affected by the reform 
and this particular shareholder group does not have sufficient voting power to influence firm 
decisions, which is in line with the agency theory. However, my results could also be explained 
by the “new view”.  
To support that the agency theory has explanatory power, I re-estimate my OLS regression 
(Eq. (1)) with Payout as the dependent variable and investigate whether the treatment effect 
varies with firm-level characteristics, which classify the treated firms as “old view” firms or 
“new view” firms. Prior literature suggests that “new view” firms are cash-rich, rather mature 
and larger compared to “old view” firms (e.g., Zodrow, 1991; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
If the “new view” prevails, I expect the treatment effect for “old view” firms to be significantly 
negative and the treatment effect for “new view” firms to be insignificant. 
Table 2.A1 reports the results for the cross-sectional tests. I use three different firm-level 
characteristics. First, I distinguish between treated firms with high and low cash in the pre-
reform period, respectively (e.g., Alstadsæter and Jacob, 2017). High (low) cash is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a treated firm’s average cash scaled by total assets in the pre-reform 
                                                 
37 For a comprehensible discussion about the theoretical foundations of the old and new view see, for example, 
Zodrow (1991). A general overview of both theories is provided by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). 
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period is higher (lower) than the median across all treated firms in the pre-reform period. 
Second, I compare “young” treated firms with rather mature treated firms (e.g., Auerbach, 
1983; Zodrow, 1991). I define young (mature) as an indicator variable equal to 1, if a treated 
firm’s age in the year of the reform is lower (higher) than the 10th percentile across all treated 
firms. Third, I distinguish between small and large treated firms (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 
2016). I define large (small) as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the average total assets of a 
treated firm in the pre-reform period are higher (lower) than the median across all treated firms 
in the pre-reform period. 
Table 2.A1: Effect of dividend taxation on payout – cross-sectional findings 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Payout  Payout 
Post x Treatment x high cash 0.0107     
 (0.0150)     
Post x Treatment x low cash -0.0145     
 (0.0127)     
Post x Treatment x mature   -0.00601   
   (0.0119)   
Post x Treatment x young   0.0492   
   (0.0366)   
Post x Treatment x large     -0.00646 
     (0.0124) 
Post x Treatment x small     0.00372 
     (0.0156) 
Firm controls Included  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included  Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.550  0.550  0.548 
N 1,036  1,036  1,036 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-level observations. The dependent variable is Payout. 
Regression models include additional interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-
sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high (low) 
cash equals 1 if the firm’s average cash scaled by total assets in the pre-reform period is above (below) the median 
across all treated firms in the pre-reform period, (2) mature (young) equals 1 if the firm is older (younger) than 
the 10th percentile of treated firms (age is defined as the year of the reform less the year of foundation), and (3) 
large (small) equals 1 if the average of total assets of a firm in the pre-reform period is above (below) the median 
across all treated firms in the pre-reform period. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported 
values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
Across all cross-sectional tests, I find neither a significant treatment effect for “new view” nor 
“old view” firms. While the results for “new view” firms are consistent with theoretical 
predictions, the insignificant results for “old view” firms suggest that another explanation, i.e., 
agency theory, drives the results for “old view” firms. However, since the agency and new 
view theory reveal the same prediction for a firm’s payout decision in my setting, the results 
of the cross-sectional tests can only indirectly suggest that the “new view” cannot fully explain 
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my results by indicating that at least “old view” firms seem to react in accordance with the 
agency theory.  
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Appendix 2.B: Simultaneous equations approach 
Following Blouin et al. (2011), I employ a simultaneous equations approach to address 
endogeneity issues in payout decisions and ownership structures. If dividend policies and 
shareholder portfolio choices are simultaneous decisions, coefficient estimates of OLS 
regressions are biased because the explanatory variable in each equation (i.e., payout or 
minority stakes of corporate shareholders) is correlated with the error term (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). However, the use of a simultaneous equations approach permits a joint 
estimation of corporate shareholder and firm responses to the dividend tax reform by using 
three-stage least squares (3SLS). I estimate the following system of two equations based on 
firm-level data: 
𝐴𝑣_𝑆𝐻𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑗,𝑡 
(3) 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑣_𝑆𝐻𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝑣_𝑆𝐻𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗,𝑡 
(4) 
Variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix) and below. The 3SLS estimation method 
stipulates that the endogenous variables (Av_SH and Payout) are instrumented by the 
exogenous variables (Firm_Controls). However, Blouin et al. (2011) note that prior studies do 
not provide clear recommendations for the control variables that should be included in a 
system of equations, which examines payout decisions and shareholder responses. I thus 
follow the suggestions of Blouin et al. (2011) when I select the controls. In Eq. (3), I include 
control variables, which capture investments in shares. I control for age, which is defined as 
the regarded year less the year of foundation, and profitability, which is defined as profit/loss 
before taxes scaled by the prior year’s total assets. In Eq. (4), I include control variables, which 
capture payout decisions. I control for size, leverage, cash and sales, which are defined as sales 
scaled by the prior year’s total assets.  
The coefficient estimate of the indicator variable Post captures the initial reform effect, even 
if the other factor in the interaction term is zero. A negative coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term Post x Payout in Eq. (3) can be interpreted as a decrease of average minority 
stakes after the dividend tax reform if payout increases. A negative coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term Post x Av_SH in Eq. (4) can be interpreted as a decrease of payouts for a larger 
average minority stake of corporate shareholders. However, since my hypotheses do not 
predict a simultaneous decision of the firm’s payout policy and shareholder response (see 
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Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), I expect that the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms are 
insignificant. Instead, I expect a negative coefficient estimate of Post in Eq. (3) because it 
captures the initial effect of the dividend tax reform on the average minority stake.  
Since I am only interested in the effect of the dividend tax reform on firms’ payouts and 
corporate shareholders’ minority stakes, I restrict my sample to the years 2012 and 2013 and 
exclude all control group observations. To consider changes in the variables over time, I 
average the variables two years prior to the reform and two years after the reform. Thus, each 
treated firm has two observations, i.e., one observation before and after the reform.  
Table 2.B1: Effect of dividend taxation – OLS and SEM 
 OLS  SEM 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Payout Av_SH  Payout Av_SH 
Post -0.00894 -0.751***  0.825 -0.877*** 
 (0.0142) (0.161)  (1.353) (0.325) 
Payout  -1.372   -1.756 
  (1.158)   (3.520) 
Post x Payout  0.438   4.891 
  (1.207)   (3.818) 
Av_SH -0.00409   0.290  
 (0.00532)   (0.351)  
Post x Av_SH 0.00168   -0.195  
 (0.00318)   (0.349)  
Firm controls Included Included  Included Included 
R² 0.028 0.127  0.008 0.000 
N 234 234  234 234 
Notes: The dependent variable is Payout in Column 1 and 3, and Av_SH in Column 2 and 4. I estimate OLS 
regressions in Column 1 and 2, and simultaneous equations by using a 3SLS estimation method in Column 3 and 
4. I restrict the sample to treated firms in the years 2012 and 2013. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 
and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
Table 2.B1 reports the results. In Column 1 and 2, I estimate OLS regressions. Column 3 and 
4 present the results of my 3SLS regressions. Overall, the results are consistent with my 
predictions and provide three main insights. First, the coefficient estimate of Post is negative 
and significant in the OLS and 3SLS regression (Column 2 and 4), indicating that the dividend 
tax reform has a negative effect on the average amount of minority stakes. Second, no other 
coefficient estimate of interest is significant, suggesting that a firm’s payout decision is not 
affected by the reform and hence firms and shareholders do not simultaneously react to the 
dividend tax increase in my sample. Third, the coefficient estimate of Post is only slightly 
different across the OLS and 3SLS regression (Column 2 and 4), indicating that a potential 
simultaneity bias does not affect my coefficient estimates.  
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Appendix 2.C: Alternative control group 
In this section, I employ foreign corporate shareholders resident in the EU that owned a 
minority stake in a German corporation during the pre-reform period as an alternative control 
group to further enhance the validity of my DiD approach. As noted in Section 2.6.1, this 
alternative control group has two main advantages. First, foreign corporate shareholders with 
minority stakes have the same small ownership stake (less than 10%) as treated shareholders. 
Second, the German withholding tax burden of foreign corporate shareholders is not affected 
by the reform and does not change depending on their ownership stake.38 
To be part of the sample, I follow, in general, the same sample selection process as outlined 
in Table 2.D1 (Appendix) with the exception that I do not require that the German corporations 
have at least one German corporate shareholder with a directly held ownership stake of less 
than 20% in the pre-reform period. Instead, German corporations must have at least one 
German corporate shareholder or a foreign corporate shareholder resident in the EU with a 
directly held ownership stake of less than 10% during the years 2010 until 2012 (pre-reform).  
The final sample comprises 3,666 firm-shareholder-year observations for the years 2010 to 
2015. Table 2.C1 provides the sample distribution in Panel A and B. The 3,666 firm-
shareholder-year observations comprise the same 2,970 treated observations as my initial 
sample and 696 observations from the control group (Panel A). Panel B reveals that my sample 
consists of 495 observations from the treatment group (equal to the number of treated 
observations in my initial sample) and 116 observations from the control group per year.  
  
                                                 
38 However, it should be noted that foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes in German corporation 
were allowed to apply for a withholding tax refund after the ECJ decision at the end of 2011 until the German 
law was passed at the beginning of 2013. Despite this possibility, I do not expect that foreign corporate 
shareholders with minority stakes reacted to the ECJ decision for the following reasons. First, the withholding 
tax refund for foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes was only a temporary possibility to achieve 
comparability with German corporate shareholders owning minority stakes until the German government 
changed the taxation of inter-corporate dividends. Second, my identification process requires that foreign 
corporate shareholders with minority stakes made their decision to invest in a German corporation before the 
ECJ decision. Third, administrative burdens and compliance hurdles, e.g., extensive reporting requirements and 
lengthy processes, complicate the reimbursement of withholding taxes (e.g., Jacob and Todtenhaupt, 2020). 
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




Table 2.C1: Sample description and summary statistics with alternative control group 
Panel A: Sample distribution  
  Number of firm-shareholder- 
year observations 
 Number of 
firms 
 Number of 
shareholders 
Treatment group  2,970 311  360 
Control group  696 98  69 
Total  3,666 409  429 
Panel B: Sample distribution of firm-shareholder observations per year  
  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  Total  
Treatment group  495  495  495  495  495  495  2,970  
Control group  116  116  116  116  116  116  696  
Total  611  611  611  611  611  611  3,666  
Panel C: Summary statistics based on firm-shareholder data    
Sample: 2010-2015 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group 
Shareholdings 2,970 3.51 2.76 1.00 3.06 5.50 
Eff_tax 2,970 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.22 0.30 
Size 2,643 8.90 2.07 7.64 8.68 10.10 
Cash 2,643 0.20 0.25 0.01 0.09 0.34 
Leverage 2,643 0.41 0.95 0.11 0.29 0.52 
Size_SH 1,480 10.07 2.73 7.93 9.93 11.82 
Cash_SH 1,480 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.12 
Leverage_SH 1,480 0.41 0.84 0.13 0.33 0.57 
       
Control group 
Shareholdings 696 3.94 2.33 1.86 4.99 5.52 
Eff_tax 696 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.31 
Size 655 9.79 1.57 8.77 9.65 10.78 
Cash 655 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Leverage 655 0.35 0.33 0.09 0.23 0.52 
Size_SH 297 10.09 3.02 8.26 10.25 11.96 
Cash_SH 297 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.12 
Leverage_SH 297 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.28 
Panel D: Summary statistics based on firm-level data 
Sample: 2010-2015 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group       
Av_SH 1,613 3.82 2.72 1.00 4.40 5.68 
Size 1,613 9.01 2.22 7.54 8.98 10.36 
Cash 1,613 0.15 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.19 
Leverage 1,613 0.46 1.19 0.12 0.30 0.59 
Payout 793 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.07 
       
Control group       
Av_SH 496 4.06 2.34 2.00 5.09 6.00 
Size 496 9.85 1.63 8.81 9.93 10.87 
Cash 496 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.08 
Leverage 496 0.40 0.34 0.13 0.27 0.65 
Payout 297 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.10 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample distribution in general (Panel A) and per year (Panel B). 
Summary statistics for the period 2010-2015 are provided for different samples: Panel C is based on firm-
shareholder-year-level observations, and Panel D is based on firm-year-level observations. All variables are 
defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix) or Appendix 2.C. The control group observations comprise foreign corporate 
shareholders owning minority stakes in German corporations.    
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With regard to the firm and shareholder control variables, observations from the treatment and 
control group are very similar in terms of size, cash and leverage. While the summary statistics 
for the treatment group in Panel C are identical to the summary statistics of my initial sample, 
the summary statistics of the firm-level observations differ from Table 2.3. The reason for the 
deviation is my identification strategy for firm-level observations. I exclude firms from my 
firm-level sample, which are part of the treatment and control group, i.e., firms with at least 
one German corporate shareholder and one foreign corporate shareholder both owning a 
minority stake, to avoid identification issues in my DiD approach. This identification process 
results in a different sample composition compared to my initial sample. 
To examine the parallel trend assumption for my treatment and alternative control group, I 
again estimate the yearly treatment effects over the period between 2010 and 2015 with the 
year 2012 as the benchmark (see Section 2.4.3). Figure 2.C1 provides point-estimates and two-
tailed 95% confidence intervals for my treated versus alternative control observations when 
using Payout (Panel A) and Shareholdings (Panel B) as the dependent variables. Overall, 
Figure 2.C1 provides support for the parallel trends in my sample. In addition, Figure 2.1 and 
2.C1 are very similar, which further supports the validity of my DiD approach.  
Next, I test Hypothesis 1 by re-estimating my DiD regression based on firm-level data (Eq. 
(1)) with my alternative control group. Table 2.C2 reports OLS regression results for two 
specifications: DiD model with fixed effects but without controls (Column 1), and DiD model 
with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2 as defined in Eq. (1)). Overall, the results reveal 
that the estimated average treatment effect is insignificant in both specifications, indicating 
that my findings are consistent with my main results in Section 2.5.1.  
Further, I test Hypothesis 2 by re-estimating my DiD regression based on firm-shareholder-
level data (Eq. (2)) with my alternative control group. Panel A of Table 2.C3 reports OLS 
regression results for three specifications: DiD model with fixed effects but without controls 
(Column 1), DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 2), and DiD model with 
fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls (Column 3 as defined in Eq. (2)). Overall, the 
findings show negative and significant estimated average treatment effects across all 
specifications, which have similar magnitudes compared to my main results in Table 2.5.  
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Figure 2.C1: Parallel trends with alternative control group 
Panel A  










Panel B  










Notes: This figure provides statistical evidence that pre-reform trends in payout (Panel A) and ownership stakes 
(Panel B) are similar, and that the dividend tax reform results in a significant decrease in the ownership stake of 
affected shareholders but does not significantly change the payout of affected firms. The control group 
observations comprise foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes in German corporations. In Panel A, 
the point-estimators are generated by estimating the following regression model: Payoutjt = β0 + β12010t x 
Treatmentj + β22011t x Treatmentj + β32013t x Treatmentj + β42014t x Treatmentj + β52015t x Treatmentj + 
𝛿Firm_Controlsjt + αj + εjt (Eq. (1)). In Panel B, the point-estimators are generated by estimating the following 
regression model: Shareholdingsijt = β0 + β12010t x Treatmentij + β22011t x Treatmentij + β32013t x Treatmentij + 
β42014t x Treatmentij + β52015t x Treatmentij + 𝛿Firm_Controlsjt + 𝛾Shareholder_Controlsit + αij + εijt (Eq. (2)). 
Since I omit the DiD indicator for the year 2012 in both regression models, this year serves as the benchmark 
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Table 2.C2: Effect of dividend taxation on payout – alternative control group 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Payout 
Post x Treatment 0.0236  0.0151 
 (0.0239)  (0.0230) 
Size   -0.0340 
   (0.0281) 
Cash   -0.00284 
   (0.166) 
Leverage   0.00142 
   (0.0137) 
Firm controls None  Included 
Firm FE Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.460  0.464 
N 1,090  1,014 
Notes: The dependent variable is Payout. The table reports two different specifications: (1) regression with fixed 
effects but without firm controls, and (2) regression with fixed effects and firm controls. The main variable of 
interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-
differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firms in the post treatment period 
2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. The control group observations comprise firms with foreign corporate shareholders 
owning minority stakes. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix) or Appendix 2.C. All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
In addition, I control for the corporate shareholder’s effective dividend tax burden (Eff_tax) in 
Panel B of Table 2.C3. Since my firm-shareholder-level observations allow me to observe the 
minority stake that a specific (foreign) corporate shareholder owns in a German company, I 
obtain country-pairs to calculate the effective dividend tax burden. The effective dividend tax 
burden for corporate shareholders domiciled in Germany is outlined in Table 2.1. However, if 
the corporate shareholder is resident in a foreign country, the effective dividend tax burden 
depends on the withholding tax rate, the dividend tax rate in the foreign country and the double 
tax relief method (see Jacob and Todtenhaupt, 2020). I collect yearly data from PwC and EY 
on the withholding tax rate in Germany (𝜏𝑤,𝐺) and the withholding tax rate in German double 
tax treaties (𝜏𝑤,𝐷𝑇𝑇), as well as the relevant double tax relief system and the dividend tax rate 
in the country in which the corporate shareholder resides (𝜏𝐷).
39  
  
                                                 
39 I collect data from PwC’s “Tax Summaries” and EY’s “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides”. 
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Table 2.C3: Effect of dividend taxation on ownership stakes – alternative control group 
Panel A: Minority stakes of corporate shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.680*** -0.664*** -0.541*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0916) (0.0978) 
Size  -0.330*** -0.359*** 
  (0.0943) (0.113) 
Cash  -0.175 0.236 
  (0.287) (0.230) 
Leverage  0.0270 0.0220 
  (0.0450) (0.0617) 
Size_SH   0.169 
   (0.116) 
Cash_SH   -0.450 
   (0.552) 
Leverage_SH   -0.130*** 
   (0.0141) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None Included 
Firm-shareholder FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.855 0.851 0.885 
N 3,666 3,298 1,777 
Panel B: Controlling for the effective dividend tax burden of corporate shareholders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.637** -0.692** -0.534** 
 (0.268) (0.288) (0.218) 
Eff_tax -0.285 0.182 -0.0479 
 (1.606) (1.744) (1.244) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None Included 
Firm-shareholder FE Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.855 0.851 0.885 
N 3,666 3,298 1,777 
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A and B is Shareholdings. Both panels report three different 
specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects but without controls, (2) regression with fixed effects and firm 
controls, and (3) regression with fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls. Panel B additionally controls for 
the effective dividend tax burden of corporate shareholders. The main variable of interest in the multivariate 
models of both panels is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The 
interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for firm-shareholder observations with treated corporate shareholders 
in the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. The control group observations comprise foreign 
corporate shareholders owning minority stakes in German corporations. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 
(Appendix) or Appendix 2.C. All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the firm-shareholder level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate 
significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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If the country of the foreign corporate shareholder offers an exemption method to mitigate the 
double taxation, the effective dividend tax burden equals, in general, 𝜏𝐷 + min (𝜏𝑤,𝐺 , 𝜏𝑤,𝐷𝑇𝑇). 
If the foreign country allows a complete exemption of the dividends received, the dividend tax 
burden equals the minimum of the German withholding tax rate and the withholding tax rate 
provided in the German double tax treaty (𝜏𝐷 = 0). If the dividends are not completely tax-
exempt in the foreign country, the effective dividend tax burden increases by the effective 
dividend tax rate in the foreign country 𝜏𝐷 > 0. However, if the country of the foreign 
corporate shareholder offers a credit method to mitigate the double taxation of dividends, the 
effective dividend tax burden equals max (𝜏𝐷 , min (𝜏𝑤,𝐺 , 𝜏𝑤,𝐷𝑇𝑇)). The results in Panel B of 
Table 2.C3 present robust results compared with Panel A, indicating that the effective dividend 
tax burden does not bias my estimated average treatment effect. 
Finally, I re-estimate my four cross-sectional tests from Section 2.5.3. Table 2.C4 reports the 
results from my DiD models with fixed effects, controls and interactions with binary 
conditional variables to capture the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. 
The results are consistent with my main results in Section 2.5.3, suggesting that besides firm-
specific payout decisions and the financial position of the treated shareholder, the dividend tax 
response is also conditional upon potential agency issues and the affiliation of the treated 
shareholder and firm to the same group.  
Overall, my findings are fully consistent with my baseline results in Section 2.5 when using 
EU resident foreign corporate shareholders with minority stakes as an alternative control 
group, indicating that potential concerns regarding the impact of the dividend tax reform on 
my initial control group do not affect my main findings. Thus, my results support the validity 
of my DiD approach. 
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 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable: Av_SH Av_SH  Shareholdings  Av_SH 
Post x Treatment x high payout -0.644***      
 (0.148)      
Post x Treatment x low payout 0.521      
 (0.452)      
Post x Treatment x maj_SH  -0.840***     
  (0.137)     
Post x Treatment x no maj_SH  -0.410***     
  (0.152)     
Post x Treatment x same GUO    -0.0829   
    (0.135)   
Post x Treatment x different GUO    -0.568***   
    (0.108)   
Post x Treatment x financial distress      -0.629*** 
      (0.151) 
Post x Treatment x no financial distress      -0.159 
      (0.118) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.010] [0.026]  [0.004]  [0.015] 
Firm controls Included Included  Included  None 
Shareholder controls None None  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None  None 
Shareholder FE None None  None  Included 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included  None 
Year FE Included Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.868 0.833  0.903  0.905 
N 1,365 2,109  1,528  1,059 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-level observations (Column 1 and 2), firm-
shareholder-level observations (Column 3), and shareholder-level observations (Column 4). The dependent 
variable is Av_SH in Column 1, 2 and 4, and Shareholdings in Column 3. Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high (low) payout equals 1 if the average payout proxy 
of a treated firm in the pre-reform period is above (below) the mean across all treated firms in the pre-reform 
period, (2) maj_SH (no maj_SH) equals 1 if the treated firm has a (no) majority shareholder in the year prior to 
the reform, (3) same (different) GUO equals 1 if the treated shareholder and firm have the same (a different) 
global ultimate owner, and (4) (no) financial distress equals 1 if the treated shareholder has an Altman z-score 
below (above) the 75th quartile in the year prior to the reform. The control group observations comprise foreign 
corporate shareholders owning minority stakes in German corporations. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 
(Appendix) or Appendix 2.C. All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the firm level in Column 1 and 2, firm-shareholder level in Column 3 or shareholder level in Column 
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Appendix 2.D: Additional tables 
Table 2.D1: Sample selection 
Selection criteria 
 Number of 
observations 
Firm-level   
 German affiliates in Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database established 
before 2007 with a corporate global ultimate owner in the EU and current 
financial data 
 34,560 
Excluding:    
(1) Firms with consolidated non-German-GAAP financial data   (191) 
(2) Firms with a legal form that is not taxed according to the German 
Corporate Income Tax Act 
 (3,912) 
(3) Firms with missing detailed ownership structure information from 2010 to 
2015 
 (8,460) 
(4) Firms without a German corporate shareholder with an ownership stake of 
less than 20% in the pre-reform period (from 2010 to 2012)  
 (21,221) 
 Preliminary number of firms  776 
Firm-shareholder-level   
 Number of firm-shareholder-year observations based on the preliminary 
number of firms after step (4) from 2010 to 2015 
 7,686 
Excluding:   
(5) Observations with missing shareholding quota in the sample period  (1,530) 
(6) Inactive shareholders or firms or restructuring processes (e.g., mergers) 
during the sample period  
 (126) 
(7) Banks, insurance, investment and holding companies as corporate 
shareholders (NACE code = 6400-6630)  
 (510) 
(8) Non-profit and public institutions as corporate shareholders  (1,302) 
(9) Listed firms or shareholders  (90) 
(10) Corporate shareholders with a total ownership stake (direct and indirect 
ownership stake) above 20% in a sample firm  
 (54) 
Final sample: Firm-shareholder-year observations  4,074 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process. The process starts with identifying German 
corporate affiliates in the steps (1) and (2). Step (3) and (4) include the historical ownership structure of German 
corporations. In particular, step (4) was conducted with hand-collected data, based on the annual ownership 
structure of each individual firm, from Amadeus exports as well as from commercial register entries. In the 
selection step (4), I also apply step (1) and (2) on the German corporate shareholder’s level. Since the main 
examination unit is the firm-shareholder level, I consider the 776 German firms (resulting from selection step 
(4)) with every German corporate shareholder that owned a stake of less than 20% in the pre-reform period (from 
2010 to 2012) over six years (from 2010 to 2015). The use of firm-shareholder relations results in 7,686 
observations as a starting point for further restrictions (step (5) to (10)). In step (6), I restrict the sample to active 
firms and shareholders (with an ownership stake of less than 20% in the pre-reform period). To do so, I check 
the status of the firms and shareholders three years after the sample period ends (from 2016 to 2018) to control 
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Table 2.D2: Effect of dividend taxation – alternative identification strategy 
 Firm-level tests  Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Payout Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.0251 -0.0200  -0.660*** -0.665*** -0.502*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0173)  (0.119) (0.129) (0.145) 
Firm controls None Included  None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None  None None Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.557 0.565  0.958 0.957 0.965 
N 771 720  2,890 2,538 1,340 
Notes: The dependent variable is Payout in Column 1 and 2, and Shareholdings in Column 3 to 5. The firm-level 
tests report two specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects but without firm controls, and (2) regression with 
fixed effects and firm controls. The firm-shareholder-level tests report three specifications: (3) regression with 
fixed effects but without controls, (4) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (5) regression with 
fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls. I employ an identification strategy, which requires that the German 
corporations have at least one German corporate shareholder with a directly held ownership stake of less than 
20% in 2012 (the year prior to the reform). Thus, the alternative sample is restricted to the period 2012-2015. 
The less restrictive identification strategy results in 174 additional firm-shareholder-year observations. The main 
variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-
in-differences effect. When conducting firm-level (firm-shareholder-level) tests, the interaction term Post x 
Treatment equals 1 for treated firms (for firm-shareholder observations with treated corporate shareholders) in 
the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in 
Column 1 and 2 or at the firm-shareholder level in Column 3 to 5. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 
and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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Table 2.D3: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Source 
Firm-shareholder characteristics  
Post Dummy variable equal to 1 for 2013, 2014, and 2015 and 0 otherwise Constructed 
Same GUO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the treated shareholder and firm have 
the same global ultimate owner  
Amadeus 
Shareholdings Ownership stake of a German corporate shareholder i in a German 
corporation j  
Hand-collected 
SH_change Change in the ownership stake (Shareholdings) scaled by the prior 
year’s ownership stake 
Hand-collected 
Treatment Dummy variable equal to 1 if a German corporate shareholder i 
owned a stake of less than 10% in another German corporation j in 
the pre-reform period (2010-2012) 
Constructed 
Firm characteristics  
Av_SH Average stake of all German corporate shareholders that owned a 
minority stake (ownership stake of less than 10% in the pre-reform 
period) in German corporation j (= treatment group) and average 
stake of all German corporate shareholders that owned a stake of at 
least 10% but less than 20% (in the pre-reform period) in German 
corporation k (= control group), respectively (j ≠ k) 
Hand-collected 
Av_SH_change Change in the average ownership stake (Av_SH) scaled by the prior 
year’s average ownership stake 
Hand-collected 
Cash Cash and equivalents scaled by total assets Amadeus 
Large_SH Largest ownership stake that a shareholder owns in the firm    Hand-collected 
Leverage Long-term debt scaled by total assets Amadeus 
Maj_SH  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the treated firm has a majority 
shareholder in the year before the reform 
Hand-collected 
#Owner Natural logarithm of the number of owners Hand-collected 
Own holdings Firm’s own holdings  Hand-collected 
Payout Profit/loss after tax net of the change in other equity scaled by the 
prior year’s total assets  
Amadeus 
Payout1 Profit/loss after tax net of the change in other equity scaled by the 
sum of profit/loss after tax and prior year’s other equity 
Amadeus 
Payout2 Profit/loss after tax net of the change in total equity scaled by the 
prior year’s total assets 
Amadeus 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets Amadeus 
Shareholder characteristics  
Av_SH Average of minority stakes (ownership stake of less than 10% in the 
pre-reform period) that a German corporate shareholder i owned in 
other German corporations (= treatment group) and average of stakes 
of at least 10% but less than 20% (in the pre-reform period) that a 
German corporate shareholder h owned in other German 
corporations (= control group), respectively (i ≠ h) 
Hand-collected 
Cash_SH Cash and equivalents scaled by total assets Amadeus 
Financial distress Dummy variable equal to 1 if the treated shareholder has an Altman 
z-score
40
 below the 75th percentile in the year prior to the reform 
Amadeus 
Leverage_SH Long-term debt scaled by total assets Amadeus 
Size_SH Natural logarithm of total assets Amadeus 
Notes: The table reports the variable definitions. The payout proxies are winsorised at the 1% (99%) level.   
                                                 
40 I use a modified version of the Altman z-score because I do not observe data on retained earnings:  
0.717 ×
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Table 2.D4: Effect of dividend taxation – balanced sample 
 Firm-level tests  Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Payout Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment 0.00184 0.00923  -0.673*** -0.734*** -0.585*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0100)  (0.123) (0.144) (0.158) 
Firm controls None Included  None Included Included 
Shareholder controls None None  None None Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.629 0.693  0.955 0.953 0.965 
N 906 804  4,074 3,270 1,572 
Notes: The dependent variable is Payout in Column 1 and 2, and Shareholdings in Column 3 to 5. The firm-level 
tests report two specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects but without firm controls, and (2) regression with 
fixed effects and firm controls. The firm-shareholder-level tests report three specifications: (3) regression with 
fixed effects but without controls, (4) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (5) regression with 
fixed effects, firm and shareholder controls. I use a balanced sample in every regression. The main variable of 
interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-
differences effect. When conducting firm-level (firm-shareholder-level) tests, the interaction term Post x 
Treatment equals 1 for treated firms (for firm-shareholder observations with treated corporate shareholders) in 
the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in 
Column 1 and 2 or at the firm-shareholder level in Column 3 to 5. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 
and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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Table 2.D5: Summary statistics over the period 2010-2012 
Panel A: Firm-shareholder observations     
Sample: 2010-2012 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group 
Shareholdings 1,485 3.89 2.57 1.50 4.00 5.56 
Size 1,334 8.83 2.10 7.61 8.57 9.97 
Cash 1,334 0.21 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.38 
Leverage 1,334 0.43 1.27 0.1 0.28 0.49 
Size_SH 766 10.01 2.69 7.90 9.86 11.72 
Cash_SH 766 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.12 
Leverage_SH 766 0.37 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.55 
       
Control group 
Shareholdings 552 12.98 2.93 10.00 12.50 15.00 
Size 495 8.52 2.18 7.00 8.54 9.68 
Cash 495 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.22 
Leverage 495 0.42 0.56 0.15 0.33 0.59 
Size_SH 267 9.85 2.91 7.51 9.27 11.74 
Cash_SH 267 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.15 
Leverage_SH 267 0.33 0.28 0.09 0.25 0.48 
Panel B: Firm-level observations 
Sample: 2010-2012 N Mean StDev P25 P50 P75 
Treatment group       
Av_SH 781 4.23 2.45 2.30 5.00 5.68 
Size 781 8.95 2.27 7.54 8.96 10.33 
Cash 781 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.18 
Leverage 781 0.50 1.65 0.11 0.27 0.56 
Payout 382 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.07 
Own holdings 781 0.49 2.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large_SH 781 80.73 20.98 65.00 93.94 94.90 
Number of owners 781 4.72 7.35 2.00 2.00 5.00 
       
Control group       
Av_SH 372 13.09 3.01 10.00 12.50 15.00 
Size 372 8.30 2.23 6.83 8.36 9.32 
Cash 372 0.17 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.25 
Leverage 372 0.42 0.62 0.13 0.32 0.59 
Payout 173 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.10 
Own holdings 372 0.24 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large_SH 372 67.59 19.95 51.04 74.90 84.75 
Number of owners 372 3.68 2.30 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the pre-reform period 2010-2012 for different samples: Panel 
A is based on firm-shareholder-year-level observations, and Panel B is based on firm-year-level observations. 
All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix).  
 Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation 




Table 2.D6: Cross-sectional tests – ownership stake in the pre-reform period 
 25th percentile  Median  75th percentile 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable: 
SH_change SH_change  SH_change SH_change  SH_change SH_change 
Post x Treatment  -0.0994*** -0.0671***  -0.0812*** -0.0469***  -0.0607*** -0.0410*** 
x high minority 
stake 
(0.0125) (0.0141)  (0.0134) (0.0164)  (0.0158) (0.0153) 
Post x Treatment -0.161** -0.219  -0.148*** -0.160**  -0.132*** -0.122*** 
x low minority 
stake 




[0.416] [0.265]  [0.094] [0.091]  [0.019] [0.095] 
Firm controls Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Shareholder 
controls 
None Included  None Included  None Included 
Firm-shareholder 
FE 
Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.034 0.030  0.035 0.029  0.034 0.027 
N 3,563 1,976  3,563 1,976  3,563 1,976 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-shareholder-level observations. The dependent 
variable is SH_change. Regression models include additional interaction terms based on conditional variables to 
assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. The following conditional variables are used: 
(1) high (low) minority stake equals 1 if the average stake that a treated corporate shareholder owns in another 
corporation in the pre-reform period is above (below) the 25th quartile across all treated observations in the pre-
reform period, (2) high (low) minority stake equals 1 if the average stake that a treated corporate shareholder 
owns in another corporation in the pre-reform period is above (below) the median across all treated observations 
in the pre-reform period, and (3) high (low) minority stake equals 1 if the average stake that a treated corporate 
shareholder owns in another corporation in the pre-reform period is above (below) the 75th quartile across all 
treated observations in the pre-reform period. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm-shareholder level. 
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Table 2.D7: Effect of dividend taxation – fully interacted regression models 
 Firm-level test  Firm-shareholder-level tests 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Payout  Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.00193  -0.686*** -0.566*** 
 (0.0139)  (0.140) (0.142) 
Firm controls Included  Included Included 
Shareholder controls None  None Included 
Firm FE Included  None None 
Firm-shareholder FE None  Included Included 
Year FE Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.537  0.954 0.965 
N 1,036  3,631 2,003 
Notes: The dependent variable is Payout in Column 1 and Shareholdings in Column 2 and 3. The firm-level test 
reports a regression with fixed effects and firm controls (Column 1). The firm-shareholder-level tests report two 
specifications: (2) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, and (3) regression with fixed effects, firm and 
shareholder controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x 
Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. When conducting the firm-level test (firm-shareholder-
level tests), the interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firms (for firm-shareholder observations 
with treated corporate shareholders) in the post treatment period 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. In addition to the 
interaction term Post x Treatment, I include interactions of each available control variable with the Post dummy 
as well as interactions with the Treatment dummy in every regression model. All variables are defined in Table 
2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at 
the firm level in Column 1 or at the firm-shareholder level in Column 2 and 3. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
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Table 2.D8: Effect of dividend taxation on corporate shareholdings – control group split 
 Control group:  
10% ≤ ownership stake < 15% 
 Control group:  
15% ≤ ownership stake < 20% 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Shareholdings Shareholdings  Shareholdings Shareholdings 
Post x Treatment -0.722*** -0.598***  -0.658*** -0.415** 
 (0.166) (0.150)  (0.165) (0.194) 
Firm controls Included Included  Included Included 
Shareholder controls None Included  None Included 
Firm-shareholder FE  Included Included  Included Included 
Year FE Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.921 0.941  0.949 0.957 
N 3,271 1,832  3,003 1,651 
Notes: The dependent variable is Shareholdings. The table reports the results for two different control groups: 
corporate shareholders with an ownership stake of at least 10% but less than 15% in another corporation in the 
pre-reform period (Column 1 and 2), and corporate shareholders with an ownership stake of at least 15% but less 
than 20% in another corporation in the pre-reform period (Column 3 and 4). The table shows two specifications 
for both groups: (1) and (3) regression with fixed effects and firm controls, (2) and (4) regression with fixed 
effects, firm and shareholder controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction 
term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment 
equals 1 for firm-shareholder observations with treated corporate shareholders in the post treatment period 2013-
2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard 
errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm-shareholder level. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
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 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable: Av_SH Av_SH  Shareholdings  Av_SH 
Post x Treatment x high payout -2.744***      
 (0.585)      
Post x Treatment x low payout -2.826***      
 (0.458)      
Post x Treatment x maj_SH  -3.185***     
  (0.279)     
Post x Treatment x no maj_SH  -1.577***     
  (0.270)     
Post x Treatment x same GUO    -0.707   
    (0.640)   
Post x Treatment x different GUO    -2.464***   
    (0.320)   
Post x Treatment x financial distress      -2.479*** 
      (0.489) 
Post x Treatment x no financial distress      -1.657*** 
      (0.535) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.909] [0.000]  [0.012]  [0.236] 
Firm controls Included Included  Included  None 
Shareholder controls None None  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None  None 
Shareholder FE None None  None  Included 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included  None 
Year FE Included Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.965 0.962  0.972  0.970 
N 524 1,157  791  645 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-level observations (Column 1 and 2), firm-
shareholder-level observations (Column 3), and shareholder-level observations (Column 4). The dependent 
variable is Av_SH in Column 1, 2 and 4, and Shareholdings in Column 3. The treatment group is restricted to 
corporate shareholders that completely sell their minority stake in a firm after the dividend tax reform, i.e., the 
minority stake is zero in at least one year in the post-reform period. Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high (low) payout equals 1 if the average payout proxy 
of a treated firm in the pre-reform period is above (below) the mean across all treated firms in the pre-reform 
period, (2) maj_SH (no maj_SH) equals 1 if the treated firm has a (no) majority shareholder in the year prior to 
the reform, (3) same (different) GUO equals 1 if the treated shareholder and firm have the same (a different) 
global ultimate owner, and (4) (no) financial distress equals 1 if the treated shareholder has an Altman z-score 
below (above) the 75th quartile in the year prior to the reform. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). 
All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in 
Column 1 and 2, firm-shareholder level in Column 3 or shareholder level in Column 4. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.   
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Table 2.D10:  Cross-sectional findings of shareholders’ dividend tax response – matched  








 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable: Av_SH Av_SH  Shareholdings  Av_SH 
Post x Treatment x high payout -0.933***      
 (0.204)      
Post x Treatment x low payout -0.0961      
 (0.146)      
Post x Treatment x maj_SH  -0.839***     
  (0.178)     
Post x Treatment x no maj_SH  -0.499**     
  (0.197)     
Post x Treatment x same GUO    -0.0200   
    (0.223)   
Post x Treatment x different GUO    -0.488**   
    (0.191)   
Post x Treatment x financial distress      -0.808*** 
      (0.204) 
Post x Treatment x no financial distress      -0.342* 
      (0.191) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.000] [0.099]  [0.009]  [0.020] 
Firm controls Included Included  Included  None 
Shareholder controls None None  Included  Included 
Firm FE Included Included  None  None 
Shareholder FE None None  None  Included 
Firm-shareholder FE None None  Included  None 
Year FE Included Included  Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.974 0.964  0.978  0.981 
N 1,040 2,246  1,691  1,205 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional tests based on firm-level observations (Column 1 and 2), firm-
shareholder-level observations (Column 3), and shareholder-level observations (Column 4) by using a matched 
sample. I employ entropy balancing matching. The dependent variable is Av_SH in Column 1, 2 and 4, and 
Shareholdings in Column 3. Regression models include additional interaction terms based on conditional 
variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. The following conditional 
variables are used: (1) high (low) payout equals 1 if the average payout proxy of a treated firm in the pre-reform 
period is above (below) the mean across all treated firms in the pre-reform period, (2) maj_SH (no maj_SH) 
equals 1 if the treated firm has a (no) majority shareholder in the year prior to the reform, (3) same (different) 
GUO equals 1 if the treated shareholder and firm have the same (a different) global ultimate owner, and (4) (no) 
financial distress equals 1 if the treated shareholder has an Altman z-score below (above) the 75th quartile in the 
year prior to the reform. All variables are defined in Table 2.D3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard 
errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level in Column 1 and 2, firm-shareholder level 
in Column 3 or shareholder level in Column 4. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) 
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This paper examines the investment response of finance lease firms to a change in tax 
depreciation rules. Using an exogenous shock in Germany, our results suggest that finance 
lease companies, the only organisations affected by such a change, reduce their investments 
following the abolition of a beneficial and long-standing tax depreciation method. We provide 
evidence that the exposure of finance lease firms to regulatory requirements moderates the 
investment effect. Additional cross-sectional tests indicate a larger investment response for 
finance lease firms with a product portfolio specialised in mobile assets and, in particular, 
office and IT assets. Our findings add to the existing contributions on the effect of tax 
depreciation on investment decisions and to the limited literature looking into the effect of 
taxation on financial institutions.  
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Prior literature has primarily analysed the effect of tax depreciation incentives on investment 
decisions of manufacturing firms. However, we know little about the investment response of 
leasing companies to tax incentives, despite the fact that leasing is one of the most important 
types of financing. In 2017, almost half of the investments in equipment and software by 
private firms in the United States were purchased via leases, which makes leasing the most 
common payment method.43 In Europe, total new leasing volumes amount to EUR 384.1bn in 
2017 with UK (EUR 101.3bn) as the largest leasing market followed by Germany (EUR 
58.7bn).44 Given the importance of leasing companies as a provider of assets, it is important 
to understand the effect of tax depreciation on leasing firms’ investments in leased assets. In 
addition, compared to manufacturing firms, due to their financing function lease firms, which 
offer finance leases are subject to regulatory requirements in many countries (e.g., Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Belgium).45 It thus remains an open empirical question how tax depreciation 
allowances affect lease firms’ investment decisions in a regulated environment. We answer 
this question by investigating the effect of tax depreciation allowances on investments by 
finance lease firms.      
The expected stimulating effect of tax depreciation deductions was investigated by many 
empirical studies (e.g., Hassett and Newmark, 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). A large 
proportion of prior literature exploits the bonus depreciation provisions in the US as exogenous 
reform settings (e.g., Desai and Goolsbee, 2004; Cohen and Cummins, 2006; Hulse and 
Livingstone, 2010; Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Ohrn, 2019). The results suggest that temporary 
bonus depreciation regimes incentivise investments. In line with studies on US bonus 
depreciation allowances, a few studies additionally provide evidence that accelerated 
depreciation provisions incentivise firm investments in other country-specific settings, e.g., 
Germany, Netherlands and United Kingdom (e.g., Wielhouwer and Wiersma, 2017; 
Eichfelder and Schneider, 2018; Maffini et al., 2019). However, empirical evidence on the 
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effect of tax depreciation on firms’ investments is limited in at least three ways. First, the 
majority of studies examine the investment response of manufacturing firms. Second, most 
existing studies focus on temporary tax depreciation regimes such as special bonus or 
discretionary tax depreciation provisions. Third, the majority of studies investigate 
depreciation tax incentives during economic downturns. Countries often foster the economy 
during economic crises by introducing such provisions simultaneously with other tax or 
investment incentives, resulting in potential confounding effects that limit the validity of 
previous results. Our paper aims to overcome these limitations and examines the investment 
response of leasing firms to a change in tax depreciation rules.   
We do so by exploiting a German tax depreciation reform that is applicable to firms offering 
finance leases. Before 2013, tax authorities accepted two regular depreciation methods for tax 
purposes. First, the lessor could apply straight-line tax depreciation over the expected useful 
life of the leased asset, which is determined in tax depreciation tables issued by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. Second, the lessor could apply straight-line depreciation over the lease 
term under consideration of the residual value provided in the lease contract.  
The latter depreciation method was the preferred and most frequently applied method for tax 
and accounting purposes of finance lease contracts. This is because the business model of 
finance lease firms requires the leased asset to be financed and amortised during the non-
cancellable lease term. In contrast to finance leases, this depreciation method is not common 
for operating leases because the business model of operating lease firms requires that the 
leased asset is financed and amortised by multiple and short-term transfers of the leased asset 
to various lessees. With effect from 1.1.2014, the supreme tax authorities abolished lease-
specific straight-line tax depreciation over the lease term.46 Since then, when determining the 
depreciation deduction for tax purposes the lessor has had to apply straight-line depreciation 
over the expected useful life of the asset, based on the tax depreciation tables.  
This setting has some valuable advantages, which, on the one hand, mitigate the limitations of 
prior literature. We examine a permanent and significant change in tax depreciation rules that 
is neither overlapped by other tax or accounting changes nor by special economic 
circumstances, e.g., economic downturns. On the other hand, we have a clear setting in which 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Federal Ministry of Finance, IV C 6 – S 2170/08/10002:004, of February 24, 2014 and specialist 
information of the tax authority Hamburg, 52 – O 1000 – 003/12, Number 06/2014 (https://stbk-hamburg.de/wp-
content/uploads/Fach-Info-6-2014-f%C3%BCr-StB-Kammer-15-12-14_1.pdf).  
 




only finance lease companies are affected by a change in tax depreciation deductions, allowing 
us to investigate the investment behaviour of a specific kind of financial institution.   
Based on theoretical considerations, the tax depreciation method applied affects the present 
value of tax depreciation deductions and hence the present value of tax payments and the cost 
of investment (e.g., Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Summers, 1981; Auerbach, 1983). In addition 
to a reduction in the cost of capital, tax depreciation deductions can alleviate financial frictions 
due to imperfect markets or regulatory requirements and thus increase investments (e.g., 
Fazzari et al., 1988). Straight-line tax depreciation over the expected useful life of the leased 
asset results in a lower present value of tax depreciation deductions compared to straight-line 
tax depreciation over the lease term, because the expected useful life of a leased asset is longer 
than the lease term. However, the benefit of a shorter depreciation period in terms of net 
present value is dependent on the capital market interest rate. Where this interest rate is zero, 
clearly the difference vanishes. Considering both potential channels (cost of capital and 
financial friction) for the investment response, we posit that the change of tax depreciation 
rules to a less beneficial tax depreciation regime decreases investments.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we exploit the German exogenous shock setting by applying a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. Our treatment group is defined as German 
companies from the finance lease sector. We manually collect financial statement data of 
German companies that offer finance leases from the German Federal Gazette’s Company 
Register database. These companies can be identified because they are licensed, supervised 
and registered by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Our control group 
consists of German firms that belong to the rental sector. We collect financial data of our 
control firms from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.  
The results of our DiD analysis show that after the preferred tax depreciation over the lease 
term was abolished, making the less beneficial tax depreciation over the expected useful life 
of the asset the only applicable tax depreciation method, firms from the finance lease sector 
reduce their investments in tangible assets. The estimated elasticity of investments with 
respect to the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment is about -6, which is in line with prior 
literature (e.g., Ohrn, 2018). Our result is consistent when applying alternative definitions of 
the dependent variable and using matched samples. Further, we conduct placebo tests to 
challenge the validity of our exogenous shock. The results suggest that the placebo treatment 
effects are not statistically significant, thereby supporting our parallel trend assumption.  
 




In addition to this analysis, we investigate whether financial frictions resulting from regulatory 
requirements regarding liquidity and risk management moderate the investment response of 
treated firms. Finance lease firms can only undertake investment decisions when they comply 
with these regulatory standards. However, the increase in tax payments due to a shift to the 
less beneficial tax depreciation allowance reduces cash flow and hence liquidity, resulting in 
a burden on the equity. Due to the regulatory requirements that finance lease firms are exposed 
to, we predict that this decrease in liquidity and burden on equity negatively affect their 
investment. We conduct cross-sectional tests to examine whether our treatment effect varies 
with the firm’s exposure to regulatory requirements. We apply four firm-level characteristics 
as proxies for the exposure of finance lease firms to regulatory standards. Results from our 
cross-sectional tests reveal a stronger treatment effect for small firms and firms with low cash 
and low equity that are affiliated to banks, suggesting that finance lease firms, which are 
particularly strongly exposed to regulatory requirements, have a stronger investment response 
to the change in tax depreciation methods. 
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we examine whether our treatment effect varies with 
business model characteristics. First, we find that the investment response of finance lease 
firms is stronger if their product portfolio relies heavily on leased assets for which the 
difference between the lease term and the expected useful life of the leased asset is high. Our 
results reveal that finance lease firms with a product focus on mobile assets, especially, 
office/IT assets, are heavily affected by the reform. Second, we find no significant treatment 
effect for direct lease firms of specific manufacturers, indicating that our findings cannot be 
explained by a decrease in demand.     
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of tax depreciation on firms’ investment 
behaviour. The majority of the recent literature provides evidence on manufacturing firms only 
or focuses on temporary tax depreciation regimes (e.g., Hassett and Newmark, 2008; Hulse 
and Livingstone, 2010; Wielhouwer and Wiersma, 2017; Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Eichfelder 
and Schneider, 2018; Ohrn, 2018; Ohrn, 2019). We add to the literature by exploiting a setting 
that overcomes the major limitations of prior studies. Our setting offers a permanent change 
in tax depreciation rules and is not confounded by other tax changes or economic factors. 
Therefore, we are able to identify a clearer investment response to a change in tax depreciation 
allowances.  
Second, our study adds to the limited literature on the effect of taxation on financial 
institutions. Prior literature examines the effect of taxation on various decisions of banks, e.g., 
 




profit-shifting activities, capital structure choice, location decision and transparency (e.g., 
Huizinga et al., 2014; Merz and Overesch, 2016; Merz et al., 2017; Heckemeyer and de Mooij, 
2017; Andries et al., 2017). However, previous studies do not focus on finance lease firms as 
a specific financial institution operating in a regulated environment. We work towards filling 
this gap by examining the effect of tax depreciation allowances on leasing firms’ investments. 
In addition, we provide evidence that regulatory requirements moderate the investment effect. 
In this context, we answer the call for research on the effect of taxation on financial institutions 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a literature review, describe the 
institutional background of tax depreciation rules and regulatory requirements for leasing 
companies in Germany, and develop our empirical prediction. Section 3.3 outlines the research 
design and describes the data. In Section 3.4 and 3.5, we present empirical findings for our 
baseline and cross-sectional tests. Section 3.6 delivers our conclusions. 
3.2 Institutional background and empirical predictions 
3.2.1 Literature review 
There is a volume of literature that examines the effect of tax incentives on firms’ investment 
decisions (e.g., Hassett and Newmark, 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Dwenger, 2010). 
Early literature fails to provide evidence on the effect of tax incentives on investment decisions 
due to rather endogenous tax regime changes when employing aggregate time-series data and 
displays difficulties in controlling for non-tax effects on investments (e.g., Hines, 1998; 
Hassett and Hubbard, 2002; Dwenger, 2010). However, more recent literature uses exogenous 
cross-sectional variation in the user cost of capital at firm- and asset-levels to overcome the 
earlier identification issues (e.g., Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Maffini et al., 2019; Ohrn, 2019). 
The bonus depreciation provisions are widely exploited reform settings that were applicable 
in the US from the end of 2001 to the end of 2004 and from 2008 onwards. While theory 
predicts that bonus depreciation deductions decrease the user cost of capital and hence should 
increase investment (e.g., Cohen et al., 2002), little evidence exists in early literature that 
bonus depreciation provisions increased firms’ investment (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Desai and Goolsbee (2004) apply a tax-adjusted q-model with firm-level data. Although they 
find that investment is positively associated with the bonus depreciation allowance, the effect 
is rather small and does not prevent the decrease in aggregate investments.  
 




Cohen and Cummins (2006) differentiate between assets with a long and a short tax life to 
investigate the effect of the bonus depreciation provision on specific asset classes. However, 
their results suggest only a very limited impact on investment spending. House and Shapiro 
(2008) show timing and substitution effects of the bonus depreciation allowances on 
investment, although it is unclear whether aggregate investments respond to the new 
depreciation regulation (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Dauchy and Martinez (2008) find a 
significant overall effect on investment, albeit a small one. They point out that the isolation of 
the bonus depreciation effect from the general trend is challenging. In the same manner, Hulse 
and Livingstone (2010) underline that a conclusion to the effect of the bonus depreciation 
provisions should be reached cautiously because of the mixed and rather weak results with 
relatively minor outcomes.47 
However, recent studies that use predominantly comprehensive data on micro levels support 
the theoretical prediction that temporary bonus depreciations affect investment decisions. 
Zwick and Mahon (2017) compare firms in industries with mainly long-duration investments 
to firms in industries with mainly short-duration investments during the US bonus depreciation 
periods. They find an investment effect that is larger for small and cash-poor firms. Ohrn 
(2019) complements the results by showing that two state adopted accelerated depreciation 
policies (US bonus depreciation and Section 179 allowance) have a big effect on investments 
in the US manufacturing sector. However, each of the policies is mitigated as the other is made 
more generous.  
In line with the latest literature on US bonus depreciation allowances, a few studies also 
provide evidence that accelerated depreciation provisions incentivise firm investments in other 
country-specific settings. Eichfelder and Schneider (2018) investigate a bonus depreciation 
provision for investments in eastern Germany after reunification. They find a strong effect on 
large firms’ investments and in particular for investments in long-lived assets, although the 
investment increase seems to be partly driven by timing effects. Wielhouwer and Wiersma 
(2017) study a discretionary tax depreciation regime, which was introduced in the Netherlands 
during the financial crisis. They find that the more flexible tax depreciation regime increases 
investments but only among firms that face the highest marginal tax rate. In addition, they 
                                                 
47 In order to explain the rather mixed results of prior literature, Edgerton (2010) argues that the effectiveness of 
US bonus depreciation provisions was reduced because of the asymmetric tax treatment of profits and losses. In 
addition, the effectiveness of tax depreciation incentives may be limited because the temporary tax depreciation 
benefit does not directly affect accounting earnings and thus does not have financial reporting consequences, 
which are more important to managers (e.g., Neubig, 2006; Hulse and Livingstone, 2010; Edgerton, 2012). 
Results of different surveys reveal that temporary accelerated and bonus depreciation provisions do not appear 
to be of great importance to managers (e.g., Rose and O’Neil, 1985; Porcano, 1987; Cohen and Cummins, 2006). 
 




show that firms postpone tax depreciation when facing losses or loss carry forwards. Maffini 
et al. (2019) investigate the effect of accelerated depreciation allowances in the UK for small 
and medium sized firms by exploiting exogenous changes in the qualifying threshold for first-
year depreciation allowances.48 They find that access to more capital allowances increases 
firms’ investments, which is mainly due to the reduction in the user cost of capital and not 
based on a cash flow effect.   
Taken together, previous literature can provide some evidence on the effect of tax depreciation 
on investment in general, although prior studies have some common features, which provide 
only limited insights into the investment effects of tax depreciation. Existing studies focus on 
temporary tax depreciation regimes such as special bonus or discretionary tax depreciation 
provisions. In addition, the majority of studies examine depreciation tax incentives during 
economic downturns and provisions that were often introduced simultaneously with other tax 
factors such as corporate tax rate changes or other investment incentives. Potential 
confounding effects in these settings limit the validity of the results.  
3.2.2 Tax depreciation rules and regulatory requirements for leasing companies in 
Germany  
Leasing activities can be generally split up into operating and finance leases. Operating leases 
are characterised by short lease terms, flexible and easy possibilities to cancel the lease 
contract, and multiple transfers of the leased asset to different lessees. In the case of operating 
lease contracts, the lessor bears the risk borne by the leased asset. This type of lease is 
generally used for short-term investments. In contrast to operating leases, finance leases have 
two essential functions: transfer of the right to use the leased asset and the financing function. 
Since finance leases constitute financial service activities, companies from the finance lease 
sector are licensed and supervised by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FFSA). According to the FFSA49, the characteristic of finance leases is that the lessor 
company procures the asset in its own name and on its own account. Then, the lessor transfers 
the use of the asset to the lessee, who essentially finances and amortises the asset over the 
lease term based on the contractual formulation. Thus, the lessee bears the investment risk, 
and not the lessor. In addition, the lessee is contractually prohibited from cancelling the lease 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that the change in the qualifying threshold is also relevant for claiming SME research and 
development tax credits.  
49 FFSA, Bulletin Finance Lease, January 19, 2009, (only available in German, https://www.bafin. 
de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Merkblatt/mb_090119_tatbestand_finanzierungsleasing.html).  
 




contract during the lease term. Since the financing function is the important feature of finance 
leases, this type of lease is used primarily for medium and long-term investments. 
Besides the different business models of operating and finance lease firms, companies in the 
latter category are treated as financial services institutions and thus are licensed and supervised 
by the FFSA. Therefore, finance lease firms are subject to organisational-specific regulatory 
obligations, in particular the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (MaRisk) issued 
by the FFSA.50 The provisions cover general requirements for risk management and specific 
provisions regarding the performance of meaningful stress tests, the handling of risk 
concentrations, and the quality and quantity of liquidity buffers. For example, the requirements 
for the management of liquidity risks demand a liquidity buffer of liquid assets that is sufficient 
to offset negative consequences resulting from a general decline in the price of marketable 
assets, and a general deterioration in refinancing conditions. In contrast, operating lease firms 
are neither supervised by the FFSA nor subject to such regulatory requirements.   
According to the German-GAAP, the attribution of leased assets depends on the beneficial 
ownership, which is comparable to IFRS and US-GAAP (e.g., Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; 
Bauman and Francis, 2011). Beneficial owner of the leased asset is the party bearing the 
majority of the opportunities and risks that the leased asset carries. Since there is no legal 
definition of beneficial ownership in Germany, the treatment for tax purposes, which is based 
on the Leasing Decrees of the German Federal Ministry of Finance, is generally applicable to 
lease accounting. While the lessor is undeniably the beneficial owner of the leased asset in the 
case of operating lease activities, resulting in the recognition of the leased asset on the balance 
sheet of the lessor, the beneficial ownership is ambiguous in the case of finance lease contracts. 
For this reason, the Federal Ministry of Finance defines, in particular, the necessary criteria 
for the attribution of leased assets to the lessor with regard to finance lease contracts.  
Under the Leasing Decrees of the Federal Ministry of Finance51, the lessor is regarded as 
beneficial owner of the leased asset if under a full-payout lease of mobile assets the lease term 
is between 40% and 90% of the expected useful life of the asset. If the lease contract contains 
a purchase or rental extension option, the purchase price and the aggregate rent must be higher 
than the book value or the lower market value. Under a partial-payout lease of mobile assets, 
                                                 
50 See, FFSA, Minimum Requirements for Risk Management, Circulars 15/2009 (BA) of August 14, 2009 and 
11/2010 (BA) of December 15, 2010. 
51 The Federal Ministry of Finance differentiates between full-payout leases (Federal Ministry of Finance, IV B/2 
– S 2170 – 31/71, of April 19, 1971) and partial-payout leases (Federal Ministry of Finance, IV B/2 – S 2170 – 
161/75, of December 22, 1975). 
 




the lessee does not finance or amortise the asset over the lease term. However, the asset is 
attributed to the lessor if the lessor has a right to sell the leased asset to the lessee or the lessee 
is bound by contract to compensate the remaining amortisation after the end of the lease term.  
If the leased asset is attributed to the lessor, the lessor is required to recognise the leased asset 
as a non-current asset measured at acquisition costs on the balance sheet, charge depreciation, 
and recognise impairment losses, if applicable. Until the end of 2013, German tax authorities 
accepted two regular depreciation methods for tax purposes. First, the lessor could apply 
straight-line depreciation over the expected useful life of the leased asset, which was, and still 
is, determined in tax depreciation tables issued by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Second, 
the lessor could apply straight-line depreciation over the lease term under consideration of the 
residual value provided in the lease contract. We provide a simplified example in Table 3.B1 
(Appendix) to present the economic advantage of the tax depreciation over the lease term 
compared to tax depreciation over the longer expected useful life of the leased asset. 
Straight-line depreciation over the lease term under consideration of the residual value was 
the most preferred and applied depreciation method with regard to finance lease contracts for 
tax and accounting purposes, because the business model of finance leases requires that the 
leased asset is financed and amortised over the non-cancellable lease term.52 Since the leased 
asset is only attributed to the lessor if the lease term is no longer than 90% of the expected 
useful life of the asset, the lease term provided in the contract is always shorter than the 
expected useful life of the asset. With regard to the business model of finance lease companies, 
depreciation over the lease term allows for a better match of revenues and allocation of 
acquisition costs over time. 
In contrast to finance leases, straight-line depreciation over the lease term is not the common 
tax depreciation method for operating leases. Here, the business model requires that the leased 
asset is not financed and amortised by a single transfer of the right to use the leased asset but 
by multiple, short-term transfers of the leased asset to various lessees.  
With effect from 1.1.2014, the lease-specific tax depreciation method was abolished by the 
supreme tax authorities (see Federal Association of German Leasing Companies, 2014). Since 
                                                 
52 After the end of the lease term, finance lease firms in general sell the leased asset at the residual value. However, 
in the case of full-payout leases the residual value of the leased asset is zero. The revenue from the sale of the 
leased asset generally amounts to 4.87% of the acquisition costs (median value from an evaluation of 47,479 
lease contracts of two German finance lease firms, see Oestreicher and Hillmann (2016)). Since the residual value 
and the revenue from the sale of the asset are of subordinate importance to our analysis due to their small 
magnitude, we do not take account of these values in our paper.       
 




then, the lessor has been required to apply straight-line depreciation over the expected useful 
life of the leased asset, based on the tax depreciation tables, when determining the depreciation 
deductions for tax purposes. For lease accounting purposes under the German-GAAP, the 
lessor can continue to apply straight-line depreciation over the lease term. 
This unique change in the tax depreciation rules allows us to investigate the investment effect 
of tax depreciations in a setting characterised by properties that mitigate identification issues 
due to endogenous changes in the tax regime, for the following reasons. First, compared to 
prior literature this setting does not present a temporary change in tax depreciation regimes 
but a permanent change in applicable depreciation methods for tax purposes. Therefore, in our 
setting it can be ruled out that finance lease firms postponed investment in the expectation that 
this regulatory change was only temporary.  
Second, compared to prior literature, our investigations do not apply to a period of economic 
downturn, which can directly affect investment behaviour or at least confound the effect of 
tax depreciation deductions (e.g., Edgerton, 2010). Third, we exploit a setting not associated 
with a specific political goal that could lead to anticipation effects or influence certain firm 
behaviour. Instead, the change in depreciation rules was an administrative decision by the 
supreme tax authorities because the applied tax depreciation over the lease term did not 
correspond with the administrative interpretation of the tax law (Federal Association of 
German Leasing Companies, 2014). Although the Federal Ministry of Finance accepted tax 
depreciation over the lease term, this acceptance was subject to a regular meeting of the 
German Länder heads of tax department in late 2013 with a view to a possible deviation from 
basic depreciation principles.53 However, we do not expect that knowledge about this meeting 
the result of which reached the public in February 2014 lead to anticipation effects.  
Fourth, the change in the applicable tax depreciation methods was significant for the finance 
lease sector because the tax depreciation over the lease term was the preferred and 
predominantly applied depreciation method for a company operating in the finance lease 
sector. The German leasing sector has a new business volume of EUR 50bn per year on 
average, of which 90% is recognised on the balance sheet of the lessor (Federal Association 
of German Leasing Companies, 2012). Therefore, leasing companies have a high intensity of 
investment (non-current assets on the balance sheet) due to their business model. In our 
sample, the average ratio of tangible assets to total assets is 70%. Consequently, changes in 
tax depreciation rules directly affect a large part of the balance sheet. The Federal Association 
                                                 
53 See, Federal Ministry of Finance, IV C 6 – S 2170/08/10002:004, of February 24, 2014. 
 




of German Leasing Companies (2014) highlights that the shift of tax payments to earlier years 
due to the less beneficial tax depreciation rule affects the equity and hence restricts financing 
options for investments in new assets for customers.   
Finally, the change does not overlap with other tax changes relevant to the leasing sector. Since 
we examine a change in German tax depreciation rules that affects only the German finance 
lease sector, different country-specific factors (such as country-specific differences in firms’ 
investment behaviour and regulatory differences in lease tax accounting, etc.) cannot explain 
our results.54 
However, a potential concern might be that the Basel III reform affects our analysis. In June 
2013, the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) (EU, 2013a) was published with 
the primary objective of implementing the Basel III regulatory framework into EU law (EU, 
2013b, Recital 1 and 10). After the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2011) agreed on a set of measures regarding capital and liquidity requirements 
in order to strengthen the supervision and risk management in the financial sector. Since the 
CRD IV applies to all banks in the EU, finance lease companies are in principle not affected 
by this regulation, except for leasing companies that are part of a banking group. However, 
we do not expect CRD IV to affect directly finance lease companies affiliated to banks in 
2014, for the following reasons. First, the Basel III reform is anticipated by banks as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) issued the regulatory standard at the end of 2010. 
Second, Basel III provided for relatively long transition periods. For example, the capital 
maintenance buffer was to be built up gradually starting in 2016 and the structural liquidity 
ratio and the maximum debt ratio were introduced in 2018. Third, substantial parts of the 
liquidity regulations of Basel III which do not have to be implemented until 2015 are already 
effective for finance lease firms due to the MaRisk regulation.55  
In sum, this setting provides us with a significant and unanticipated change in tax depreciation 
rules for firms operating in the finance lease sector. Furthermore, we cannot identify potential 
confounding effects that could affect our analysis. Therefore, we can exploit this setting to 
examine the effect of tax depreciation rules on investments by finance lease firms.  
                                                 
54 Since we examine unconsolidated German GAAP financial statements of mainly private finance lease and 
rental firms, it is not likely that our results are due to drafts and changes to IFRS 16.  
55 To further mitigate the concern that the CRD IV confounds our analyses, we exclude all finance lease 
companies affiliated to banks and re-estimate our OLS regression (Eq. (1)) with Investment as the dependent 
variable for our full and matched sample. In tests not documented here, the results are in general consistent with 
our main findings, indicating that finance lease firms affiliated to banks do not drive our results.   
 





Theoretical considerations concerning the effect of taxation on investment decisions of firms 
have their roots in neoclassical investment theory (e.g., Jorgenson, 1963; Tobin, 1969), as 
amended to encompass corporate taxation (e.g., Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Summers, 1981). 
In general, a firm should invest as long as the marginal benefit of an additional investment 
exceeds the marginal costs of the additional investment. To measure this association, Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967) derive from the neoclassical investment theory the concept of the user cost 
of capital, in which the cost of investment is, among other influencing factors, affected by 
corporate taxes. In this model, corporate taxes on profits reduce the investment’s cash flow 
and hence increases the cost of investment (e.g., Auerbach, 1983). On the other hand, 
allowances for tax depreciation decrease the cost of investment because tax depreciation 
deductions reduce the corporate income tax base (e.g., Summers, 1981).  
The method of tax depreciation affects the present value of tax depreciation deductions and 
therefore the present value of tax payments and cost of investment. In general, the tax benefit 
of depreciation deductions depends on the tax rate, interest rate, depreciation period and the 
permitted amount of depreciation per year (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). The change from 
straight-line tax depreciation based on the lease term to straight-line tax depreciation over the 
longer expected useful life of the asset reduces the present value of tax depreciation 
deductions. According to the neoclassical investment theory, higher cost of capital due to a 
decrease in the present value of tax depreciation deductions should lead to a lower capital 
stock and thus to a decrease in the investment rate in the short term.  
In contrast to theoretical models that assume perfect capital markets and no financial frictions 
(e.g., Miller and Modigliani, 1958; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967), some theoretical approaches 
examine investment behaviour under the assumption of incomplete and imperfect markets 
(e.g., Greenwald et al., 1984; Fazzari et al., 1988). In the latter theoretical approach, cash flow 
is considered an important determinant of firms’ investment spending if internal finance has 
important cost advantages over external finance (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Michaely and 
Roberts, 2011). Besides incomplete and imperfect markets, regulatory requirements regarding 
liquidity and capital present additional financial frictions limiting the opportunities to finance 
investment (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019). If a firm is financially constrained in the sense that it 
faces imperfect markets or regulatory requirements, less beneficial tax depreciation 
allowances can aggravate financial constraints and decrease investments. Considering both 
 




potential channels56 for the investment response (i.e., cost of capital and financial frictions), 
we state our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis: Finance lease firms decrease their investments after the change in tax 
depreciation allowances to a less beneficial tax depreciation regime in 2014.  
3.3 Research design and data 
3.3.1 Estimation strategy 
To test our empirical predictions, we apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation 
method. The application of the DiD approach requires the determination of a treatment and a 
control group. In general, the change in tax depreciation rules applies to companies from the 
leasing sector. However, not all lease companies are affected by the change in tax depreciation 
rules because operating and finance leases follow different business models. The business 
model of finance leases is that of financial services, because a finance lease is characterised 
by the transfer of the right to use the leased asset to a single lessee, who essentially finances 
and amortises the asset over the lease term. Due to this business model, prior to the 
administrative order in 2014, straight-line depreciation over the lease term was the most 
preferred and applied depreciation method in terms of tax and accounting for assets leased 
under a finance lease contract. Since finance lease companies are directly affected by the 
change in tax depreciation allowances, we use German finance lease firms as our treatment 
group.   
The use of finance lease firms as our treatment group has two advantages. First, as mentioned 
in Section 3.2.2, almost all finance lease companies recognise the leased assets on their balance 
sheet because of the special attribution criteria according to the Leasing Decrees of the German 
Federal Ministry of Finance. Therefore, we can observe the change in investment volumes of 
finance lease companies during our sample period. Second, we have access to the total 
population of finance lease companies in Germany. Since the FFSA supervises German 
finance lease firms, a list of all licensed finance lease companies is publicly available. In sum, 
our treatment group consists of companies operating in the finance lease sector, which are 
registered with the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority over the course of our 
sample period (2011-2015).  
                                                 
56 In Section 3.5.1, we shed more light on the financial friction channel affecting the investment response.  
 




In contrast to finance leases, operating leases are characterised by short lease terms. Thus, 
multiple transfers to different lessees of the right to use the leased asset are necessary in order 
to amortise the asset. The business model of operating leases is that of rental services, because 
operating lease firms depreciate the leased asset over the expected useful life of the said asset. 
Therefore, our control group consists of German companies in the rental industry, including 
operating lease firms.  
This control group has several advantages. First, the business model of renting out assets has 
considerable similarities with finance lease activities, which means that both industries are 
affected by similar economic circumstances, e.g. fluctuations in demand or competition with 
credit institutions. Second, companies in the rental, operating lease and finance lease sectors 
invest intensively in tangible assets and hence have a similar balance sheet structure. However, 
rental and operating lease organisations are not affected by the change in tax depreciation 
allowances described above, because the lease-specific tax depreciation method was 
applicable to leased assets and used, in particular, for assets leased by finance lease firms.  
To test the effect of the change in tax depreciation rules on the investments made by finance 
lease companies (Hypothesis 1), we estimate the following baseline DiD model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
The dependent variable Investment is defined as the difference in tangible assets from t to t-1 
relative to the prior year’s tangible assets (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016). Although finance 
lease companies are in general obliged to disclose leased assets separately from other tangible 
assets, we define tangible assets as the sum of leased and other tangible assets for two reasons. 
First, the use of tangible assets ensures better comparability between our treatment and our 
control group. Second, we avoid the problem of missing values if leased assets are not shown 
separately on the balance sheet.57  
                                                 
57 In an additional test, we re-estimate our OLS regression but use as the dependent variable the net investment 
rate of leasing assets for our treated firms (instead of the sum of tangible and leasing assets) to address the concern 
that changes in other tangible assets drive our results. The dependent variable for our control group does not 
change since we have no information about potential leasing assets of rental firms/operating lease firms. The 
results are consistent with our main findings, indicating that our results reveal effects on leasing assets and not 
tangible assets (see Table 3.B2 (Appendix)). However, we cannot solve a potential measurement error in the 
dependent variable for our control group. 
 




We define our sample period from 2011 to 2015.58 We use this relatively narrow sample 
window to reduce the likelihood that other events unrelated to the change in tax depreciation 
rules affect the investment decision of companies from the finance lease sector. We exploit 
the change in the tax depreciation regime for the finance lease sector, which has been effective 
and enforced by the tax authorities since the beginning of 2014, as an exogenous event. 
Therefore, Post equals 1 for 2014-2015 and 0 for 2011-2013. The indicator variable Treatment 
distinguishes between observations belonging to the treatment and control group, respectively. 
In line with our prediction, we expect a negative and significant estimate of our DiD 
coefficient (Post x Treatment). 
We estimate Equation (1) using OLS regression and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). Following recent literature, we control for firm-
level characteristics to capture the ability to invest in tangible assets (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 
2016; Jacob et al., 2019; Rauter, 2020). We include total assets (Size) to control for the firm’s 
size because size can be a proxy for firm value and investment opportunities. Leverage 
controls for the capital structure, which influences investment decisions. In addition, we 
include Profitability and Loss in order to control for the firm’s performance and potential 
investment opportunities. Further, we control for available cash by including Liquidity. 
Finally, to control for general time trends in investment activities and time-invariant 
unobservable differences in firm characteristics, we use firm and year fixed effects. Table 3.B3 
(Appendix) provides a description of the variables used in this study.   
The econometric approach we apply may raise general concerns. First, since our treated and 
control firms belong to different industries, they have different characteristics, which might 
drive the differences observed in the investment behaviour. We try to mitigate this concern by 
employing a matching approach. Therefore, our empirical strategy is to use a sample of 
comparable rental and operating lease firms that we match with our finance lease firms. Using 
propensity score matching, we match each treated firm with a control firm based on pre-reform 
average values of the natural logarithm of tangible assets and all covariates used in our main 
DiD regression model (Eq. (1)). To avoid a sample size reduction, we use one-to-one nearest 
neighbour matching without replacement, which is the most common method of matching in 
accounting research (Shipman et al., 2017).59     
                                                 
58 Since we scale most of our controls by prior year’s total assets, we include data from 2010 to calculate controls 
in 2011. 
59 Our main inferences do not change when we use a different matching strategy (e.g., one-to-two nearest 
neighbour matching with replacement).  
 




Second, the validity of our DiD analyses hinges on the assumption that the reform is not 
anticipated by finance lease firms. However, anticipation of the change in tax depreciation 
allowances seems very unlikely because the change was an administrative order by the 
supreme tax authorities, which is not similar to a public legislative procedure (see Section 
3.2.2). To mitigate this concern further, we check the parallel trend assumption of our DiD 
analysis by conducting placebo tests and providing yearly treatment effects in Section 3.4.2.    
3.3.2 Data and sample overview 
We use two different data sources to construct our sample. First, we use the Amadeus database 
provided by Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus contains accounting statements (i.e., balance sheets 
and income statements) for private firms in Europe. We use this data source to collect financial 
statement data of our control firms, which are German firms that belong to the rental and 
operating lease sectors (NACE code 7710-7739, hereafter “rental firms”).60 Second, we 
identify and collect financial statement data relating to our treated firms. Since the Amadeus 
database does not contain comprehensive data on banks and financial services companies, we 
manually collect financial statement data of German firms from the finance lease sector, which 
is published in the German Federal Gazette’s Company Register database. To identify 
companies offering finance leases, we received a list from the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority comprising all companies from the finance lease sector that were licensed and 
supervised by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority over the sample period (2011-
2015). During our sample period, 311 companies were licensed to carry out finance lease 
activities.     
Table 3.B4 (Appendix) outlines our sample selection process. We restrict our data to firms 
with unconsolidated German-GAAP financial statement data because we want to examine the 
investment response of each individual firm. In order to avoid confounding events and effects, 
we check for restructuring processes (e.g. mergers and takeovers) during the sample period.61 
A potential concern in our identification of control firms could arise because companies from 
the finance lease sector might be wrongly attributed to the operating lease sector in the 
Amadeus database. In order to address this concern, we drop all firms in our control group 
that have similar company names compared to the firms in our treatment group. In addition, 
                                                 
60 While the Amadeus database in principle separates finance leases (NACE code 6491) from operating leases, 
the database combines hiring activities and operating leases in the NACE codes 7710-7739. 
61 We check for restructuring processes by using the database Northdata, which provides company information 
on German firms. 
 




we require firm-year observations to contain information on our dependent variable 
(investment) and controls (total assets, leverage, profitability, loss, and liquidity). Finally, each 
firm needs at least one observation before and after the reform. The final sample comprises 
2,226 firm-year observations of 548 firms for the years 2011 to 2015.62  
Table 3.1:Sample description 
Panel A: Sample distribution 
  Full sample  Matched sample 
  Number of firm-
year observations 
 Number of 
firms 
 Number of firm-
year observations 
 Number of 
firms 
Treatment group  927  195  927  195 
         
Control group  1,299  353  732  195 
         
Total  2,226  548  1,659  390 
Panel B: Summary statistics over the period 2011-2015 
 N Mean StDev P50 Min Max 
Treatment group       
Investment 927 0.0220 0.2896 0.0035 -0.6898 4.0512 
Liquidity 927 0.0007 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 0.1877 
Size 927 10.0241 1.8133 9.9699 5.3270 13.9484 
Leverage 927 0.6172 0.3491 0.6442 0.0000 2.4416 
Profitability 927 0.0318 0.0785 0.0155 -0.3454 0.6980 
Loss 927 0.1931 0.3949 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
       
Full sample control group       
Investment 1,299 0.1082 0.3689 0.0232 -0.7885 3.0672 
Liquidity 1,299 0.0922 0.1188 0.0449 0.0000 0.6457 
Size 1,299 8.5800 1.7554 8.6045 4.3820 13.1019 
Leverage 1,299 0.5246 0.3599 0.5191 0.0000 2.3487 
Profitability 1,299 0.0891 0.1275 0.0593 -0.3298 0.8024 
Loss 1,299 0.1424 0.3496 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
       
Matched sample control group       
Investment 732 0.0816 0.3348 0.0091 -0.7885 2.3117 
Liquidity 732 0.0260 0.0409 0.0120 0.0000 0.4789 
Size 732 8.7833 1.753 8.8100 4.5109 13.1019 
Leverage 732 0.5770 0.3692 0.5783 0.0000 1.9337 
Profitability 732 0.0685 0.1129 0.0458 -0.3125 0.6409 
Loss 732 0.1831 0.3870 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: This table provides the sample description. Panel A outlines the sample distribution of our full and 
matched sample. Panel B provides summary statistics for the treatment, full and matched sample control group 
over the period 2011-2015. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). In order to calculate the control 
variables in 2011, which are scaled by prior year’s total assets, we use data from 2010, which we do not include 
in our sample period.  
                                                 
62 Since our final sample is not balanced due to missing data, we check the robustness of our main results, 
following the process to balance the sample. We use the balanced sample to re-estimate our DiD regression (Eq. 
(1)) with Investment as the dependent variable for our full and matched sample (see Table 3.B5 (Appendix)). 
Although the size of the balanced sample is substantially smaller, the results are in general consistent with our 
main findings, indicating that missing firm-year observations do not affect our results. 
 




Panel A in Table 3.1 reports that out of 548 firms, 195 firms belong to the finance lease sector 
(treatment group) and 353 firms belong to the rental sector (control group). After applying the 
one-to-one nearest neighbour matching, the number of control firms drops to 195 resulting in 
1,659 firm-year observations of 390 firms. Panel B in Table 3.1 presents summary statistics 
separately for treatment, full sample and matched sample control group observations over the 
sample period 2011-2015. Since our sample size is very small, we do not correct for outliers 
in our analyses.63 Table 3.B3 (Appendix) lists detailed variable definitions.  
Our summary statistics show that treated firms in general have a smaller net investment rate 
compared to control firms. With regard to the control variables, the full sample rental firms 
and finance lease firms have on average a similar leverage, profitability and frequency of loss 
occurrence. However, our full sample control firms are on average slightly smaller and have 
more liquidity compared to our treated firms. Our matched sample reduces the mean difference 
between the treated and control firms, which increases the comparability of the two groups.64  
However, we note that differences between our treatment and control group remain. To further 
mitigate concerns that observable differences between our treatment and control group drive 
our results, we employ entropy balancing matching (Hainmueller, 2012; see Table 3.B8 
(Appendix)).65 
3.4 The effect of tax depreciation on firms’ investment behaviour 
3.4.1 Main results 
We start our main analysis with a graphic illustration of investment rates over time. Using our 
full sample, Figure 3.1 plots the average Investment of firms from the finance lease sector 
(blue line) and firms from the rental sector (red line) over the years 2011-2015. We observe a 
parallel trend in the investment rates of finance lease and rental firms in the pre-reform period 
(2011-2013). While rental firms invest on average 10-11% of their tangible assets, finance 
lease firms invest 4-5% of their tangible assets every year. Following the administrative decree 
                                                 
63 In order to mitigate the concern that outliers influence our results, we winsorise all continuous variables at the 
1% (99%) level and re-estimate our OLS regression (Eq. (1)) with Investment as the dependent variable for our 
full and matched sample (see Table 3.B6 (Appendix)). The results are consistent with our main findings, 
indicating that outliers do not affect our results.    
64 In Table 3.B7 (Appendix), we provide summary statistics separately for treatment, full sample and matched 
sample control group observations over the pre-reform sample period 2011-2013. We can draw the same 
conclusions from the summary statistics of the pre-reform and full sample period.   
65 We employ entropy balancing matching and re-estimate our main regression model (Eq. (1)) with Investment 
as the dependent variable. By constructing weights for each control observation, entropy balancing ensures that 
treated and control firms are comparable in observable firm-level characteristics (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). 
Our DiD results are in general consistent with our main regression results (see Table 3.B8 (Appendix)). 
 




in 2014, we observe a sharp drop in the investment rate of finance lease firms, which recovers 
slightly in 2015. The investment rate of rental firms, on the other hand, increases slightly in 
the post-reform period.  








Notes: This figure provides visual evidence that pre-reform trends in investments are similar while the reform of 
tax depreciation allowances results in a significant decrease in the investment of finance lease firms. The figure 
plots the average investment in % of finance lease firms (blue line) and rental firms (red line). Investment is 
defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). The dashed vertical line highlights the year prior to the reform. 
We further compare investments of finance lease and rental firms before and after the reform. 
Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that the average investment rate of finance lease firms is lower for 
the periods after the reform (-0.0097) than before the reform (0.0434). The time difference is 
significant at conventional levels (p-value < 0.01). Panel B and Panel C present the time 
difference in the average investment rate before and after the reform for rental firms in our full 
(Panel B) and matched sample (Panel C). Firms in the rental sector have on average a higher 
investment rate in the pre- and post-reform period. However, we find no significant time 
difference in investment rates for either control group, i.e., rental firms in our full or in our 
matched sample.     
After the first indications reveal that the reform of tax depreciation allowances decreases the 
investment rate of finance lease firms, we test our Hypothesis 1 using our DiD approach (Eq. 
(1)). Table 3.3 reports OLS regression results for our baseline model. We estimate two 
specifications for our full and matched sample: DiD model with fixed effects but without 
controls (Column 1 and 3), and a fully specified DiD model with fixed effects and firm controls 
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Table 3.2: Univariate time difference analysis 
Panel A: Treatment group (N = 927) 
 Pre-reform (2011 - 2013)  Post-reform (2014 - 2015) 
 Time difference 
 Mean  Mean 
Investment 0.0434  -0.0097  
0.0530*** 
(0.0193) 
Panel B: Full sample control group (N = 1,299) 
 Pre-reform (2011 - 2013)  Post-reform (2014 - 2015) 
 Time difference 
 Mean  Mean 
Investment 0.1046  0.1133  
-0.0086 
(0.0208) 
Panel C: Matched control group (N = 732) 
 Pre-reform (2011 - 2013)  Post-reform (2014 - 2015) 
 Time difference 
 Mean  Mean 
Investment 0.0664  0.1027  
-0.0363 
(0.0251) 
Notes: We report the average investment rate (Investment) of the treatment (Panel A), full sample and matched 
control group (Panel B and C) before and after the reform of tax depreciation allowances. The last column shows 
the results from the t-test that the average investment rate before the reform equals the average investment rate 
after the reform. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix).   
Overall, the findings in Table 3.3 provide the following insights. First, the estimated average 
treatment effect is (as predicted) negative and significant at conventional levels (p-value < 0.1) 
in Column 1 and 2. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the coefficient increases 
slightly when we include firm-level controls in Column 2. This should not be surprising since 
our treatment and control group differ in some firm characteristics. Second, we find significant 
DiD estimators for the matched sample (Column 3 and 4), which accounts for differences in 
the economic activities of finance lease and rental firms. The coefficient estimates are very 
similar when excluding or including firm-level controls. Third, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is similar across the matched sample and fully specified regression based on the 
full sample (Column 2 to 4), which suggests that our results are robust to changes in the 
composition of our control group. Across all specifications, the results confirm our first 
hypothesis that the less beneficial tax depreciation allowances negatively affect investments 
of finance lease firms.   
For the full sample, the coefficient is -0.0698 and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). Our 
results reveal that the change to the less beneficial tax depreciation regime reduces the net 
investment rate in tangible assets of finance lease firms by 6.98 percentage points compared 
to rental firms. The economic magnitude of the DiD estimator is large. Given that the average 
 




tangible assets of a finance lease firm in the pre-reform sample are about EUR 64.8m, 
investments in tangible assets decrease by EUR 4.5m for each finance lease firm, on average.66 
This quite large effect of tax depreciation on investments can be explained by the business 
model of companies from the finance lease sector. The main purpose of leasing companies 
with a focus on finance lease contracts is to buy assets, which are recognised on the balance 
sheet of the lessor, and lease them over a specific lease term to the lessee as agreed by contract. 
Consequently, the business model of companies from the finance lease sector relies heavily 
on the amount of leased assets. The average ratio of tangible assets to total assets is 70%, 
which underlines the focus on tangible assets. 
Table 3.3: Effect of tax depreciation on investment 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Post x Treatment -0.0437* -0.0698***  -0.0673** -0.0632** 
 (0.0264) (0.0256)  (0.0309) (0.0283) 
Size  -0.194***   -0.192*** 
  (0.0442)   (0.0481) 
Leverage  0.759***   0.714*** 
  (0.0813)   (0.0950) 
Profitability  0.303**   0.0720 
  (0.147)   (0.135) 
Loss  -0.0153   -0.0214 
  (0.0268)   (0.0266) 
Liquidity  -0.0852   0.993* 
  (0.214)   (0.550) 
Controls None Included  None Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.142 0.384  0.152 0.411 
N 2,226 2,226  1,659 1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. The table reports two different specifications for the full and 
matched sample: (1) and (3) regression with fixed effects but without firm-level controls, and (2) and (4) fully 
specified regression with fixed effects and firm-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate 
models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction 
term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firm observations (companies from the finance lease sector) in the 
post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported 
values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
We translate our results into an elasticity of investments in tangible assets with respect to the 
net-of-tax cost of a unit investment (following Jacob et al., 2019, and Maffini et al., 2019). 
Tangible assets of a finance lease firm increase, on average, by 4.3% in the pre-reform period 
(see Table 3.B7 (Appendix)). A reduction in net investments by 6.98 percentage points means 
that the finance lease firm’s growth factor of tangible assets decreases by 6.7% (= 0.0698 / 
                                                 
66 Table 3.B7 (Appendix) contains descriptive statistics of tangible assets.   
 




(1+0.043)) relative to renting firms. Assuming the marginal tax rate is 30%, the discount rate 
is 7%, the average lease term is 4 years and the average tax depreciation period is 6 years, the 
change in depreciation allowances increases the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment by around 
1.13% (see Appendix 3.A (Appendix)). Therefore, the implied elasticity of investment with 
respect to the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment is about -6.  
To put our depreciation allowance effect into perspective, we compare our results with the 
recent literature, which calculates the elasticity of investment with respect to the net-of-tax 
cost of a unit investment. Using changes in thresholds for first-year allowances in the UK, 
Maffini et al. (2019) estimate elasticities of 8.3 – 9.9 for small and medium firms. Ohrn (2018) 
examines the effect of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) in the US and 
calculates an elasticity around 6.5. Other studies estimate the elasticity of capital expenditure 
with respect to the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment. For example, Zwick and Mahon (2017) 
study US federal bonus depreciation allowances and estimate an elasticity of 7 using industry-
level variations. Ohrn (2019) examines the response to US state bonus depreciation policies 
and estimates an elasticity of 9.55.  
Our result is mostly comparable to Maffini et al. (2019) and Ohrn (2018) because both studies 
calculate the elasticity of investment with respect to the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment. 
Our result is especially in line with Ohrn (2018). However, we acknowledge that the 
comparison with both studies is limited since we use the net investment rate instead of 
investment (which equals capital expenditure scaled by lagged fixed assets) as the dependent 
variable.67, 68  
Next, we test the robustness of our results by using alternative dependent variables. Since the 
drawback of our investment rate could be that it does not account for depreciation and changes 
in total assets, we employ two different investment rates to mitigate the concern that scaling 
effects and depreciation affect our results. First, we calculate the investment rate as the change 
in tangible assets scaled by the prior year’s total assets (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016). 
Second, we employ the gross investment rate, defined as the change in tangible assets before 
                                                 
67 Due to data limitations, we do not have information about capital expenditure, which prevents us from 
calculating elasticities for specifications similar to prior literature.  
68 We note that we use an interest rate of 7% for the determination of the elasticity to be comparable with the 
prior literature. However, the average effective interest rate of German banks granting loans for new businesses 
up to EUR 1 million over our sample period is 3.08% (https://www.bundesbank.de/statistic-rmi/Statistic 
Download?tsId=BBK01.SUD124&its_csvFormat=en&its_fileFormat=csv&mode=its). Employing this interest 
rate and re-calculating our elasticity results in an elasticity of -10.8, which is very much in line with the result of 
Maffini et al. (2019). Therefore, we acknowledge that our initial elasticity underestimates the effect of the change 
in tax depreciation allowances on investments.     
 




depreciation scaled by the prior year’s total assets (e.g., Bethmann et al., 2018; Jacob et al., 
2019). 
Table 3.4 reports the results from OLS regressions with our two alternative dependent 
variables for the full (Column 1 and 2) and matched sample (Column 3 and 4): change in 
tangible assets scaled by prior year’s total assets (Column 1 and 3) and gross investment rate 
(Column 2 and 4). Overall, the results show a negative significant effect of a less beneficial 
tax depreciation regime on the investment of companies from the finance lease sector, which 
is consistent with the results of Table 3.3.  
Table 3.4: Effect of tax depreciation on investment – alternative dependent variables 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Inv_TA Inv_Depr  Inv_TA Inv_Depr 
Post x Treatment -0.0338*** -0.0365**  -0.0323** -0.0343** 
 (0.0127) (0.0142)  (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Controls Included Included  Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.487 0.657  0.481 0.674 
N 2,226 1,935  1,659 1,508 
Notes: The dependent variable is change in tangible assets scaled by prior year’s total assets (Inv_TA) in Column 
1 and 3 and the gross investment rate (Inv_Depr) in Column 2 and 4. The table reports fully specified regressions 
with fixed effects and firm-level control for the full and matched sample. The main variable of interest in the 
multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The 
interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firm observations (companies from the finance lease sector) 
in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported 
values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
3.4.2 Placebo tests 
Since one crucial assumption of our identification approach using DiD analyses is the parallel 
trend in our treatment and control group, we assess the robustness of our results by challenging 
the validity of our exogenous shock. Thus, we conduct placebo tests by re-estimating our 
baseline regression (Eq. (1)) in two versions. First, we use a restricted sample period from 
2011 to 2013 and apply a pseudo-reform in 2013. Second, we use a restricted sample period 
from 2011 to 2012 and define the placebo treatment date as the year 2012. If the parallel trend 
assumption is satisfied for the treatment and control group observations, we expect the DiD 
coefficient estimators of the pseudo-reform settings to be insignificant.  
The results of both placebo tests are reported in Table 3.5. We test both placebo treatment 
dates with the full (Column 1 and 3) and matched sample (Column 2 and 4). The results 
 




suggest that the placebo treatment effects are not statistically significant, supporting the 
validity of our DiD analyses.  
Table 3.5: Placebo treatment tests 
  Full sample Matched sample  Full sample Matched sample 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Sample period: 2011-2013  Sample period: 2011-2012 
2012 x Treatment  
  
 -0.0355 -0.0296 
  
  
 (0.0351) (0.0396) 
2013 x Treatment  0.00280 0.0418    
  (0.0378) (0.0374)    
Controls  Included Included  Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included  Included Included 
Firm fixed effects  Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R²  0.351 0.399  0.330 0.396 
N  1,224 924  690 528 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. The table reports placebo treatment tests for two sample periods: 
2011-2013 in Column 1 and 2, and 2011-2012 in Column 3 and 4, in which we define a placebo treatment date 
as the year 2013 (Column 1 and 2) and 2012 (Column 3 and 4). For both sample periods we test two 
specifications: (1) and (3) placebo test with fixed effects and firm controls based on the full sample, and (2) and 
(4) placebo test with fixed effects and firm controls based on the matched sample. All variables are defined in 
Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels 
at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
To further check the validity of the parallel trend assumption in our setting, we plot the point-
estimates based on a version of our baseline model (Eq. (1)), in which we replace the DiD 
indicator (Post x Treatment) with a series of four separate DiD indicator variables, each 
marking one year over the period between 2011 and 2015. We omit the indicator for the year 
2013 because this year serves as a benchmark. The purpose of this test is to check whether our 
dependent variable has a trend and the difference in the trends between the treated and control 
group is significant in the pre-reform period. Since the parallel trend assumption requires that 
our dependent variable remains constant and parallel between both groups, we expect that the 
point-estimates in the pre-reform period are insignificant.  
Figure 3.2 provides point-estimates and two-tailed 90% confidence intervals for our treated 
versus control firms. The results in Figure 3.2 suggest that the yearly treatment effects in the 
pre-reform period (2011-2013) are insignificant, which provide support for the parallel trends 
in our sample. These findings are consistent with results of our placebo tests.     
  
 




Figure 3.2: Treatment effects over time 
 
Notes: This figure plots the yearly treatment effects. The point-estimators are generated by estimating the 
following regression model: Investmentit = β0 + β12011t x Treatmenti + β22012t x Treatmenti + β32014t x 
Treatmenti + β42015t x Treatmenti + β5Controlsit + β6Yeart + β7Firmi + εit. Since we omit the DiD indicator for 
the year 2013, this year serves as the benchmark year. The solid points indicate point-estimates and the lines 
represent 90% confidence intervals. 
3.5 Heterogeneity in investment effects 
3.5.1 Firm-level variation in the exposure to regulatory requirements 
In Section 3.2.3, we identify two channels affecting the investment response: cost of capital 
and financial friction. Since finance lease firms face financial frictions due to regulatory 
requirements, we investigate in this section whether the latter channel is verifiable. The notion 
behind this channel relies on the impact that regulatory requirements have on financing 
opportunities. As outlined in Section 3.2.2, finance lease firms have to fulfil regulatory 
requirements regarding liquidity and risk management. Consequently, they can only undertake 
investment decisions when they comply with these regulatory standards.  
Since the change to the less beneficial tax depreciation regime shifts the tax-deductible 
expenses to the end of the lease contract, the lessor has higher tax payments until the end of 
the lease term. However, an increase in tax payments due to a shift to the less beneficial tax 
depreciation allowance reduces cash flow and hence liquidity, resulting in a burden on the 
equity.69 Due to the regulatory requirements that finance lease firms are exposed to, this 
decrease in liquidity and burden on equity negatively affect their investment.   
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We examine this channel by conducting cross-sectional tests analysing whether our treatment 
effect predictably varies with the firm’s exposure to regulatory requirements measured by firm 
characteristics that capture these standards. We predict that firms more exposed to regulatory 
requirements have a stronger investment response to the change in tax depreciation 
allowances. We apply four different firm-level characteristics as proxies for the exposure of 
finance lease firms to regulatory standards.  
Table 3.6 reports the results for our cross-sectional tests based on our full sample. We use our 
baseline DiD approach (Eq. (1)). However, to capture cross-sectional variation in the baseline 
treatment effect, we interact binary conditional variables with the DiD estimator Post x 
Treatment. We estimate DiD models with fixed effects and firm controls.  
Table 3.6: Cross-sectional findings – exposure to regulatory requirements 
 Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x treatment x high cash -0.0485*    
 (0.0262)    
Post x treatment x low cash -0.132***    
 (0.0422)    
Post x treatment x high equity  -0.0562**   
  (0.0271)   
Post x treatment x low equity  -0.110***   
  (0.0388)   
Post x treatment x large   -0.0249  
   (0.0335)  
Post x treatment x small   -0.0828***  
   (0.0281)  
Post x treatment x bank    -0.120*** 
    (0.0356) 
Post x treatment x no bank    -0.0518* 
    (0.0275) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.041] [0.159] [0.096] [0.053] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.385 0.384 0.384 0.385 
N 2,226 2,226 2,226 2,226 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our full sample. Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high cash (low cash) equals 1 if the average cash of a 
finance lease firm, which is defined as cash holdings including receivables from credit institutions scaled by prior 
year’s total assets, is above (below) the 25th percentile across the treated firms in the pre-reform period; (2) high 
equity (low equity) equals 1 if equity scaled by prior year’s total assets of a finance lease firm is above (below) 
the 25th percentile across the treated firms in the year prior to the reform; (3) large (small) equals 1 if total assets 
of a finance lease firm are above (below) the mean across the treated firms in the year prior to the reform; (4) 
bank (no bank) equals 1 if a finance lease firm is (is not) an affiliate of a bank. All regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
 




First, we distinguish between finance lease firms with high and low cash in the pre-reform 
period, respectively (e.g., Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Jacob et al., 2019). We use cash as a proxy 
for liquidity, which is one of the most important regulatory requirements. Therefore, we 
predict that firms with low cash in the pre-reform period have a stronger investment response. 
Cash is defined as cash and equivalents (including receivables from credit institutions) scaled 
by the prior year’s total assets. High (low) cash is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a finance 
lease firm’s average Cash in the pre-reform period is higher (lower) than the 25th percentile 
across all treated firms in the pre-reform period.  
Second, we compare the investment response of finance lease firms with high and low equity, 
respectively. Since equity is essential to comply with the risk management requirements, we 
expect a larger investment response for firms with low equity. We define high (low) equity as 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a finance lease firm’s equity ratio in the year prior to the 
reform is higher (lower) than the 25th percentile across all treated firms in the year prior to the 
reform.70 
Third, we distinguish between small and large finance lease firms, respectively (e.g., Dobbins 
and Jacob, 2016). Prior literature shows that small firms’ growth is limited by the amount of 
internal finance, which is why small firms rely more heavily on internal funds (e.g., Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002). Since internal funds, which are also needed to fulfil the regulatory 
standards, are an important financing possibility, we expect smaller firms to have a stronger 
investment response. We define large (small) as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the total 
assets of a finance lease firm in the year prior to the reform are higher (lower) than the average 
of total assets across all treated firms in the year prior to the reform. 
Fourth, we compare the investment response of finance lease firms that are an affiliate of a 
bank (bank) with finance lease firms without an affiliation with a bank (no bank). Since a 
banking group is subject to stronger liquidity and equity requirements (e.g., due to reforms 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), we expect that bank-owned 
finance lease firms have a stronger reaction to the tax depreciation reform.  
                                                 
70 In order to mitigate the concern that the legal form of the finance lease firm affects our results due to a different 
determination of equity, we re-estimate our OLS regression (Eq. (1)) with Investment as the dependent variable 
for our full and matched sample and investigate whether the treatment effect varies with the legal form (see Table 
3.B9 (Appendix)). The results show that the coefficient estimate for corporations has a similar magnitude and 
statistical power compared to partnerships suggesting that the legal form does not affect the investment response 
of finance lease firms.    
 




Consistent with our predictions, we find a stronger treatment effect for small firms and firms 
with low cash and low equity that are affiliated to banks. The difference in coefficient 
estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels (except for Column 2). Therefore, 
our results suggest that finance lease firms, which are particularly strongly exposed to the 
regulatory requirements, have a stronger investment response to the change in tax depreciation 
methods. In Table 3.B10 (Appendix), we re-estimate our cross-sectional tests based on our 
matched sample. The results are robust and consistent with our findings in Table 3.6.71 
3.5.2 Firm-level variation in business models 
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we examine whether our treatment effect predictably 
varies with firm-level characteristics that capture the business model of finance lease firms. 
We collect all information on a finance lease firm’s business model by using the firm’s annual 
report in the year prior to the reform and checking the company website. Using the collected 
information, we can conduct several cross-sectional tests. We use our baseline DiD approach 
(Eq. (1)). However, to capture the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect, we 
again interact binary conditional variables with the DiD estimator Post x Treatment. We 
estimate DiD models with fixed effects and firm controls for our full and matched sample.  
First, we examine whether the product focus affects the investment response of finance lease 
firms. Since the change in the tax depreciation regime causes an extension of the depreciation 
period, we expect that the investment response of finance lease firms is stronger if their 
product portfolio heavily relies on leased assets for which the difference between the lease 
term and the useful life of the leased asset is high. We gather information on the difference 
between the lease term and useful life of the leased asset for different asset classes from 
Oestreicher and Hillmann (2016), which we use to formulate our predictions.72 Table 3.7 
reports the results for our cross-sectional tests capturing the variation in the firm’s product 
portfolio. 
                                                 
71 However, we note that the tax depreciation effect should be predominant if firms have profits (e.g., Wielhouwer 
and Wiersma, 2017). To analyse this pattern, we re-estimate our OLS regression (Eq. (1)) with Investment as the 
dependent variable for our full and matched sample and investigate whether the treatment effect varies with profit 
and loss situations (see Table 3.B11 (Appendix)). The results show that the coefficient estimate for profitable 
firms is significant while the coefficient estimate for loss firms is not significant, suggesting that the change in 
tax depreciation allowances affects predominantly the investment response of profitable and not loss-making 
firms. However, the coefficient estimates are not statistically different. 
72 In Oestreicher and Hillmann (2016), we analyse 85,604 lease contracts of two important German finance lease 
companies with a diverse product portfolio. About 54,919 lease contracts offer information on the lease term and 
expected useful life of the leased asset for tax purposes. In a descriptive analysis, we show which product classes 
should be predominantly affected by the German tax depreciation reform, i.e., have the largest difference between 
the lease term and expected useful life of the leased asset.    
 




In Panel A of Table 3.7, we test two specifications for the full and matched sample. First, we 
distinguish between finance lease firms with a product focus on mobile assets and finance 
lease firms with a product focus on immobile assets, respectively (Column 1 and 3). Since 
immobile assets (e.g., buildings) are long-lived assets, which are leased over a long period, we 
expect that finance lease firms with a focus on mobile assets (e.g., machinery) have a stronger 
investment response to the tax depreciation reform. Second, we further split the product focus 
on mobile assets into finance lease firms with a diverse portfolio of mobile assets and finance 
lease firms with a specialised portfolio of mobile assets (Column 2 and 4). We expect that 
finance lease firms with a diverse portfolio of mobile assets react less strongly to the reform 
because the diversity of the assets should reduce the overall effect of the reform.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant treatment effect for finance lease firms 
with a product focus on mobile assets in the full and matched sample while the treatment effect 
is not significant for finance lease firms with a product focus on immobile assets. In addition, 
we find a significant treatment effect for finance lease firms with a specialised focus on a 
particular asset class in the full and matched sample. We find only weak evidence for finance 
lease firms with a diverse product portfolio of mobile assets in the full sample and even no 
significant effect in the matched sample. However, the difference in coefficient estimates is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels in Panel A.  
In Panel B of Table 3.7, we further split finance lease firms with a specialised product focus 
on a particular asset class into the following different product classes: office/IT, industry, 
medicine, agriculture and vehicles. The order of the listed product classes complies with a 
decrease in the difference between the lease term and expected useful life of a leased asset, 
which means that leased office/IT assets have the largest while vehicles have the smallest 
difference between the lease term and the expected useful life of the leased asset. Column 1 
and 2 report the results for the full and matched sample, respectively. Consistent with our 
prediction, the results suggest that finance lease firms with a product focus on office/IT assets 
have a large and significant investment response to the reform. We present the difference in 
coefficient estimates to the coefficient estimate of finance lease firms with a focus on office/IT 
products. The difference in coefficients is significant for the product classes with the smallest 
difference between the lease term and expected useful life of the leased asset (i.e., agriculture 
and vehicles). In line with Panel A, we find again a weak effect of finance lease firms with a 
diverse product portfolio of mobile assets, which is again not significant in the matched 
sample.  
 




Table 3.7: Cross-sectional findings – product portfolio 
Panel A: General product focus 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Post x treatment x mobile -0.0704***   -0.0641**  
 (0.0263)   (0.0290)  
Post x treatment x immobile -0.0618   -0.0509  
 (0.0403)   (0.0360)  
Post x treatment x specialised  -0.0659**   -0.0604** 
  (0.0278)   (0.0303) 
Post x treatment x diverse  -0.0815*   -0.0733 
  (0.0429)   (0.0446) 
Post x treatment x immobile  -0.0618   -0.0509 
  (0.0403)   (0.0360) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.825]   [0.684]  
F-test for differences [p-value] 
specialised vs. diverse 
  
[0.720] 
   
[0.766] 
specialised vs. immobile  [0.918]   [0.775] 
Controls Included Included  Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.384 0.383  0.410 0.410 
N 2,226 2,226  1,659 1,659 
Panel B: Detailed product focus 
 Full sample  Matched sample 













Post x treatment x office/IT -0.184**   -0.176**  
 (0.0772)   (0.0766)  
Post x treatment x industry -0.112 [0.588]  -0.106 [0.590] 
 (0.112)   (0.111)  
Post x treatment x medicine -0.0680 [0.189]  -0.0617 [0.186] 
 (0.0490)   (0.0506)  
Post x treatment x agriculture 0.0427 [0.006]  0.0486 [0.006] 
 (0.0404)   (0.0416)  
Post x treatment x vehicles -0.0379 [0.054]  -0.0335 [0.054] 
 (0.0262)   (0.0292)  
Post x treatment x immobile -0.0608 [0.129]  -0.0498 [0.097] 
 (0.0403)   (0.0359)  
Post x treatment x diverse -0.0812* [0.223]  -0.0730 [0.210] 
 (0.0429)   (0.0446)  
Controls Included   Included  
Year fixed effects Included   Included  
Firm fixed effects Included   Included  
Adj. R² 0.384   0.412  
N 2,226   1,659  
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our full (Panel A, Column 1 and 2 and Panel B, Column 
1) and matched sample (Panel A, Column 3 and 4 and Panel B, Column 2). Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used in Panel A: (1) mobile (immobile) equals 1 if a finance lease 
firm’s product focus is on mobile (immobile) assets; (2) we further split mobile assets into specialised (diverse), 
which equals 1 if a finance lease firm offers mainly products for a specific sector (wide range of products). The 
 




following conditional variables are used in Panel B: (1) office/IT equals 1 if a finance lease firm’s product focus 
is on office/IT assets; (2) industry equals 1 if a finance lease firm’s product focus is on machinery and equipment; 
(3) medicine equals 1 if a finance lease firm’s product focus is on medical products; (4) agriculture equals 1 if a 
finance lease firm’s product focus is on agricultural products; (5) vehicles equals 1 if a finance lease firm’s 
product focus is on vehicles; (6) immobile equals 1 if a finance lease firm’s product focus is on immobile assets; 
(7) diverse equals 1 if a finance lease firm offers a wide range of products from different sectors. All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
In addition to the product focus, we examine whether the leasing-specific business 
characteristic of direct leases affects the investment response of finance lease firms. Direct 
lease is a business model in which manufacturers use finance leases to promote their products. 
This specific business characteristic allows us to address a potential concern in our research 
design. Since finance leases present a financial services function, the business of finance lease 
firms is highly demand-related, which means that finance lease firms only invest in assets if 
they enter into a contract with a lessee about the leased asset. Thus, observing a negative 
investment response after the change in tax depreciation regimes could reflect merely a decline 
in demand and not a response to the reform. To investigate potential demand effects, we 
distinguish between finance lease firms that are direct lease firms of a specific manufacturer 
and finance lease firms without an affiliation with a manufacturer, respectively. Direct lease 
firms of manufacturers are highly reliant on the customers’ demand for the product range of 
the specific manufacturer because direct lease firms serve only as an additional distribution 
channel. A decline in demand should thus immediately result in a decrease in investment by 
direct lease firms, while the change in the tax depreciation regime should not have a significant 
effect on investment because direct lease firms are only a channel to directly distribute and 
finance products of their affiliated companies.    
Table 3.8: Cross-sectional findings – manufacturer ownership 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Post x treatment x manufacturer -0.0533  -0.0496 
 (0.0396)  (0.0412) 
Post x treatment x no manufacturer -0.0732***  -0.0660** 
 (0.0271)  (0.0297) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.615]  [0.678] 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.384  0.410 
N 2,226  1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our full and matched sample. Regression models include 
additional interaction terms based on a conditional variable to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline 
treatment effect. We include the conditional variable manufacturer (no manufacturer), which equals 1 if a finance 
lease firm is (is not) a direct lease firm of a specific manufacturer. All regression models have standard errors 
that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 
and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
 




Table 3.8 reports the results for our cross-sectional tests. The findings reveal an insignificant 
treatment effect for direct lease firms of specific manufacturers, indicating that a decrease in 
demand cannot explain the findings in our main analysis. However, the difference in 
coefficient estimates is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the investment response of companies from the finance lease sector 
to a change in tax depreciation rules. We find that finance lease companies reduce their 
investments after a German administrative order in the beginning of 2014 changed the 
applicable tax depreciation method from the previous more beneficial straight-line tax 
depreciation over the lease term to the less beneficial straight-line tax depreciation over the 
longer expected useful life of the leased asset. In addition, we predict and find that the 
regulatory requirements to which finance lease firms are exposed moderate the investment 
effect. Further cross-sectional tests indicate that the business model affects the investment 
response. We find a stronger treatment effect for finance lease firms with a product portfolio 
that heavily relies on leased assets for which the difference between the lease term and the 
expected useful life of the leased asset is high. Our results reveal that finance lease firms with 
a product focus on mobile assets and especially office/IT assets are heavily affected by the 
reform. 
Our results are subject to limitations. First, we cannot observe the applied tax depreciation 
method of firms from the operating lease and finance lease sector. However, based on their 
business models and legal requirements with regard to the attribution of leased assets to the 
lessor we assume that finance lease companies applied the more favourable tax depreciation 
over the lease term prior to the administrative order while this was not the common 
depreciation method for operating lease firms. Despite the lease-specific depreciation 
preferences, we cannot fully rule it out that companies from the finance and operating lease 
sector could have applied other tax depreciation methods. However, this would bias our results 
against finding investment effects.  
Second, our inferences rely on the parallel trend assumption. Although we plot the yearly point 
estimates in Figure 3.2, which do not suggest a violation of the parallel trend assumption, we 
cannot completely rule out the possibility of confounding effects affecting our inferences. 
However, our fixed-effects structure, matching design and thorough sample selection should 
 




increase the confidence that our identification strategy mitigates time trends and firm-specific 
confounding effects in our setting.  
Third, we exploit only one exogenous shock, which allows us to examine the sector-specific 
investment effect of finance lease firms in Germany. Therefore, internal validity increases at 
the expense of external validity. However, we expect that our results are at least generalisable 
to other countries in Europe because the German leasing market and the regulatory 
requirements are comparable to other countries in Europe.  
Despite these potential limitations, our paper provides novel evidence on the effect of tax 
depreciation allowances on investment of finance lease firms, which are financial institutions 
operating in a regulated and supervised environment. In addition, we extend the general 
literature on tax depreciation and investment by exploiting a setting that overcomes the major 
limitations of prior studies. We are hence able to identify a clearer investment response to tax 
depreciation. Further, our study reveals that regulatory requirements regarding liquidity and 
risk management are an important moderator of the investment response of regulated firms. 
  
 





Appendix 3.A: Value of the change in depreciation allowances  
We define z as the present value of tax savings from tax depreciation deductions for an increase 
in investment by one unit (Maffini et al., 2019). The marginal tax rate (τ) is 30%, which equals 
in general the total tax burden of corporations. Following recent literature, we assume that the 
interest rate (r) is 7% (e.g., Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Maffini et al., 2019; Ohrn, 2019). Further, 
we assume that the average lease term is 4 years and the average tax depreciation period is 6 
years. We base our assumptions on a study by Oestreicher and Hillmann (2016) in which we 
analysed 85,604 lease contracts of German firms from the finance lease sector.  
Before the reform, the present value of tax savings due to straight-line tax depreciation based 
on the lease term (Dpre) can be expressed as 











After the reform, straight-line depreciation over the expected useful life of the asset is the only 
applicable depreciation method. However, since finance leases require that the leased asset is 
financed and amortised over the non-cancellable lease term, finance lease firms sell their assets 
after the lease term to an anticipated residual value, which we assume to be zero for 
simplification (see Section 3.2.2 and Table 3.B1 (Appendix)). The present value of tax savings 
due to straight-line tax depreciation based on the useful life of the asset (Dpost) can be expressed 
as  



















Therefore, the change in the present value of tax savings from tax depreciation deductions for 
an increase in investment by one unit is -0.033 (= 𝑑𝑧/𝑧 = −0.028𝜏/0.8468𝜏), which 
complies with a decrease of the present value of tax depreciation deductions for a unit 
investment by around 3.3%. Given the assumption that the marginal tax rate is 30%, the 
change in tax depreciation allowance should increase the net-of-tax cost of a unit investment, 
1 – z, by around 1.13% (= 𝑑(1 − 𝑧)/(1 − 𝑧)  = 0.028 × 0.3/(1 − 0.8468 × 0.3)).  
  
 




Appendix 3.B: Additional tables 
Table 3.B1: Simplified example of tax depreciation methods 
Panel A: Straight-line depreciation over the expected useful life of the leased asset 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 
 Depreciation 166.66 166.66 166.66 166.66 
 Loss on sale    333.36 
a. Tax benefit from depreciation 50.00 50.00 50.00 150.00 
Panel B: Straight-line depreciation over the lease term considering a residual value 
  t1 t2 t3 t4 
 Depreciation 250.00 250.00 250.00 250.00 
 Loss on sale    0 
b. Tax benefit from depreciation 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Panel C: Liquidity effect 
a.-b. Difference in the tax benefit -25.00 -25.00 -25.00 75.00 
 Present value of difference in tax benefits -8.39    
Notes: This table presents the liquidity effect (Panel C) that results from a comparison between the tax benefit 
of two tax depreciation methods based on a simplified example. The following assumptions are made for the 
example: the acquisition cost of the leased asset is EUR 1,000, the expected useful life of the leased asset is six 
years, the lease term is four years, the residual value and market value of the leased asset at the end of the lease 
term are EUR 073, the tax rate of the lessor is 30% and the interest rate is 7%. Panel A presents the tax benefit 
from depreciation if straight-line tax depreciation over the expected useful life of the leased asset is applied. 
Panel B presents the tax benefit from depreciation if straight-line tax depreciation over the lease term under 
consideration of the residual value of the leased asset at the end of the lease term is applied.    
  
                                                 
73 Due to the business model of finance lease firms, the residual value and sales price of the leased asset are of 
subordinate importance to our analysis. For simplification purposes, we assume both values to be zero.  
 




Table 3.B2: Robustness tests – alternative dependent variable 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable: Net investment rate of leasing assets (Inv_Leasing) 
Post x Treatment -0.0645**  -0.0563* 
 (0.0272)  (0.0300) 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.361  0.374 
N 2,128  1,561 
Notes: The dependent variable is the net investment rate of leased assets for our treated firms and Investment for 
our control group. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects and firm-level controls for the 
full and matched sample. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x 
Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for 
treated firm observations (companies from the finance lease sector) in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 
0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that 
are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** 








Table 3.B3: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Source 
Investment measures  
Investment Change in tangible assets (including leasing assets) scaled 
by prior year’s tangible assets (≙ net investment rate) 
Amadeus/hand-collected 
Inv_Depr Change in tangible assets (including leasing assets) before 
depreciation scaled by prior year’s total assets (≙ gross 
investment rate) 
Amadeus/hand-collected 
Inv_Leasing Change in leasing assets scaled by prior year’s leasing 
assets for treated firms; change in tangible assets scaled by 
prior year’s tangible assets for control firms  
Amadeus/hand-collected 
Inv_TA Change in tangible assets (including leasing assets) scaled 
by prior year’s total assets 
Amadeus/hand-collected 
   
Other firm characteristics  
Leverage Total debt scaled by prior year’s total assets Amadeus/hand-collected 
Liquidity Cash and equivalents scaled by prior year’s total assets Amadeus/hand-collected 
Loss Dummy variable equal to 1 if prior year’s profit/loss before 
taxes is negative 
Amadeus/hand-collected 
Profitability  Profit/loss before taxes scaled by prior year’s total assets  Amadeus/hand-collected 
Post Dummy variable equal to 1 for 2014 and 2015 and 0 
otherwise 
Constructed 
Size Natural logarithm of prior year’s total assets Amadeus/hand-collected 
Treatment Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a company from 
the finance lease sector, and 0 if the firm belongs to the 
rental or operating lease sector 
Constructed 
Note: This table shows variable definitions. 
  
 




Table 3.B4: Sample selection 
Selection criteria 
 Number of 
firms 
 Number of 
observations 
Panel A: Treatment group     
 German companies from the finance lease sector, which are 
registered by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
from 2011 to 2015, with published unconsolidated annual 
financial statements in the German Federal Gazette’s 
Company Register database 
 311  1,555 
Excluding:      
(1) Firms with restructuring processes (e.g. mergers) during the 
sample period 
 (35)  (175) 
(2) Observations with missing values for the dependent and 
control variables  
 (72)  (435) 
(3) Firms without financial data of the net investment rate at 
least one year prior and after the reform 
 (9)  (18) 
 Final sample of treated firms  195  927 
Panel B: Control group     
 German firms in Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database 
belonging to the rental sector (NACE code: 7710-7739) 
 9,784  48,920 
Excluding:     
(1) Firms with consolidated or non-German-GAAP financial 
data 
 (7)  (35) 
(2) Firms with similar company names compared to companies 
from the finance lease sector 
 (16)  (80) 
(3) Firms with restructuring processes (e.g. mergers) during the 
sample period 
 (4)  (20) 
(4) Observations with missing values for the dependent and 
control variables  
 (8,756)  (47,097) 
(5) Firms without financial data of the net investment rate at 
least one year prior and after the reform 
 (648)  (389) 
 Final sample of control firms  353  1,299 
Final sample of treated and control firms:  548  2,226 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process for our treated (Panel A) and control firms 
(Panel B). Our primary data sources are the German Federal Gazette’s Company Register database for our treated 
firms and the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database for our control firms. Dependent and control variables are 








Table 3.B5: Alternative regression specification – balanced sample 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Post x Treatment -0.0457  -0.0696* 
 (0.0294)  (0.0353) 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.345  0.329 
N 1,245  930 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects and 
firm-level controls for the full and matched sample. We use a balanced sample. The main variable of interest in 
the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. 
The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firm observations (companies from the finance lease 
sector) in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 
(Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the 
firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) 
(10%), two-tailed.  
  
 




Table 3.B6: Alternative regression specification – winsorising 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Post x Treatment -0.0529**  -0.0530** 
 (0.0223)  (0.0246) 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.404  0.449 
N 2,226  1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects and 
firm-level controls for the full and matched sample. We winsorise all continuous variables at the 1% (99%) level. 
The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the 
difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firm observations 
(companies from the finance lease sector) in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables 
are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate 








Table 3.B7: Sample statistics over the period 2011-2013 
 N Mean StDev P50 Min Max 
Treatment group       
Investment 553 0.0434 0.3325 -0.0009 -0.5863 4.0512 
Liquidity 553 0.0005 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0695 
Size 553 10.0219 1.8030 9.9806 5.3270 13.8670 
Leverage 553 0.6227 0.3602 0.6460 0.0000 2.4416 
Profitability 553 0.0282 0.0719 0.0149 -0.3454 0.5839 
Loss 553 0.2170 0.4126 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Total assets (in EUR 1,000) 553 98,572 191,483 21,687 313 1,142,128 
Tangible assets (in EUR 1,000) 553 64,820 138,554 1,2465 0.0262 889,141 
       
Full sample control group       
Investment 769 0.1046 0.3431 0.0190 -0.7592 1.6973 
Liquidity 769 0.0916 0.1177 0.0448 0.0000 0.6457 
Size 769 8.4802 1.7591 8.4884 4.3944 13.1019 
Leverage 769 0.5321 0.3583 0.5191 0.0000 2.0387 
Profitability 769 0.0913 0.1268 0.0591 -0.2817 0.8024 
Loss 769 0.1378 0.3450 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
       
Matched sample control group       
Investment 426 0.0664 0.3045 0.0007 -0.7147 1.6458 
Liquidity 426 0.0198 0.0224 0.0112 0.0000 0.1175 
Size 426 8.7005 1.7598 8.7227 4.5109 13.1019 
Leverage 426 0.5827 0.3684 0.5891 0.0000 1.8712 
Profitability 426 0.0657 0.1034 0.0404 -0.1836 0.6409 
Loss 426 0.1901 0.3929 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of the treatment, full and matched control group for the pre-reform 
period 2011-2013. All variables are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). 
  
 




Table 3.B8: Entropy balancing 
 (1) (2) 
Post x Treatment -0.0418 -0.0627** 
 (0.0276) (0.0258) 
Controls None Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.152 0.362 
N 1,830 1,830 
Notes: This table provides the results of our baseline regression based on a matched sample. We employ entropy 
balancing matching. We match on first differences of all firm-level covariates (size, leverage, profitability, 
liquidity, loss) and the natural logarithm of tangible assets in the year before the reform. The entropy balancing 
method calculates weights, which we use to re-estimate our main regression model (Section 3.4.1). The 
dependent variable is Investment. The table reports two different specifications: (1) regression with fixed effects 
but without firm-level controls, and (2) fully specified regression with fixed effects and firm-level controls. The 
main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the 
difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated firm observations 
(companies from the finance lease sector) in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables 
are defined in Table 3.B3 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate 
significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
  
 




Table 3.B9: Cross-sectional findings – legal form 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Post x Treatment x corporation -0.0698**  -0.0635** 
 (0.0284)  (0.0305) 
Post x Treatment x partnership -0.0696**  -0.0622* 
 (0.0318)  (0.0347) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.995]  [0.968] 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.539  0.410 
N 2,226  1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our full and matched sample (Column 1 and 2). Regression 
models include additional interaction terms based on a conditional variable to assess the cross-sectional variation 
in the baseline treatment effect. We include the conditional variable corporation (partnership), which equals 1 if 
the finance lease firm has a legal form that is equivalent to a limited liability company (partnership). All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported 
values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
  
 




Table 3.B10: Cross-sectional findings – exposure to regulatory requirements, matched sample 
 Matched sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x treatment x high cash -0.0421    
 (0.0290)    
Post x treatment x low cash -0.125***    
 (0.0433)    
Post x treatment x high equity  -0.0501*   
  (0.0298)   
Post x treatment x low equity  -0.102**   
  (0.0399)   
Post x treatment x large   -0.0188  
   (0.0352)  
Post x treatment x small   -0.0760**  
   (0.0306)  
Post x treatment x bank    -0.113*** 
    (0.0372) 
Post x treatment x no bank    -0.0454 
    (0.0299) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.041] [0.171] [0.095] [0.049] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.413 0.411 0.411 0.412 
N 1,659 1,659 1,659 1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our matched sample. Regression models include additional 
interaction terms based on conditional variables to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: (1) high cash (low cash) equals 1 if the average cash of a 
finance lease firm, which is defined as cash holdings including receivables from credit institutions scaled by prior 
year’s total assets, is above (below) the 25th percentile across the treated firms in the pre-reform period; (2) high 
equity (low equity) equals 1 if equity scaled by prior year’s total assets of a finance lease firm is above (below) 
the 25th percentile across the treated firms in the year prior to the reform; (3) large (small) equals 1 if total assets 
of a finance lease firm are above (below) the mean across the treated firms in the year prior to the reform; (4) 
bank (no bank) equals 1 if a finance lease firm is (is not) an affiliate of a bank. All regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
  
 




Table 3.B11: Cross-sectional findings – loss situation 
 Full sample  Matched sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Post x treatment x profit -0.0681***  -0.0635** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0288) 
Post x treatment x loss -0.0781  -0.0617 
 (0.0553)  (0.0548) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.853]  [0.972] 
Controls Included  Included 
Year fixed effects Included  Included 
Firm fixed effects Included  Included 
Adj. R² 0.384  0.410 
N 2,226  1,659 
Notes: The dependent variable is Investment. We use our full and matched sample (Column 1 and 2). Regression 
models include additional interaction terms based on a conditional variable to assess the cross-sectional variation 
in the baseline treatment effect. We include the conditional variable profit (loss), which equals 1 if the average 
profit/loss before taxes in the pre-reform period is positive (negative). All regression models have standard errors 
that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 

















In this paper, I examine the effects of mandatory public Country-by-Country Reporting 
(CbCR) disclosure requirements in the EU financial sector on banks’ real economic activities. 
Using the implementation of CbCR as an exogenous shock, I find that EU multinational banks 
decrease their tax avoidance activities, total assets, earning assets and the number of 
employees compared to EU domestic banks after CbCR disclosure requirements became 
effective in 2014. Cross-sectional tests reveal that the response of EU multinational banks 
prevails for those exposed to reputational concerns and detection risks. My findings add to the 
literature on the real effects of disclosure and supplements the emerging literature on the 
consequences of public CbCR in particular. 
 
JEL classification: E51, G21, G28, H20, H26, M41, M48 
 
Keywords: Tax transparency, country-by-country reporting, banks, real effects, tax avoidance    
 
 
Acknowledgements: For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Rebecca Höhl, Reinald 
Koch, Olaf Korn, Andreas Oestreicher and Robert Schwager. 
 
  
                                                 
74 University of Goettingen, Faculty of Business and Economics, Tax Division, Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3, 
37073 Goettingen, Germany. 
75 First version of the working paper: April 2020. This version: November 2020. 
 





Prior literature provides evidence on the effect of mandatory public disclosure on real firm 
behaviour, especially in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018b; Fiechter et al., 2019; Rauter, 2020). However, 
little is known about the effect of mandatory public disclosure of tax information on real firm 
behaviour (Dyreng and Maydew, 2018). I reduce this gap by exploiting a setting in Europe, 
which allows me to test whether public disclosure of tax information creates “real effects” 
(e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).  
The European Union’s (EU) Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) (Directive 
2013/36/EU), which was passed in June 2013, mandates banks76 in the EU to disclose annual 
financial and tax information by geographical location and type of activity. The so-called 
Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) was first required from banks in July 2014. They had 
to disclose turnover and the number of employees per country based on consolidated data. 
Since 1 January 2015, EU banks have had to disclose profit or loss before tax, tax on profit or 
loss and public subsidies received in addition to the previously mentioned information. 
A small bunch of studies investigates the effects of the CbCR, which is public for the EU 
financial sector and private for EU multinational firms. Previous literature finds that under the 
private CbCR disclosure regulation treated multinational firms reduce their tax avoidance 
behaviour (Hugger, 2019; Joshi, 2020). In addition, treated multinational firms decrease their 
number of subsidiaries in tax havens, but increase revenues, employment, investment and tax 
expenses in low-tax European countries, indicating that firms shift their real economic 
activities (De Simone and Olbert, 2020).  
Studies that exploit the effect of public CbCR for EU banks find mixed market reactions (e.g., 
Dutt et al., 2019a; Flagmeier and Gawehn, 2020). Brown et al. (2019) find no significant 
change in the reported number of geographic segments or country segments after the 
introduction of public CbCR. However, Eberhartinger et al. (2020) reveal that banks reduce 
their number of subsidiaries in tax havens after the introduction of the public disclosure 
requirement. The effect of public CbCR for EU banks on their overall tax avoidance is mixed, 
depending on the sample selection, control group identification and data (Brown, 2018; 
Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et al., 2020). My paper extends Joshi et al. (2020) and 
Overesch and Wolff (2019) by examining the effect of CbCR disclosures on real activities of 
                                                 
76 The term “banks” captures all financial sector entities that fall under the CbCR disclosure requirements.    
 




EU banks and complements De Simone and Olbert (2020) by investigating the effect of a 
mandatory public disclosure provision.  
The impact of CbCR disclosures on banks’ activities depends on the expected costs of 
disclosure. One potential cost channel could be that banks face higher detection and 
enforcement risks by tax authorities. The importance of this channel depends on the relevance 
of the information content of CbCR disclosures to tax authorities. Another potential cost 
channel could be reputational concerns. The disclosure of tax information per country could 
facilitate the monitoring of bank activities that the public could perceive as tax avoidance 
behaviour, which is not socially desirable (e.g., Roychowdhury et al., 2019). Under this 
channel, banks might change their tax avoidance behaviour to reduce potential social costs 
such as loss of trust and damage to their image. If, however, CbCR disclosures raised costs for 
banks due to either an increase in detection and enforcement risks or reputational concerns, I 
would expect that banks reduce their tax avoidance activities.  
A decline in tax avoidance resulting from the disclosure of tax information negatively affects 
real economic activities when banks include tax avoidance behaviour in their decision to 
maximise their after-tax profits. If the benefits and costs of tax avoidance are part of the bank’s 
profit function, the optimal level of tax avoidance affects the optimal levels of the input factors, 
e.g. capital and labour (Bruehne and Jacob, 2019; Dyreng et al., 2020). Therefore, I predict 
that the increase in the costs of tax avoidance due to the disclosure of tax information decreases 
tax avoidance behaviour, resulting in a decline in real activities, such as investment decisions. 
I examine the effect of CbCR disclosures on banks’ tax avoidance behaviour and real 
economic activities by applying a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The treatment 
group consists of multinational banks headquartered in the EU because the CRD IV applies to 
each EU bank. In line with prior literature, the control group comprises domestic banks 
domiciled in the EU since they do not have opportunities to employ cross-border tax avoidance 
activities (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et al., 
2020). I use a sample period from 2011-2015, defining the years 2014 and 2015 as the 
treatment period.   
I collect financial and ownership data from the Bankscope database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. Following prior literature, I use the GAAP effective tax rate as a proxy for tax avoidance 
behaviour (see for an overview, e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Blouin, 2014; Wilde and 
Wilson, 2018). Further, I employ total assets, earning assets (i.e., the sum of loans, securities 
 




and property) and the number of employees as proxies for real economic activities of EU banks 
(e.g., Gropp et al., 2019; De Simone and Olbert, 2020). 
My first set of empirical tests shows that EU multinational banks decrease their tax avoidance 
behaviour after the CbCR disclosure requirement became effective in 2014. This result is 
statistically and economically significant compared to EU domestic banks. Further, the result 
is in line with prior studies (e.g., Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et al., 2020). My finding is 
robust after controlling for bank and bank’s home country characteristics and using an 
alternative tax avoidance measure as the dependent variable. 
In my second set of tests, I find that after the CbCR disclosure reform EU multinational banks 
reduce their real economic activities measured as total assets, earning assets and the number 
of employees (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019). These results suggest that a decrease in tax avoidance 
due to the disclosure of tax information negatively affects a bank’s real economic activities. 
My findings seem to be robust after including bank and bank’s home country characteristics 
and employing alternative dependent variables. 
In my third set of empirical tests, I explore the cross-sectional variation in the multinational 
bank’s response to CbCR by examining whether the two possible cost channels – 
enforcement/detection risks and reputational concerns – moderate the treatment effect on tax 
avoidance and hence on real economic activities. These tests aim at providing more insights 
and evidence that banks’ real economic activities reduce after the CbCR disclosure because 
their tax avoidance activities decrease. My results for the channel covering the enforcement 
and detection risk reveal that the effect of CbCR disclosures on tax avoidance and real 
economic activities of multinational banks is significant for those with at least one affiliate in 
a tax haven country and with a high number of foreign affiliates. In addition, I find a significant 
response of treated banks headquartered in a country with a high government quality. The 
results for the reputation channel reveal that the effect of CbCR disclosures on treated banks’ 
tax avoidance and real economic activities is significant for large banks and those 
headquartered in a country in which at least one NGO is resident. However, the listing of a 
treated bank affects tax avoidance but does not predominantly impact real economic activities. 
Overall, I find support for both channels, indicating that the decrease in tax avoidance drives 
the adverse effects of CbCR disclosures on banks’ real economic activities.  
Additional analyses support the validity of my inferences and enhance my results. First, I re-
estimate my baseline regressions based on an entropy-balanced sample to mitigate the 
concerns that EU domestic banks and EU multinational banks are not comparable (e.g., 
 




Hainmueller and Xu, 2013; Fiechter et al., 2019; Joshi et al., 2020). The results do not suggest 
that observable differences across treated and control banks confound the baseline inferences. 
Second, I assess the validity of the parallel trend assumption by estimating the yearly treatment 
effects over the sample period. The results indicate that the parallel trend assumption can be 
supported. Third, I vary the definition of the treatment date and treatment group to mitigate 
the concern that misspecifications affect my findings. Results from variations in the treatment 
date are consistent with my baseline findings. To further address the concern that other 
provisions of the CRD IV confound and drive the reduction in real activities, I define placebo 
treatments regarding the bank’s liquidity, equity and profitability (following Overesch and 
Wolff, 2019). My results do not show a decrease in real economic activities after the reform 
for less liquid or less profitable banks or banks with low equity, suggesting that the CbCR 
disclosure requirement induces the decline in tax avoidance and real activities of multinational 
banks. 
My paper contributes to the literature on real effects of public disclosures (e.g., Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016; Christensen et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018b; Fiechter et al., 2019; Rauter, 
2020). I respond to the call for research by Dyreng and Maydew (2018) on how public 
disclosure of tax information affects the behaviour of firms. Prior literature provides little 
evidence on the effect of mandatory public disclosure of tax information on the location of 
subsidiaries, firm’s tax avoidance behaviour and tax authority’s enforcement attention (e.g., 
Dyreng et al., 2016; Bozanic et al., 2017). I contribute to this branch of literature by showing 
that banks respond to the disclosure of tax information not only by decreasing their tax 
avoidance activities but also by reducing their real economic activities. These results should 
be of interest to policymakers because the disclosure of tax information seems to achieve its 
main policy objective of reducing aggressive tax avoidance. However, the regulation seems to 
have unintended consequences on real economic activities of banks (e.g., Rauter, 2020; De 
Simone and Olbert, 2020).   
In particular, my study adds to the emerging literature on the consequences of public and 
private CbCR (e.g., Brown, 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Dutt et al., 2019a; Hugger, 2019; 
Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi, 2020; De Simone and Olbert, 2020; Joshi et al., 2020; 
Flagmeier and Gawehn, 2020; Eberhartinger et al., 2020). Recent studies find that 
multinational firms reduce tax avoidance and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens, but 
shift their real economic activities, e.g. revenues, employment and investment, to low-tax 
European countries after the implementation of mandatory private CbCR (Joshi, 2020; De 
Simone and Olbert, 2020). However, evidence on the effects of mandatory public CbCR on 
 




banks’ tax avoidance behaviour is mixed (Brown, 2018; Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et 
al., 2020), even though first evidence indicates that the tax haven presence declined after the 
introduction of public CbCR for European banks (Eberhartinger et al., 2020). I contribute to 
this branch of literature by providing first evidence on the effect of public CbCR on real 
activities of EU banks, i.e., on employment and investment, when comparing EU multinational 
banks with EU domestic banks in a DiD setting. Additionally, I show that the real impact is 
based on the effect of CbCR on tax avoidance, which depends on reputational concerns as well 
as detection and enforcement risks. My paper is closely related to Joshi et al. (2020) and De 
Simone and Olbert (2020). However, it extends and complements both papers by examining 
the real effects of public CbCR on banks’ real economic activities.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the regulatory background. In Section 4.3, 
I provide a literature review and develop my empirical predictions. Section 4.4 outlines the 
research design and describes the sample and data. In Section 4.5, I present the baseline and 
cross-sectional findings. Section 4.6 provides additional analyses and Section 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 Country-by-country reporting under the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV  
In June 2013, the European Parliament and European Council published the EU Capital 
Requirements Directive IV (Directive 2013/36/EU) (EU, 2013a). The primary objective of the 
CRD IV was to implement the Basel III regulatory framework into EU law (EU, 2013b, Recital 
1 and 10). After the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) 
agreed on a set of measures regarding capital and liquidity requirements to strengthen the 
supervision and risk management in the financial sector. The overall aim was to reduce the 
risk of future crises in the financial sector (EU, 2013a, Recital 34). The CRD IV implemented 
most of the Basel III recommendations and imposed additional provisions to enhance 
corporate governance practices by institutions (EU, 2013a, Recital 53) and to increase 
transparency via a country-by-country reporting (Art. 89 CRD IV).  
Article 89 CRD IV contains the most relevant provision I examine in this paper. The CbCR 
mandates banks to disclose annual financial and tax information by geographical location and 
type of activity. Recital 52 of the Directive states the aim of CbCR (EU, 2013a): “Increased 
transparency regarding the activities of institutions, and in particular regarding profits made, 
taxes paid and subsidies received, is essential for regaining the trust of citizens of the Union 
in the financial sector. Mandatory reporting in that area can therefore be seen as an important 
element of the corporate responsibility of institutions towards stakeholders and society.” 
 




The CbCR regulation broadly applies to banks, investment firms and other credit institutions 
(hereafter “banks”) in the European Economic Area77 (Art. 4 CRR in EU, 2013b).78 All 
member states of the EEA oblige each bank to disclose information on a consolidated basis by 
the member state and by the third country in which it has an establishment (Art. 89 CRD IV). 
Consequently, a bank headquartered in the EEA with foreign subsidiaries must fill a CbC 
report at the group level. Banks headquartered outside the EEA but with subsidiaries domiciled 
in the EEA only have to disclose information on their subsidiaries in the EEA.     
According to the CRD IV, banks have to reveal each year the following information per 
country on a consolidated basis (Art. 89 CRD IV): 
a) Names, nature of activities and geographical location; 
b) Turnover; 
c) Number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; 
d) Profit or loss before tax; 
e) Tax on profit or loss; 
f) Public subsidies received. 
The implementation of the CbCR regulation into national law by member states was required 
by 1 January 2014. By 1 July 2014, banks had to disclose the first CbC report consisting of 
information a) to c).79 Since 1 January 2015, EU banks have been required to disclose the 
information referred to a) to f).  
This change in mandatory public disclosure of tax information offers valuable features that 
mitigate identification issues in econometric analyses for the following reasons. First, this 
exogenous shock setting reduces the possibility of anticipation effects. Although the EU 
Commission started working on the CRD IV in 2009 (PwC, 2016), the tax transparency 
requirement was only suggested at a very late stage. In February 2013, the final proposal of 
the CRD IV included the first proposal of CbCR for banks before the final Directive was 
passed four months later (PwC, 2016). This short period of negotiating the tax transparency 
requirement and the short period between passing the CRD IV and implementing the Directive 
into national law mitigate the possible shortcoming that banks could anticipate the reform.  
                                                 
77 The European Economic Area (EEA) consists of countries of the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway.  
78 The detailed definitions are complex and their application in practice can be uncertain (PwC, 2016). 
79 In addition, all global systematically important institutions authorised within the Union shall submit to the 
Commission the information referred to d) to f) on a confidential basis (Art. 89 CRD IV). 
 




In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that banks perceive this reform as permanent. 
Although Article 89 CRD IV states that the EU Commission shall conduct a general 
assessment about potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of tax 
information by 31 December 2014, it seems unlikely for several reasons that this reform is just 
temporary. First, the OECD (2013) also suggested a (private) CbCR for multinational 
enterprises in Action 13 of the BEPS project in 2013. Second, the assessment of the European 
Commission (2014) on the public CbCR was already published in October 2014 and revealed 
that the tax transparency requirement is not expected to have adverse economic consequences 
and thus should apply.  
A potential challenge regarding the setting is that the CRD IV is a package comprising several 
provisions in addition to CbCR. However, I mitigate the concern that other provisions of the 
package drive my results. First, not all provisions became effective in 2014 but in later years, 
making it less likely that banks immediately react to other provisions than the CbCR.80 Second, 
my identification strategy and choice of the control group should reduce potential concerns 
regarding confounding effects (see Section 4.4.1). Third, by examining placebo treatments, I 
provide evidence that other provisions of the CRD IV do not affect my results (see Section 
4.6.3). 
4.3 Related literature and hypotheses 
4.3.1 Literature review 
Prior literature provides some empirical evidence on the effect of mandatory public disclosure 
on real firm behaviour, e.g., on changes in investments (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Dyreng 
and Maydew, 2018). Investigating mandatory CSR disclosure regulations, Chen et al. (2018b) 
find that CSR disclosure resulted in a decrease in firms’ pollutant emissions in China due to 
an increase in CSR activities. Fiechter et al. (2019) exploit the EU CSR Directive as an 
exogenous shock and find that firms anticipated the disclosure mandate by increasing CSR 
activities even before the first mandatory disclosures were required. Examining the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, Christensen et al. (2017) reveal that the disclosure of violations of mine-
safety regulations in financial statements improved firms’ compliance with mine safety 
regulations, leading to a reduction in workforce injuries. Rauter (2020) examines the EU 
country-by-country reporting of extraction payments and shows that disclosing firms 
                                                 
80 For example, the regulations for capital requirements shall apply from 1 January 2016 onward (Art. 162 CRD 
IV). 
 




increased their payments to host governments, decreased investment and obtained fewer 
extraction licenses. 
Evidence on the effect of mandatory public disclosure of tax information on real firm 
behaviour is sparse (Dyreng and Maydew, 2018). Dyreng et al. (2016) investigate the effect 
of public scrutiny of UK firms’ subsidiary locations on firms’ disclosure and tax avoidance 
behaviour. They find that firms, which were initially not compliant with the mandatory public 
subsidiary disclosure regulation in the UK and gained public attention, decreased their tax 
avoidance behaviour and use of tax havens. Bozanic et al. (2017) provide evidence that the 
Internal Revenue Service finds public FIN 4881 disclosures of income tax risks in the United 
States useful for tax enforcement purposes.  
An increasing number of studies investigate the effects of the EU country-by-country reporting 
disclosure of tax information, which is public for the EU financial sector and private for EU 
multinational firms. Joshi (2020) examines the private CbCR disclosure regulation and finds 
that treated multinational firms reduced their tax avoidance behaviour measured with the 
GAAP effective tax rate. However, Hugger (2019) exploits the same reform setting and shows 
that the effective tax rate of treated multinational firms increased, but the growth rate of total 
tax payments was unaffected. De Simone and Olbert (2020) extend Joshi (2020) by examining 
the effect of private CbCR disclosures on firms’ real economic activities. They find that treated 
multinational firms reduced their number of subsidiaries in tax havens, but increased revenues, 
employment, investment and tax expenses in low-tax European countries, indicating that firms 
shifted their real economic activities.  
A few recent studies investigate the effect of public CbCR for EU banks. Dutt et al. (2019a) 
examine the stock price reaction to the adoption of public CbCR and find no market reaction, 
while Flagmeier and Gawehn (2020) show weakly significant investor reactions by applying 
another event date and treatment group. Brown et al. (2019) investigate the effect of public 
CbCR on geographic segment reports of EU banks. They find no evidence of a change in the 
number of geographic segments, country segments or items per geographic segment. 
However, they reveal a positive association between banks’ operations in tax havens and 
strategical aggregation of geographic segments, indicating that banks potentially tried to 
obfuscate activities in tax havens. However, Eberhartinger et al. (2020) find evidence that 
                                                 
81 FIN 48 is an interpretation issued by the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) regarding the 
calculation and disclosure of reserves for uncertain tax positions. 
 




banks reduced their tax haven presence after the introduction of CbCR compared to companies 
from the insurance industry. 
Brown (2018) and Overesch and Wolff (2019) examine the effect of public CbCR for EU 
banks on the bank’s overall tax avoidance. However, they find mixed results. Overesch and 
Wolff (2019) show that treated banks increased their GAAP effective tax rate after the 
implementation of public CbCR, while Brown (2018) cannot provide evidence for a decrease 
in tax avoidance of EU banks. Exploiting the same reform, Joshi et al. (2020) find a decrease 
in the level of income shifted by the financial affiliates of European banks but no robust 
evidence on the increase in European banks’ overall tax burden after the reform. The mixed 
findings result from differences in the sample selection, control group identification and data.  
4.3.2 Empirical predictions 
The effect of CbCR disclosures on banks’ activities depends on the expected costs of 
disclosure. One potential cost channel could be that banks face higher detection and 
enforcement risks by tax authorities. The importance of this channel depends on the relevance 
of the information content of CbCR disclosures to tax authorities. It is questionable whether 
CbCR disclosure offers an additional benefit to tax authorities because it can be assumed that 
tax authorities are informed about the common tax planning strategies of banks due to prior 
tax audits (Evers et al., 2017). In addition, banks are already subject to tax disclosure 
regulations, e.g. many countries require banks to prepare a transfer pricing documentation, 
which informs tax authorities (Deloitte 2019). Further, taxpayers are obliged to provide tax 
auditors with additional information upon request during their tax audits (OECD, 2006, p. 14, 
note 45). Moreover, CbCR disclosures do not appear to be helpful to tax authorities when they 
assess transfer pricing risks because CbCR does not reflect international transfer pricing rules, 
but a geographic overview of economic activities (Hanlon, 2018). In addition, it does not seem 
to be very reasonable to relate tax payments with profits per country and year because these 
items are probably affected by prior periods, e.g. loss carry-forwards and, in general, 
differences between financial accounting and the determination of taxable income (Evers et 
al., 2017; Hanlon, 2018). 
Apart from that, CbCR could provide tax authorities with additional useful information. 
Before the CbCR regulation became effective, most countries required local entities to prepare 
a transfer pricing documentation, which typically discloses only transactions of the local entity 
with related parties. CbCR provides now additional country-level information about 
 




subsidiaries of a group, even if these subsidiaries do not have transactions with local entities. 
Therefore, local tax authorities gain more insights into operations in foreign countries, in 
particular in foreign tax haven countries (Dutt et al., 2019b; De Simone and Olbert, 2020). 
The goal of the OECD (2015, p. 9) regarding CbCR is to provide tax authorities with useful 
information to assess transfer pricing risks and other BEPS-related risks and thus potentially 
enhance enforcement effectiveness. A survey among tax managers and executives reveals that 
85% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that tax authorities will increase tax audit 
assessments globally (Deloitte, 2018).  
Another potential cost channel could be reputational concerns. The main goal of CbCR for 
banks is to increase transparency regarding the activities of institutions and thus regain the 
trust of stakeholders and society (EU, 2013a, Recital 52). The disclosure of tax information 
per country could facilitate the monitoring of banks’ activities that the public could perceive 
as tax avoidance behaviour, which is not socially desirable (e.g., Roychowdhury et al., 2019). 
For example, banks with a high engagement in tax haven countries, an unequal distribution of 
tax payments across countries or a low share of tax payments relative to economic factors such 
as turnover and the number of employees across countries could face reputational concerns. 
Under this channel, banks might change their tax avoidance behaviour to reduce potential 
social costs such as loss of trust and damage to their image.  
Surveys among tax managers and executives reveal that managers are concerned about the 
continuing high interest of media, political and activist groups in corporate taxation (Deloitte, 
2018). Further, they show that reputational concerns are important to managers and affect the 
degree to which they engage in tax planning (Graham et al., 2014; Deloitte, 2018). For many 
managers, tax planning in their organisations has become a corporate responsibility issue and 
not just a compliance issue (Deloitte, 2018).  
However, empirical literature in the field of reputational costs and tax planning is mixed. Some 
studies show that investors do not seem to continuously react to potential reputation effects 
resulting from the disclosure of (potential) tax avoidance strategies (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009; Gallemore et al., 2014; Huesecken et al., 2018; Hoopes et al., 2018; Dutt et al., 2019a). 
In contrast to these studies, there is ample evidence in the literature that managers and 
investors react to reputational concerns by changing their tax planning behaviour, in particular 
when they anticipate public scrutiny and stakeholder reactions (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009; Graham et al., 2014; Dyreng et al., 2016; Austin and Wilson, 2017; Hoopes et al., 2018).   
 




Taken together, if CbCR disclosures raised costs for banks due to either an increase in 
detection and enforcement risks or reputational concerns, I would expect that banks reduce 
their tax avoidance activities and hence their overall tax avoidance. My first hypothesis states 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: EU multinational banks decrease their level of tax avoidance after the 
implementation of public CbCR disclosure requirements in 2014.     
A decrease in tax avoidance resulting from the disclosure of tax information can affect real 
economic activities. Dyreng et al. (2020) provide a theoretical framework that includes tax 
avoidance behaviour in the firm’s decision to maximise their after-tax profits.82 The authors 
assume that, on the one hand, engaging in tax avoidance reduces the tax rate (τ – A). On the 
other hand, tax avoidance causes potential costs (see above). Consequently, the optimum level 
of tax avoidance requires that the marginal benefit from one additional percentage point of 
taxes avoided equals the marginal cost of tax avoidance. Therefore, an increase in the cost of 
tax avoidance negatively affects the optimal level of tax avoidance. As engaging in tax 
avoidance reduces the tax rate (τ – A), the optimal level of tax avoidance impacts the optimal 
levels of the input factors, e.g., capital and labour (Bruehne and Jacob, 2019). Thus, a decrease 
in tax avoidance adversely affects real economic activities (capital and labour). 
The recent empirical literature provides evidence that tax avoidance creates real effects (for 
an overview, see Bruehne and Jacob, 2019). An increase in tax avoidance can increase 
corporate investment decisions (e.g., De Vito et al., 2019), decrease the transparency of firms’ 
operations (e.g., Kim et al., 2011; Donohoe and Knechel, 2014; Chen et al., 2018a; Chung et 
al., 2019) and increase the cost of debt (e.g., Hasan et al., 2014; Platikanova, 2017).  
Although prior studies generally examine the behaviour of non-financial firms, the theoretical 
prediction and empirical results can be transferred (at least in part) to the financial sector 
because recent empirical studies provide evidence that banks are also engaged in tax avoidance 
behaviour (e.g., Merz and Overesch, 2016; Langenmayr and Reiter, 2017).83 In addition, 
empirical literature shows that banks’ loan supply and income from various business models 
are negatively responsive to taxes (e.g., Huizinga et al., 2014; Han et al., 2015; Merz and 
Overesch, 2016).  
                                                 
82 Appendix 4.A (Appendix) provides a detailed overview of the theoretical framework by Dyreng et al. (2020).  
83 It should be noted that the business model of financial firms substantially differs from other firms. Therefore, 
for example, a bank’s production function includes the additional input factor loanable funds (e.g., Clark, 1984; 
Wang, 2003a; Wang, 2003b). Further, banks employ different tax avoidance strategies (e.g., Langenmayr and 
Reiter, 2017). 
 




Given this theoretical prediction and prior empirical literature, I expect that the increase in the 
cost of tax avoidance because of the disclosure of tax information decreases the tax avoidance 
behaviour, resulting in a decline in real activities, e.g., investment decisions.  
Hypothesis 2: EU multinational banks decrease their real activities after the implementation 
of public CbCR disclosure requirements in 2014.   
4.4 Research design and data 
4.4.1 Estimation strategy 
Although the CRD IV applies to all banks headquartered in the EU, I employ a difference-in-
differences (DiD) analysis to test my empirical predictions. My treatment group consists of 
multinational banks headquartered in the EU because these banks can employ tax avoidance 
activities with affiliates abroad and thus potentially react to CbCR. In line with the recent 
literature, I choose domestic banks headquartered in the EU as my control group (e.g., 
Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et al., 2020). The advantage of this control group is that 
purely domestic banks have neither an incentive nor the opportunity to employ cross-border 
tax planning strategies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that CbCR does not provide tax authorities and stakeholders with incremental 
information, which could increase detection and enforcement risks as well as reputational costs 
for domestic banks. Thus, I do not expect domestic banks to react to the CbCR disclosure 
requirement. 
Besides the fact that domestic banks do not have the opportunity to engage in cross-border tax 
planning, EU domestic banks have several favourable characteristics mitigating potential 
endogeneity issues. First, domestic and multinational banks in the EU face the same EU 
financial market environment and regulatory requirements, in general. Second, EU domestic 
and multinational banks are both subject to the liquidity and capital requirements under the 
CRD IV. Using domestic banks as a control group should therefore mitigate the concern that 
other provisions under the CRD IV, except the CbCR disclosure requirement, drive my results.   
By applying the DiD approach, I compare both groups (first difference) before and after the 
reform (second difference) regarding the overall tax avoidance and real economic activities. I 
thus employ the following DiD model to test both hypotheses: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
 




In my first set of tests, I define the dependent variable Outcome as the GAAP effective tax 
rate (ETR) of a bank i at the end of year t. The ETR is a widely used proxy for tax avoidance 
in the prior literature (see for an overview, e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Blouin, 2014; 
Wilde and Wilson, 2018). To test my second hypothesis, I define the dependent variable 
Outcome as a measure for banks’ real activities such as earning assets, total assets and number 
of employees (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019; De Simone and Olbert, 2020). My sample period 
captures the years from 2011 to 2015.84 I use this relatively narrow sample window to reduce 
the likelihood that other events unrelated to the change in disclosure requirements affect the 
tax avoidance behaviour and economic activities of multinational banks in the EU.85 I exploit 
the change in disclosure requirements, which is effective since July 2014 as an exogenous 
event. Therefore, Post equals 1 for 2014-2015 and 0 for 2011-2013. The indicator variable 
Treatment distinguishes between observations belonging to the treatment and control group, 
respectively. In line with my predictions, I expect a positive (negative) and significant estimate 
of my DiD coefficient (Post x Treatment) when I test hypothesis 1 (hypothesis 2). 
I estimate Eq. (1) using OLS regression and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the bank level (Petersen, 2009).86 Following Joshi et al. (2020) and Overesch and Wolff 
(2019), I control for bank-level characteristics that could affect the bank’s effective tax rate 
and capture the ability to invest in assets and employees. I include total equity (Size) because 
size can be a proxy for tax planning and investment opportunities. ROA presents the return on 
assets of a bank as a proxy for profitability and financial resources. Leverage controls for the 
capital structure affecting the tax shield on interest and investment decisions.87     
I also include several variables controlling for country-year-level characteristics of the 
parent’s home country that might correlate with tax avoidance and investment activities. I add 
the statutory tax rate (STR) to control for tax rate changes. Further, GDP growth and inflation 
represent the market growth and price level, respectively. In Table 4.B2 (Appendix), I provide 
a detailed variable description. Finally, to control for general time trends in tax avoidance and 
economic activities and time-invariant unobservable differences in bank characteristics, I 
include bank and year fixed effects.  
                                                 
84 I include data from 2010 to calculate growth rates of variables or lagged controls in 2011. 
85 I restrict my sample to the period 2011-2015 for the following reasons. First, I want to avoid that the financial 
crisis between 2007 and 2009 affects my data. Second, the OECD published the final reports of the 15 BEPS 
actions in 2015. Since then, many countries have been revising their national tax regulations, which also affect 
financial institutions.  
86 In addition, I check whether the clustered-level of standard errors affects my results. Therefore, I cluster the 
standard errors at the country level to capture that errors might correlate at that level (e.g., Fiechter et al., 2019). 
Table 4.B1 (Appendix) shows that my inferences are robust to a different clustering of standard errors.  
87 I lag bank-level controls to avoid an endogeneity bias (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 2016; Andries et al., 2017). 
 




My identification approach may raise the general concern that multinational and domestic 
banks are not comparable because they have different business models and are different in size 
and investment activities (e.g., Buch and Golder, 2001; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). I 
mitigate this concern by employing a matching approach. By using entropy balancing 
matching in Section 4.6.1, I ensure that treated and control banks are comparable in observable 
bank-level characteristics. In addition, I check the parallel trend assumption of my DiD 
analysis by providing yearly treatment effects in Section 4.6.2, thereby supporting the view 
that EU domestic banks are appropriate peers to the treated EU multinational banks. Further, 
I test placebo treatments in Section 4.6.3 to mitigate the concern that other provisions of the 
CRD IV, e.g., additional liquidity and capital requirements, drive my results.  
4.4.2 Data and sample overview 
I use the Bankscope database provided by Bureau van Dijk to obtain financial and ownership 
data for banks. Table 4.B3 (Appendix) outlines my sample selection process. I select all active 
financial institutions that are the ultimate parent of their respective group because I am 
interested in the overall the tax avoidance of the group (e.g., Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joschi 
et al., 2020). In line with Joschi et al. (2020), I include all active financial institutions with 
banking activities because it is broadly accepted that these institutions are subject to the 
disclosure requirements (Art. 4 CRD IV; PwC, 2016).  
Further, I exclude all banks headquartered outside the EU as the Directive does not apply or 
only partly applies to banks outside the EU.88 In addition, I drop all banks without at least one 
majority-owned affiliate from the financial sector and without consolidated accounting data89. 
Following Merz and Overesch (2016) and Joshi et al. (2020), I exclude micro-financing 
institutions and specialised governmental institutions to mitigate the concern that their profit 
shifting behaviour may differ from other banks. To avoid that potential measurement errors 
could drive my results, I drop all observations with a GAAP effective tax rate below zero and 
above one. In addition, I require bank-year observations to contain information on my 
dependent variables (total assets, earnings assets, GAAP effective tax rate and the number of 
employees). The final sample comprises 1,107 bank-year observations for the years 2011 to 
2015.    
                                                 
88 CbCR under CRD IV applies even to banks headquartered outside the EU if they have at least one affiliate in 
the EU. Then, banks have to prepare a CbC report for the EU financial affiliates.  
89 I cannot conduct analyses based on unconsolidated data due to a lack of sufficient data on the subsidiary level.  
 




Table 4.1: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample distribution 
   Number of banks  Number of observations 
EU banks  263  1,107 
      
 with at least one foreign financial 
institution affiliate (≙ EU multina-
tional banks) 
 122  510 
      
 without foreign financial institution 
affiliates (≙ EU domestic banks) 
 141  597 
Panel B: Sample distribution by country 
   Number of observations  Percent 
AT Austria  52  4.70 
BE Belgium  14  1.26 
BG Bulgaria  7  0.63 
CY Cyprus  5  0.45 
CZ Czech Republic  2  0.18 
DE Germany  89  8.04 
DK Denmark  65  5.87 
ES Spain  79  7.14 
FI Finland  31  2.80 
FR France  211  19.06 
GB United Kingdom  242  21.86 
GR Greece  23  2.08 
HU Hungary  9  0.81 
IE Ireland  4  0.36 
IT Italy  137  12.38 
LT Lithuania  5  0.45 
LU Luxembourg  19  1.72 
LV Latvia  14  1.26 
MT Malta  5  0.45 
PL Poland  11  0.99 
PT Portugal  28  2.53 
RO Romania  4  0.36 
SE Sweden  46  4.16 
SI Slovenia  5  0.45 
Total  1,107  100 
Panel C: Sample distribution by specialisation 
  Number of observations  Percent 
Commercial banks  309  27.91 
Cooperative banks  274  24.75 
Finance companies  68  6.14 
Investment & Trust corporations  51  4.61 
Investment banks & Financial services  158  14.27 
Other credit institutions & Financial services  28  2.53 
Real Estate & Mortgage banks  117  10.57 
Savings banks  73  6.59 
Securities firms  29  2.62 
Total  1,107  100 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample distribution (Panel A), which is divided into the sample 
distribution per country (Panel B) and the sample distribution per specialisation (Panel C).   
 
 




Panel A of Table 4.1 reports that out of 263 EU banks, 122 banks have at least one majority-
owned foreign affiliate belonging to the banking sector (treatment group) and 141 banks only 
have majority-owned domestic affiliates from the banking sector (control group). I require that 
domestic banks in my control group have at least one affiliate to mitigate the concern that 
investment activities differ between stand-alone banks and groups. Panel B reveals the sample 
distribution by country. In general, observations are evenly distributed across countries, except 
for the United Kingdom and France.90 Panel C reports the sample distribution by 
specialisation. Commercial and cooperative banks present the majority of observations.91    
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
Sample period: 2011-2015 
 N Mean P50 StDev 
EU multinational banks     
ETR 510 0.26 0.23 0.17 
Earning Assets 510 16.35 16.29 2.60 
Total Assets 510 16.63 16.52 2.36 
Employees 510 7.96 7.71 2.06 
Size 503 14.19 14.07 2.01 
Leverage 503 0.86 0.92 0.16 
ROA 503 0.01 0.01 0.03 
STR 503 0.27 0.26 0.06 
Inflation 503 1.52 1.50 1.36 
GDP Growth 503 0.95 1.10 2.41 
     
EU domestic banks     
ETR 597 0.29 0.29 0.14 
Earning Assets 597 15.14 15.48 2.05 
Total Assets 597 15.29 15.52 1.82 
Employees 597 6.60 6.78 1.57 
Size 579 12.91 12.92 1.67 
Leverage 579 0.87 0.90 0.14 
ROA 579 0.01 0.01 0.04 
STR 579 0.29 0.30 0.06 
Inflation 579 1.60 1.50 1.29 
GDP Growth 579 1.17 1.20 1.58 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of the treatment (EU multinational banks) and control (EU 
domestic banks) group for the sample period from 2011 to 2015. All variables are defined in Table 4.B2 
(Appendix). In order to calculate the control variables in 2011, which are scaled by prior year’s total assets, I use 
data from 2010.   
                                                 
90 To rule out that observations from the United Kingdom and France drive my results, I exclude the treated 
observations from both countries and re-estimate my DiD regression (Eq. (1)) (see Table 4.B4 (Appendix)). The 
results are consistent with my main findings, indicating that observations from France and the United Kingdom 
do not drive my results. 
91 Since cooperative banks can differ from commercial banks regarding the ownership structure and business 
model, I check whether cooperative banks affect my results. Therefore, I exclude cooperative banks from my 
initial sample and re-estimate my DiD regression (Eq. (1)) (see Table 4.B5 (Appendix)). The results are consistent 
with my main findings, indicating that cooperative banks do not drive my results. 
 




Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for treatment and control group observations, 
respectively. Table 4.B2 (Appendix) lists detailed variable definitions. The summary statistics 
show that EU domestic banks have, on average, a higher ETR compared to EU multinational 
banks, which is in line with the missing possibility for domestic banks to engage in cross-
border tax planning. Further, the summary statistics reveal that, compared to the observations 
in my treatment group, the observations in my control group show only slightly lower 
economic activities, measured in terms of total assets, earning assets and the number of 
employees. These statistics mitigate the concern that domestic banks are not comparable with 
multinational banks.92 In terms of the control variables, my control banks are, on average, very 
similar to my treated banks.  
4.5 Main results 
4.5.1 Banks’ tax avoidance behaviour 
In my first set of analyses, I replicate Joshi et al. (2020) and Overesch and Wolff (2019) by 
addressing my first hypothesis whether EU multinational banks decrease their tax avoidance 
behaviour in response to the CbCR disclosure requirement under the CRD IV. Table 4.3 
reports OLS regression results from estimating my baseline model (Eq. (1)) with a tax 
avoidance measure as the dependent variable. I estimate three different specifications in both 
panels: (1) regression with fixed effects but without controls, (2) regression with fixed effects 
and bank-level controls, and (3) fully specified regression with fixed effects, bank- and 
country-level controls (as defined in Eq. (1)).  
In Panel A, I use the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR)93 as the dependent variable. My findings 
reveal three main insights. First, the estimated average treatment effect (Post x Treatment) is 
positive and significant for each specification (p-value < 1%). Second, the different regression 
specifications do not seem to affect the economic significance of the results. Both insights 
indicate that the DiD coefficient estimate is robust after controlling for bank and bank’s home 
country characteristics. Third, the magnitude of the DiD effect is economically significant. 
Compared to EU domestic banks, EU multinational banks face an increase in the GAAP 
effective tax rate of approximately 5% points. The results confirm my first hypothesis and are 
                                                 
92 In an additional test, I mitigate the concern that outliers bias my small sample. Therefore, I winsorise my four 
dependent variables at the 1% and 99% level and re-estimate Eq. (1) (see Table 4.B6 (Appendix)). The results 
are consistent with my main findings, indicating that outliers do not drive my results.  
93 Due to data limitations in Bankscope, I cannot use the cash effective tax rate as the dependent variable.  
 




in line with Joshi et al. (2020), although I use a slightly different identification strategy and 
set of control variables.  
Table 4.3: Effect of CbCR on banks’ tax avoidance 
Panel A: GAAP effective tax rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: ETR ETR ETR 
Post x Treatment 0.0522*** 0.0549*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
Size  0.0117 0.0129 
  (0.0287) (0.0259) 
Leverage  -0.0146 -0.00556 
  (0.111) (0.108) 
ROA  -0.0392 -0.0374 
  (0.176) (0.172) 
STR   0.813*** 
   (0.280) 
Inflation   -0.0118 
   (0.00724) 
GDP Growth   0.00557 
   (0.00342) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Country controls None None Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.405 0.401 0.408 
N 1,107 1,082 1,082 
Panel B: Difference between STR and GAAP ETR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: STR_ETR STR_ETR STR_ETR 
Post x Treatment -0.0517*** -0.0553*** -0.0509*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0176) 
Firm controls None Included Included 
Country controls None None Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.339 0.334 0.337 
N 1,107 1,082 1,082 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Panel A and STR_ETR (difference between 
the statutory tax rate (STR) and ETR) in Panel B. The table reports three different specifications for each panel: 
(1) regression with fixed effects but without control variables, (2) regression with fixed effects and bank-level 
controls, and (3) fully specified regression with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main 
variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-
in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the post 
treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 4.B2 (Appendix). All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
In Panel B, I use an alternative tax avoidance measure to test the robustness of my results. 
Following Thomsen and Watrin (2018), I consider the difference between the statutory tax 
rate of the bank’s home country and the bank’s GAAP effective tax rate (STR_ETR) as my 
 




second dependent variable. This measure has the feature that, to some extent, it captures the 
effect that banks pay lower taxes if the government reduces the statutory tax rate. I expect that 
a decrease in the difference between the STR and ETR indicates a reduction in the tax 
avoidance behaviour. The findings in Panel B are in line with my prediction. The results show 
across all three specifications that the difference between the STR and ETR decreases after 
the introduction of the CbCR disclosure requirement, indicating that banks reduce their tax 
avoidance behaviour. These findings are entirely in line with the results in Panel A.  
Overall, my results suggest that EU multinational banks decrease their tax avoidance 
behaviour after the CbCR disclosure mandate became effective.94 This result is statistically 
and economically significant compared to EU domestic banks. 
4.5.2 Banks’ economic activities 
In my second set of analyses, I examine whether EU multinational banks reduce their 
economic activities in response to the CbCR disclosure requirement because they face a 
decrease in tax avoidance. I use the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets, earning assets and 
number of employees as proxies for banks’ real economic activities (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019). 
Table 4.4 reports OLS regression results from estimating my baseline model (Eq. (1)) for each 
of the three dependent variables. I estimate two different specifications for each dependent 
variable: (1) regression with fixed effects but without controls, and (2) fully specified 
regression with fixed effects, bank- and country-level controls (as defined in Eq. (1)). 
My findings offer two main insights. First, the estimated average treatment effect (Post x 
Treatment) is negative and significant in each specification (p-value < 10%). Second, the 
magnitude of the DiD effect is economically significant. Compared to EU domestic banks, EU 
multinational banks face a decrease in total assets by approximately 5% (Column 2). This 
decrease in total assets is caused by a decrease in earnings assets of roughly 6% (Column 4). 
Since earning assets include all income-generating and income-contributing assets, such as 
loans, securities, real estate properties and other tangible assets, the reduction in these assets 
indicates that banks’ core economic activities decrease. Further, compared to EU domestic 
banks, EU multinational banks reduce the number of employees by approximately 5.6% after 
the CbCR disclosure requirement became effective. 
                                                 
94 However, it should be noted that my tax avoidance measures cannot directly determine the tax avoidance 
behaviour of banks. Each of these measures has limitations and thus only presents a proxy for tax avoidance (e.g., 
Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Blouin, 2014; Thomsen and Watrin, 2018).  
 




Table 4.4: Effect of CbCR on banks’ real economic activities 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Total assets Total assets  Earning assets Earning assets  Employees Employees 
Post x Treatment  -0.0928** -0.0540**  -0.0919* -0.0632**  -0.0735** -0.0564** 
  (0.0425) (0.0273)  (0.0474) (0.0297)  (0.0289) (0.0225) 
Size   0.590***   0.586***   0.372*** 
   (0.0940)   (0.120)   (0.0646) 
Leverage   -1.035   2.651   -0.513** 
   (0.664)   (2.703)   (0.198) 
ROA   2.712***   3.304***   1.225*** 
   (0.564)   (0.845)   (0.394) 
STR   -2.040***   -1.881***   -2.542*** 
   (0.513)   (0.595)   (0.425) 
Inflation   -0.0148   0.00879   0.00136 
   (0.0125)   (0.0172)   (0.0100) 
GDP Growth   -0.000344   -0.000754   0.00201 
   (0.00529)   (0.00610)   (0.00438) 
Controls  None Included  None Included  None Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Bank fixed effects  Included Included  Included Included  Included Included 
Adj. R²  0.989 0.995  0.985 0.991  0.993 0.996 
N  1,107 1,082  1,107 1,082  1,107 1,082 
Notes: The dependent variable is Total assets (natural logarithm of total assets) in Column 1 and 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3 and 4, and 
Employees (natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 5 and 6. The table reports two different specifications for the three dependent variables: (1), (3) and (5) 
regression with fixed effects but without control variables, and (2), (4) and (6) fully specified regression with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main variable 
of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for 
treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 4.B2 (Appendix). All regression models have standard errors 









In further tests, I validate the robustness of my results. In the first set of additional tests, I re-
estimate Eq. (1) but use alternative dependent variables. First, I replace the number of 
employees with the cost of employees. It is arguable that the cost of employees is a more 
flexible measure and captures more variation over time compared to the number of employees 
and should therefore reduce potential measurement errors. Second, my main analyses on the 
effect of CbCR on banks’ real economic activities reveal that banks’ total assets decrease after 
the CbCR disclosure requirement became effective (see Table 4.4). In addition, my findings 
show that the decline in total assets is driven by a decrease in earning assets. Alternatively, the 
reduction in banks’ total assets could result from a decrease in non-earning assets. To test this 
alternative outcome variable, I use non-earning assets as a dependent variable and re-estimate 
Eq. (1).  
Panel A of Table 4.5 reports the results. Replacing the number of employees with the cost of 
employees as the dependent variable does not seem to affect the DiD estimator (Column 1). 
The average treatment effect is robust with respect to the statistical significance and economic 
magnitude, confirming the results of my analyses on banks’ number of employees. Further, 
Column 2 reveals that CbCR disclosure requirements do not affect non-earning assets of EU 
multinational banks compared to EU domestic banks. This result rules out that the decrease in 
total assets is driven by a factor other than the income-generating assets (earning assets) shown 
in Table 4.4.  
In my second set of robustness tests, I change the definition of my dependent variables that 
serve as proxies for banks’ real economic activities. So far, I use the natural logarithm of total 
assets, earnings assets and the number of employees as the dependent variables. This definition 
of the dependent variables could cause a measurement error since I do not consider the 
previous amount of the specific item when calculating the dependent variables. Therefore, I 
replace the dependent variables with growth rates, i.e., the change in the natural logarithm of 
the item scaled by the natural logarithm of the prior year’s item (e.g., Dobbins and Jacob, 
2016; De Simone and Olbert, 2020).  
Panel B of Table 4.5 reports the results for the alternatively defined dependent variables: 
Earning assets growth (Column 1), Total assets growth (Column 2) and Employment growth 
(Column 3). The coefficient estimate for earning assets growth and total assets growth is 
negative and significant, but the growth rate of the number of employees is not significant. 
These additional tests indicate that the findings are only partly consistent with the results of 
my main analyses. However, due to data limitations, these tests should be considered with 
 




caution. My unbalanced sample limits the calculation of growth rates and thus restricts the 
validity of the results.  
Table 4.5: Alternative dependent variables 
Panel A: Alternative dependent variable 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Cost of Emp Non-earning assets 
Post x Treatment -0.0589** -0.0746 
 (0.0230) (0.0567) 
Controls Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.995 0.972 
N 1,074 1,073 
Panel B: Alternative definition of dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Earning assets growth Total assets growth Employment growth 
Post x Treatment -0.00137** -0.00110* 0.00120 
 (0.000659) (0.000645) (0.00101) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.268 0.388 0.369 
N 933 933 933 
Notes: In Panel A, I use the following alternative dependent variables: Cost of Emp (natural logarithm of 
personnel expenses) in Column 1 and Non-earning assets (natural logarithm of non-earning assets) in Column 2. 
In Panel B, I apply the following alternative definitions of the dependent variables used in my baseline model: 
Earning assets growth (change in the natural logarithm of bank’s earning assets scaled by the natural logarithm 
of prior year’s earning assets) in Column 1, Total assets growth (change in the natural logarithm of bank’s total 
assets scaled by the natural logarithm of prior year’s total assets) in Column 2 and Employment growth (change 
in the natural logarithm of bank’s number of employees scaled by the natural logarithm of the prior year’s number 
of employees) in Column 3. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and 
country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x 
Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for 
treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
Since my results show that earning assets are negatively affected by the disclosure 
requirement, additional tests aim at getting more insights into the effect of CbCR on single 
items within the earning assets. Therefore, I divided earning assets into Gross loans, Net loans, 
Securities, Bank loans and Investments. I re-estimate Eq. (1) with these single items as the 
dependent variable. Table 4.B7 (Appendix) reports the results of my DiD analysis with fixed 
effects and without controls (Panel A) and with fixed effects and controls (Panel B). My 
findings suggest that gross and net loans significantly decrease after the reform. However, this 
 




result does not hold when I include controls.95 The DiD estimators are negative but not 
significant when using securities, bank loans or investments as the dependent variable.  
Overall, the results confirm my second hypothesis by indicating that EU multinational banks 
reduce their real economic activities after the CbCR disclosure reform. However, it should be 
noted that the statistical significance and economic magnitude vary with different 
specifications. 
4.5.3 Cross-sectional variation in the average treatment effect 
In Section 4.3.2, I state that the effect of CbCR on tax avoidance depends on two possible cost 
channels: enforcement/detection risk and reputational concerns. In addition, I predict that a 
decrease in tax avoidance adversely affects banks’ economic activities, indicating that real 
effects only appear if the bank’s tax avoidance behaviour is affected. To test these relations, I 
conduct cross-sectional tests designed to examine whether my treatment effects vary with 
detection/enforcement risks and reputational concerns. I predict that treated banks exposed to 
higher detection risks and reputational costs strongly decrease their tax avoidance behaviour, 
resulting in a larger reduction in real activities. 
I identify proxies to test whether both channels moderate the responsiveness of banks to the 
disclosure requirement. To empirically assess the moderating effects, I use my baseline DiD 
approach (Eq. (1)), but interact binary conditional variables with the DiD estimator Post x 
Treatment. I estimate DiD models with fixed effects and controls for each of my four 
dependent variables (effective tax rate, total assets, earning assets and the number of 
employees) that capture tax avoidance and real economic activities of banks. 
First, I examine whether higher enforcement and detection risks moderate the treatment 
effects. I argue that, once tax information is disclosed per country in the CbC reports, banks 
with affiliates in tax haven countries or with a high number of foreign affiliates could face 
higher detection risks because tax authorities could perceive them as engaged in aggressive 
tax avoidance activities. Under this channel, disclosing banks should change their tax planning 
strategies to avoid additional tax audits. This potential decrease in tax avoidance could 
negatively affect banks’ real economic activities. In addition, I predict that the quality of 
government affects the behaviour of banks, because the quality of government includes the 
                                                 
95 In a cross-sectional test, I find that treated banks significantly reduce gross and net loans after the reform if 
they have at least one affiliate in a tax haven. This effect is larger compared with treated banks without an affiliate 
in a tax haven country (see Table 4.B8 (Appendix)). Cross-sectional tests regarding the presence in a tax haven 
are explained in Section 4.5.3. 
 




government’s ability to formulate, implement and enforce regulations, which leads to a higher 
detection and enforcement risk.  
Table 4.6 reports the results for my first set of cross-sectional tests. In Panel A, I distinguish 
between treated banks that have at least one subsidiary from the financial sector headquartered 
in a tax haven (Tax haven) and treated banks without a subsidiary from the financial sector 
domiciled in a tax haven country (No tax haven). Following De Simone and Olbert (2020), I 
classify a country as a tax haven if it is listed in any of the tax haven lists used in Bennedsen 
and Zeume (2018). In Panel B, I distinguish between treated banks with a number of foreign 
affiliates in the top 20th percentile (High no. foreign subs) and below the top 20th percentile 
(Low no. foreign subs).96 In Panel C, I distinguish between treated banks domiciled in a 
country with a government quality index above the median (High quality) and below the 
median (Low quality) in the pre-reform period. I obtain data on the government quality from 
the worldwide governance indicators provided by the World Bank (e.g., Dharmapala and 
Hines, 2009; Osswald and Sureth-Sloane, 2020). I calculate the government quality index for 
each country as the mean of the three indicators: government effectiveness, regulatory quality 
and rule of law in the pre-reform period.  
The results in Table 4.6 reveal the following insights. Across all panels and specifications, the 
effect of CbCR disclosures on the tax avoidance and real economic activities of banks is 
significant for those with at least one affiliate in a tax haven country and a high number of 
foreign affiliates. In addition, the response of banks is significant if they are headquartered in 
a country with a high government quality. However, the difference in coefficient estimates is 
only significant for total assets and earning assets if the bank has at least one affiliate in a tax 
haven country (Panel A) and for the number of employees if the bank has a high number of 
foreign affiliates (Panel B). Overall, these results provide indications that the cost channel 
regarding enforcement and detection risk moderates the effect of CbCR on banks’ tax 
avoidance and hence their real economic activities.  
  
                                                 
96 Due to the highly skewed distribution of the bank’s number of foreign affiliates, I choose the top 20th percentile 
for the cross-sectional test.  
 




Table 4.6: Cross-sectional findings – detection risk 
Panel A: Presence in tax haven countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x Tax haven 0.0567*** -0.0892** -0.111*** -0.0755*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0384) (0.0394) (0.0263) 
Post x Treatment x No tax haven 0.0439 -0.0112 -0.00529 -0.0333 
 (0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0342) (0.0315) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.6998] [0.0734] [0.0226] [0.2425] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.408 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel B: Number of foreign subsidiaries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x High no. foreign subs 0.0901*** -0.110* -0.145** -0.137*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0662) (0.0614) (0.0469) 
Post x Treatment x Low no. foreign subs 0.0408** -0.0394 -0.0422 -0.0358 
 (0.0195) (0.0275) (0.0311) (0.0230) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.1669] [0.2983] [0.1108] [0.0373] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.410 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel C: Government quality  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x High quality 0.0697*** -0.0634* -0.0847** -0.0689** 
 (0.0253) (0.0341) (0.0375) (0.0298) 
Post x Treatment x Low quality 0.0289 -0.0429 -0.0380 -0.0419 
 (0.0221) (0.0379) (0.0411) (0.0294) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.2135] [0.6622] [0.3657] [0.4857] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.410 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: In all panels, the dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural 
logarithm of total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and 
Employees (natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. Regression models include an additional 
interaction term based on the conditional variable to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: Tax haven (No tax haven) equals 1 for treated banks with 
at least one (without a) subsidiary from the financial sector headquartered in a tax haven (Panel A), High no. 
foreign subs (Low no. of subs) equals 1 for treated banks with a number of foreign affiliates above (below) the 
top 20th percentile (Panel B), High quality (Low quality) equals 1 for treated banks domiciled in a country with 
a government quality index above (below) the median in the pre-reform period (Panel C). All regression models 
have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
  
 




Second, I examine whether reputational concerns moderate the treatment effects. The 
disclosure of tax information per country could facilitate the monitoring of banks’ activities 
that the public could perceive as tax avoidance behaviour, which is not socially desirable. 
Therefore, banks exposed to reputational concerns should decrease their tax avoidance 
behaviour to reduce potential social costs such as loss of trust and damage to corporate image. 
However, a decrease in tax avoidance could reduce real economic activities of banks. I predict 
that banks are more exposed to reputational concerns if they are headquartered in countries in 
which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are resident. For example, NGOs can affect 
the behaviour of banks via “shaming campaigns” (e.g., Fiechter et al., 2019; Rauter, 2020). 
Further, I expect a higher treatment effect for large banks as they often have higher media 
attention (e.g., Rauter, 2020).97 Besides, banks listed on stock markets are more exposed to 
the perception of investors and stakeholders and thus should have a stronger response to the 
CbCR disclosures if they anticipate adverse stakeholder reactions (e.g., Hoopes et al., 2018).  
Table 4.7 reports the results for my second set of cross-sectional tests. In Panel A, I distinguish 
between treated banks headquartered in a country in which at least one NGO is resident (NGO) 
and treated banks headquartered in a country without an NGO (No NGO). Following Fiechter 
et al. (2019), I obtain the presence of NGOs from the UN.98 In Panel B, I distinguish between 
treated banks with average total assets above the median (Large) and below the median (Small) 
in the pre-reform period. In Panel C, I distinguish between listed and unlisted treated banks.  
The results in Table 4.7 reveal the following insights. The effect of CbCR disclosures on the 
tax avoidance and real economic activities of banks is significant for large banks and those 
headquartered in a country in which at least one NGO is resident. However, the difference in 
coefficient estimates is only significant for the number of employees if the bank is large. 
Considering the effect of the listing on the treatment effect, I only find weak and partly mixed 
results. While my results show a significantly larger effect on tax avoidance for listed banks 
compared to unlisted banks, I find no strong indication that the decrease in tax avoidance 
affects real activities. My findings indicate that banks react to reputational concerns by 
decreasing their tax avoidance. However, this does not seem to predominantly affect their real 
activities because, for example, listed firms have lower costs for access to external capital 
needed to finance their real activities (e.g., Goyal et al., 2011). Overall, these results provide 
                                                 
97 I acknowledge that size can also be a channel for the detection risk as larger firms generally face a higher risk 
for tax audits.  
98 See, https://www.unenvironment.org/civil-society-engagement/accreditation/list-accredited-organizations 
(Number of UN-accredited NGOs per country; last access: February 2020). 
 




some indications that the cost channel with respect to reputational concerns also moderates 
the effect of CbCR on banks’ real economic activities. 
Table 4.7: Cross-sectional findings – reputational risk 
Panel A: Presence of NGOs in the country of the parent  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x NGO 0.0456** -0.0512* -0.0586* -0.0487** 
 (0.0194) (0.0307) (0.0339) (0.0245) 
Post x Treatment x No NGO 0.0299 -0.0153 -0.0254 -0.0435 
 (0.0352) (0.0415) (0.0494) (0.0347) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.7401] [0.5739] [0.6542] [0.9194] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.409 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel B: Bank size  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x Large 0.0601*** -0.0744** -0.0802** -0.107*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0362) (0.0370) (0.0274) 
Post x Treatment x Small 0.0423* -0.0349 -0.0472 -0.00903 
 (0.0250) (0.0360) (0.0404) (0.0285) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.5750] [0.4048] [0.5082] [0.0049] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.408 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel C: Listing  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment x Listed 0.0711*** -0.0577 -0.0731* -0.0573** 
 (0.0226) (0.0360) (0.0395) (0.0272) 
Post x Treatment x Unlisted 0.0106 -0.0466 -0.0433 -0.0548* 
 (0.0238) (0.0303) (0.0322) (0.0319) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.0568] [0.8001] [0.5329] [0.9488] 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.412 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: In all panels, the dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural 
logarithm of total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and 
Employees (natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. Regression models include an additional 
interaction term based on the conditional variable to assess the cross-sectional variation in the baseline treatment 
effect. The following conditional variables are used: NGO (No NGO) equals 1 for treated banks headquartered 
in a country with (without) an NGO (Panel A), Large (Small) equals 1 for treated banks with average total assets 
above (below) the median in the pre-reform period (Panel B), Listed (Unlisted) equals 1 for treated banks, which 
are (are not) listed on a stock exchange. All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate 
significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
 




However, my cross-sectional results face several limitations. First, the Bureau van Dijk’s 
Bankscope database has some drawbacks. Regarding ownership data, the data on subsidiaries, 
in particular subsidiaries in tax havens, are not complete. In addition, ownership data and 
information on listings are, in general, only available for the most recent update.99 Second, 
most differences in coefficient estimates are not significant, indicating that my proxies for 
both channels do not entirely drive the effect on banks’ tax avoidance and real economic 
behaviour. Third, my proxy indicator variables might correlate with each other, obfuscating 
the results of my cross-sectional tests. Therefore, my findings should be interpreted with 
caution.  
4.6 Additional analyses 
4.6.1 Matching 
As outlined in Section 4.4.1, my identification strategy may raise concerns about the 
comparability of EU domestic banks with EU multinational banks in my DiD model because 
both groups differ in size, their business model and investment activities (e.g., Buch and 
Golder, 2001; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Consequently, these differences could drive 
unobserved differences in banks’ tax avoidance behaviour and real economic activities. To 
mitigate this concern, I re-estimate my baseline regressions (Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) based on 
an entropy-balanced sample to ensure that treated and control banks are comparable in 
observable bank characteristics (e.g., Hainmueller and Xu, 2013; Fiechter et al., 2019; Joshi 
et al., 2020). 
The entropy balancing method constructs a weight for each control observation such that the 
sample moments of observed covariates are identical between the treatment and weighted 
control group (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014, p. 244). In contrast to other matching methods (e.g. 
nearest neighbour matching) where units are either dropped or matched (weights of zero or 
one), the reweighting scheme in entropy balancing is more flexible. It reweights units 
appropriately to achieve balance, but at the same time keeps the weights as close as possible 
to the initial weights in order to avoid loss of information and thus maintain efficiency for the 
analysis (Hainmueller, 2012, p. 26). In this regard, entropy balancing provides a generalisation 
of the propensity score weighting approach (Hainmüller, 2012, p. 26). 
                                                 
99 The last update of the data I use in this study is from December 2016. However, these drawbacks should bias 
my results against finding effects. 
 




I match on all bank-level covariates (Size, ROA and Leverage) in the two years before the 
reform and set the balancing constraint to the first moment (i.e., mean). The entropy balancing 
method calculates weights that I use to re-estimate my baseline regression models (Section 
4.5.1 and 4.5.2).  
Table 4.8: Entropy balancing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment 0.0544*** -0.0564* -0.0791** -0.0476* 
 (0.0192) (0.0313) (0.0339) (0.0241) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.504 0.996 0.994 0.997 
N 883 883 883 883 
Notes: This table provides the results of my baseline regressions based on a matched sample. I employ entropy 
balancing matching. The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural 
logarithm of total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and 
Employees (natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. The table reports fully specified 
regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the 
multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The 
interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 
and 0 otherwise. All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at 
the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% 
(5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
Table 4.8 reports the results from re-estimating Eq. (1) using entropy balancing. I find 
significant treatment effects with comparable economic magnitudes across all four 
specifications (p-value < 10%). In general, the results are in line with my baseline findings 
(Table 4.3 and 4.4). However, the statistical significance is slightly lower for the regressions 
with total assets and the number of employees as the dependent variable (Column 2 and 4). 
Overall, the results in Table 4.8 do not suggest that observable differences across treated and 
control banks confound the baseline inferences.   
4.6.2 Parallel trend assumption 
The DiD estimation requires a parallel trend in the outcome variables for my treatment and 
control group before the reform. To check the validity of the parallel trend assumption in my 
setting, I plot the point-estimates based on a version of my baseline model (Eq. (1)) in which 
I replace the DiD indicator (Post x Treatment) with a series of four separate DiD indicator 
variables, each marking one year over the period between 2011 and 2015. I omit the indicator 
for the year 2013 because this year serves as the benchmark. The purpose of this test is to 
check whether the four dependent variables are trending and the difference in the trends 
between the treated and control group is significant in the pre-reform period. Since the parallel 
 













Estimated treatment effects (together with 
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trend assumption requires that the dependent variables remain constant and parallel between 
both groups, I expect the point-estimates in the pre-reform period to be insignificant.  








   
 
Notes: This figure plots the yearly treatment effects. The point-estimators are generated by estimating the 
following regression model: Outcomeit = β0 + β12011t x Treatmenti + β22012t x Treatmenti + β32014t x Treatmenti 
+ β42015t x Treatmenti + β5Controlsit + β7Banki + εit. Since I omit the DiD indicator for the year 2013, this year 
serves as the benchmark year. The dependent variables represent the GAAP ETR (Figure 1a), total assets (Figure 
1b), earning assets (Figure 1c) and the number of employees (Figure 1d). All variables are defined in Table 4.B2 
(Appendix). The solid points indicate point-estimates and the lines represent 95% confidence intervals.    
Figure 4.1 provides point-estimates and two-tailed 95% confidence intervals for my treated 
versus control banks and each of the four dependent variables. The results presented in Figure 
4.1 suggest that the placebo treatment effects in the pre-reform period (2011-2012) are slightly 
insignificant, providing only weak support for the parallel trends in my sample. Further, at 
around the time when CbCR was partially implemented, I observe significant effects for 
banks’ effective tax rates and the number of employees, but not for total assets and earning 
assets. On the other hand, in the year after the partial implementation of CbCR, Figure 4.1 
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(2020), and banks’ number of employees, while the effects on banks’ total assets and earning 
assets are significant.  
To further challenge the validity of my exogenous shock, I calculate yearly treatment effects 
as described above, but use the year 2011 as the benchmark (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2016). Table 
4.9 reports the results. The regression results indicate that the coefficients in the two years 
leading up to the reform are not statistically significant (p-value > 10%) except for total assets. 
I find weak evidence of higher total assets among EU multinational banks two years prior to 
the reform (Column 2). However, the difference does not persist. In the two years following 
the implementation of CbCR, the coefficients are significant (p-value < 10%) except for total 
assets and earning assets in the year of the implementation. Overall, these results are in line 
with Figure 4.1, indicating that the parallel trend assumption can be supported and the effects 
can be attributed to the reform. However, I note that the magnitude of the coefficients before 
the reform is high and their statistical significance is weak in the year following the reform.   
Table 4.9: Yearly treatment effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
2012 x Treatment  0.0269 0.0505* 0.0496 0.0266 
  (0.0252) (0.0281) (0.0380) (0.0225) 
2013 x Treatment  0.0402 -0.0418 -0.0380 -0.0412 
  (0.0244) (0.0290) (0.0397) (0.0268) 
2014 x Treatment  0.101*** -0.0250 -0.00260 -0.0596** 
  (0.0253) (0.0315) (0.0424) (0.0291) 
2015 x Treatment  0.0427* -0.0833* -0.127** -0.0649* 
  (0.0235) (0.0424) (0.0547) (0.0355) 
Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R²  0.047 0.514 0.375 0.370 
N  1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural logarithm of 
total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and Employees 
(natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. The table reports yearly treatment effects. I estimate 
the baseline model for the entire sample period from 2011-2015 by replacing the DiD indicator (Post x Treatment) 
with a series of four separate DiD indicator variables, each marking one year over the period between 2012 and 
2015. I omit the indicator for the year 2011 (2011 x Treatment) because this year serves as the benchmark. The 
table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
4.6.3 Treatment and reform variation 
In this section, I vary the Post and Treatment definition to mitigate the concern that 
misspecifications affect my results. In the first set of additional tests, I change the treatment 
date to account for the fact that the CbCR disclosure requirement was passed in June 2013, 
 




partially became effective in 2014 and is fully effective since 2015 (e.g., Overesch and Wolff, 
2019). To test whether the year 2013 affects my results, I drop this year in my sample and re-
estimate Eq. (1) with each of my four dependent variables. Panel A of Table 4.10 reports the 
results. My findings are consistent with my baseline results (Table 4.3 and 4.4), although the 
economic magnitude of the coefficient estimates is slightly larger.  
Further, I test whether banks responded in 2015, as each banking group has since been obliged 
to disclose all items required by the CbCR. Therefore, I re-define the Post variable by 
assuming that the reform year is 2015 and re-estimate Eq. (1) with each of my four dependent 
variables. Panel B of Table 4.10 reports the results. In line with my yearly treatment analyses 
(Table 4.9), the effect of CbCR disclosures on the ETR is not significant in 2015, indicating 
that the disclosure requirement does not have a persistent effect on the bank’s ETR. However, 
banks significantly decrease their real economic activities in 2015, suggesting that the bank’s 
response to the reform is related to timing effects in order to adjust their real activities.  
Table 4.10: Treatment date variation 
Panel A: Without the year 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  0.0625*** -0.0840*** -0.0947*** -0.0760*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0321) (0.0354) (0.0274) 
Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R²  0.423 0.994 0.990 0.995 
N  855 855 855 855 
Panel B: Treatment year in 2015 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  -0.00264 -0.0775** -0.129*** -0.0438* 
  (0.0163) (0.0349) (0.0466) (0.0247) 
Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R²  0.400 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N  1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: In both panels, the dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural 
logarithm of total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and 
Employees (natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. The table reports fully specified 
regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. In Panel A, I exclude the year 2013 from 
the sample. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, 
capturing the difference-in-differences effect. In Panel A, the interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for 
treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the interaction 
term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the year 2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression 
models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: 
coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.   
 




Table 4.11: Placebo treatment 
Panel A: Treatment based on liquidity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment_liquidity 0.0171 0.0410 0.0195 
 (0.0313) (0.0289) (0.0246) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel B: Treatment based on equity  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment_equity -0.0188 -0.0168 -0.0278 
 (0.0373) (0.0387) (0.0297) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Panel C: Treatment based on profitability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment_profitability -0.0407 -0.0237 -0.00103 
 (0.0289) (0.0300) (0.0270) 
Controls Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: In each panel, the dependent variable is Total assets (natural logarithm of total assets) in Column 1, 
Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 2, and Employees (natural logarithm of the number 
of employees) in Column 3. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and 
country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x 
Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. I define the following placebo treatments: (Panel A) 
treatment equals 1 for banks with a cash to total assets ratio below the 25th percentile in the year before the 
reform; (Panel B) treatment equals 1 for banks with an equity ratio below the 25th percentile in the year before 
the reform; (Panel C) treatment equals 1 for banks with a return on assets below the 25th percentile in the year 
before the reform. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for placebo treated bank observations in the 
post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression models have standard errors that are 
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** 
(**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed.  
In the second set of additional tests, I address the concern that other provisions of the CRD IV 
confound and drive my results. The major provisions in the CRD IV package comprise new 
standards regarding capital and liquidity requirements as well as corporate governance 
practices (EU, 2013a). To mitigate the concern that the reduction in real activities results from 
stricter regulatory requirements regarding capital and liquidity, I follow Overesch and Wolff 
(2019) by defining placebo treatments with respect to liquidity, equity and profitability. The 
 




idea of placebo treatments is to test whether the effect of the CRD IV on banks’ real activities 
depends on the bank’s liquidity, equity ratio and profitability rather than on the type of bank, 
i.e., multinational or domestic. It could be expected that less liquid banks, banks with low 
equity or less profitable banks predominantly respond to the CRD IV provisions. However, if 
my findings result from the decrease in tax avoidance due to the CbCR disclosure and are not 
driven by other provisions of the CRD IV, I expect insignificant DiD coefficients.  
Table 4.11 reports the results of my DiD analyses with three placebo treatments. In Panel A, 
treatment equals 1 for banks with liquidity below the 25th percentile in the year before the 
reform (= less liquid banks). In Panel B, treatment equals 1 for banks with an equity ratio 
below the 25th percentile in the year before the reform (= low equity banks). In Panel C, 
treatment equals 1 for banks with profitability below the 25th percentile in the year before the 
reform (= less profitable banks). Across all panels and all specifications, I do not find 
significant placebo treatment effects. Overall, my results suggest that total assets, earning 
assets and the number of employees are lower in multinational banks after the reform, but not 
in less liquid or less profitable banks or banks with low equity. These findings support that my 
main results (Section 4.5.2) are caused by the decrease in tax avoidance due to the CbCR 
disclosure requirement.  
4.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the response of EU multinational banks to mandatory public 
disclosure of tax information. Using the EU CRD IV, which became effective in 2014 and 
contained the CbCR disclosure requirement for all banks in the EU, as an exogenous shock 
setting, allows me to examine whether disclosure of tax information affects banks’ tax 
avoidance behaviour and real economic activities. I predict and find that EU multinational 
banks reduce their tax avoidance behaviour and decrease their investments in earning assets 
as well as their total assets and the number of employees compared to EU domestic banks after 
the reform in 2014. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that detection risks and reputational 
concerns moderate the decrease in tax avoidance, resulting in a reduction in real economic 
activities.      
My results are subject to limitations. First, my inferences rely on the parallel trend assumption. 
Although I plot and estimate yearly treatment effects with different benchmark years, which 
do not suggest a violation of the parallel trend assumption, it should be noted that the 
 




magnitude of the coefficients in the periods prior to the reform are high and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients in the year following the reform is rather weak. 
Second, I cannot entirely rule out that confounding events might affect my inferences. Since 
the CRD IV package also comprises new regulations for capital and liquidity requirements, it 
could be possible that these additional regulations bias my results (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019). 
However, since all banks in the EU are affected by the provisions of the CRD IV, I mitigate 
this concern by using EU domestic banks as my control group. I also apply placebo treatments, 
but these are not significant, indicating that other provisions of the CRD IV package do not 
drive my results.  
Further, the treatment effect of EU multinational banks could also be affected by anticipation 
effects due to the EU Directive on the disclosure of non-financial information100 (Directive 
2014/95/EU), which was passed in 2014 (e.g., Fiechter et al., 2019). It could be expected that 
an increase in CSR would be at the expense of other economic activities. However, since the 
CSR Directive applies to large companies, including banks, in the EU with more than 500 
employees, my sample comprises treated and control banks, which both are potentially 
affected. Therefore, potential anticipation effects of the CSR Directive should not bias my 
results, if multinational as well as domestic banks react in the same way to the non-financial 
disclosure regulation. My tests with placebo treatments also indicate that anticipation effects 
of the CSR Directive do not bias my results.   
Fourth, another challenge is that real economic activities of EU banks could be driven by a 
reduction in the demand for bank products (e.g., Gropp et al., 2019). In this case, I would 
expect that not only multinational but also domestic banks face the demand reduction. 
Therefore, this potential driver should affect both groups in the same way. In addition, my 
fixed-effects structure, matching design and thorough sample selection should increase the 
confidence that my identification strategy mitigates time trends and bank-specific confounding 
effects in my setting. Fifth, as my inferences are based on consolidated data, future research 
should shed more light on the response of banks’ affiliates to the CbCR disclosure 
requirement.  
Despite these limitations, my findings contribute to the literature on real effects of public 
disclosures (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Christensen et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018b; 
Fiechter et al., 2019; Rauter, 2020). I reveal that banks respond to the disclosure of tax 
                                                 
100 This Directive is called “CSR Directive” (Corporate Social Responsibility).  
 




information by decreasing their real economic activities. In addition, my study adds to the 
emerging literature on the consequences of public and private CbCR (e.g., Brown, 2018; 
Brown et al., 2019; Dutt et al., 2019a; Hugger, 2019; Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi, 2020; 
De Simone and Olbert, 2020; Joshi et al., 2020; Flagmeier and Gawehn, 2020; Eberhartinger 
et al., 2020). My paper is closely related to Joshi et al. (2020), Overesch and Wolff (2019) and 
De Simone and Olbert (2020) but extends and complements the studies by examining real 
effects of public CbCR disclosures on banks’ real economic activities. However, since the 
setting faces many challenges, my results should serve as a first indication of the real economic 
effects of public CbCR. Further research is needed to shed more light on the real effects of 
public disclosure requirements.     
  
 





Appendix 4.A: Theoretical framework 
I follow the theoretical framework provided by Dyreng et al. (2020). This framework makes 
it possible to understand the firm’s decision to engage in tax avoidance (Bruehne and Jacob, 
2019). Using the following model, Dyreng et al. (2020) assume that a firm wants to maximise 
after-tax profits: 
П(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴) = [1 − (𝜏 − 𝐴)](𝜌𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝜂𝑟𝐾) − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟𝐾 − 𝐶(𝐴) (2) 
The input factors comprise capital K, labour, L and tax avoidance A. All three factors cause 
costs, i.e., cost of capital investment r and wage costs w. The parameter η expresses tax-
induced investment distortions, e.g., limited tax loss offset rules and non-deductible costs, 
capturing the characteristic that the cost of financing and the economic depreciation are not 
fully deductible for tax purposes. The statutory tax rate is represented by the parameter 𝜏. 
Engaging in tax avoidance reduces the statutory tax rate by 𝐴 percentage points, resulting in 
an effective tax rate of 𝜏 − 𝐴. However, tax avoidance is, on the other hand, costly. It can be 
assumed that the costs of tax avoidance 𝐶(𝐴) increase with a firm’s engagement in tax 
avoidance strategies (𝐶′(𝐴) > 0).101 Differentiating Eq. (2) with respect to tax avoidance 𝐴, 
the optimal level of tax avoidance satisfies the following condition: 
𝜌𝐹(𝐾∗, 𝐿∗) − 𝑤𝐿∗ − 𝜂𝑟𝐾∗ = 𝐶′(𝐴∗) (3) 
Eq. (3) presents equilibrium values. The left-hand side reveals the tax base, indicating that a 
higher tax base incentivises the engagement in tax avoidance. Hence, it depicts the marginal 
benefits of tax avoidance. The right-hand side captures the marginal costs of tax avoidance. 
Eq. (2) and (3) provide two main insights. First, the costs of tax avoidance affect the optimal 
level of tax avoidance. Second, the optimal level of tax avoidance impacts the optimal level 
of the input factors, such as capital and labour. Tax avoidance can therefore have real effects. 
  
                                                 
101 For simplification, the authors assume that the cost of tax avoidance is not deductible for tax purposes.  
 




Appendix 4.B: Additional tables 
Table 4.B1: Alternative regression specifications – standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable:  ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  0.0509*** -0.0540** -0.0632** -0.0564* 
  (0.0164) (0.0223) (0.0295) (0.0303) 
Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects  Included Included Included Included 
Clustered SE  Country Country Country Country 
Adj. R²  0.408 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N  1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural logarithm of 
total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and Employees 
(natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. The table reports fully specified regressions with 
fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is 
the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x 
Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the country level. 










Table 4.B2: Variable definitions 
Variable Description Source 
   
Outcome variables   
ETR Tax expenses scaled by pre-tax profit (GAAP effective tax 
rate) 
Bankscope 
STR_ETR Difference between the home country’s statutory tax rate and 
the GAAP effective tax rate 
 
Earning Assets Natural logarithm of earning assets Bankscope 
Total Assets Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope 
Employees Natural logarithm of the number of employees Bankscope 
Cost of Emp Natural logarithm of personnel costs Bankscope 
Non-earning assets Natural logarithm of non-earning assets Bankscope 
Total assets growth Change in the natural logarithm of total assets scaled by the 
natural logarithm of prior year’s total assets 
Bankscope 
Earning assets growth Change in the natural logarithm of earning assets scaled by the 
natural logarithm of prior year’s earning assets 
Bankscope 
Employment growth Change in the natural logarithm of the number of employees 
scaled by the natural logarithm of the prior year’s number of 
employees 
Bankscope 
   
Bank characteristics   
Post Dummy variable equal to 1 for 2014 and 2015 and 0 otherwise Constructed 
Treatment Dummy variable equal to 1 for EU multinational banks and 0 
for EU domestic banks 
Constructed 
Size Natural logarithm of prior year’s total equity  Bankscope 
Leverage Prior year’s total liabilities scaled by prior year’s total assets Bankscope 
ROA Prior year’s pre-tax profit or loss scaled by prior year’s total 
assets 
Bankscope 
   
Country characteristics  
STR Top statutory corporate tax rate in the home country per year IBFD European Tax  
Handbooks 
Inflation Annual average rate of change in the harmonized index of 
consumer prices 
Eurostat 
GDP Growth Annual growth rate of GDP Eurostat 
Note: This table shows variable definitions. 
  
 




Table 4.B3: Sample selection 
  Number of banks 
 All active banks that are the ultimate parent in their group  4,046 
Excluding:    
(1) Banks headquartered outside the EU  (3,013) 
(2) Banks without at least one majority-owned affiliate from the 
financial sector 
 (229) 
(3) Banks without consolidated data   (487) 
(4) Micro-financing institutions and specialised governmental credit 
institutions 
 (6) 
(5) Observations with GAAP ETR below zero and above one  (15) 
(6) Observations with missing values for my dependent variables: total 
assets, earning assets, GAAP effective tax rate and number of 
employees 
 (33) 
 Final sample of banks  263 
 Total firm-year observations  1,107 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process. My primary data source is Bureau van Dijk’s 
Bankscope database.    
  
 




Table 4.B4: Alternative regression specifications – without treated observations from FR and  
                      UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  0.0515** -0.0589** -0.0601** -0.0569** 
 (0.0213) (0.0269) (0.0302) (0.0257) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.405 0.995 0.992 0.995 
N 961 961 961 961 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural logarithm of 
total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and Employees 
(natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. I exclude treated observations from the countries 
France and United Kingdom. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and 
country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x 
Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for 
treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient 
(standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance levels at 1% (5%) (10%), two-tailed. 
  
 




Table 4.B5: Alternative regression specifications – without cooperative banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  0.0408** -0.0582* -0.0636* -0.0570** 
 (0.0180) (0.0318) (0.0334) (0.0276) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.389 0.995 0.991 0.996 
N 808 808 808 808 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural logarithm of 
total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and Employees 
(natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. I exclude cooperative banks from the sample. The 
table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main 
variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-
in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the post 
treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression models have standard errors that are 
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** 








Table 4.B6: Alternative regression specifications – winsorising 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ETR Total assets Earning assets Employees 
Post x Treatment  0.0490*** -0.0515* -0.0536* -0.0554** 
 (0.0163) (0.0274) (0.0288) (0.0225) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.423 0.995 0.994 0.996 
N 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR (GAAP effective tax rate) in Column 1, Total assets (natural logarithm of 
total assets) in Column 2, Earning assets (natural logarithm of earning assets) in Column 3, and Employees 
(natural logarithm of the number of employees) in Column 4. In each Column, I winsorise the dependent variable 
at the 1% and 99% level to reduce effects of outliers. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed 
effects, bank-level and country-level controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the 
interaction term Post x Treatment, capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x 
Treatment equals 1 for treated bank observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All 
regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported 








Table 4.B7: Effect of CbCR on banks’ economic activities – detailed earning assets 
Panel A: Without controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Gross loans Net loans Securities Bank loans Investments 
Post x Treatment  -0.0967* -0.112* -0.115 -0.105 -0.182 
 (0.0573) (0.0594) (0.0915) (0.0899) (0.171) 
Controls None None None None None 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.979 0.988 0.957 0.946 0.937 
N 1,040 1,040 1,084 995 595 
Panel B: With controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Gross loans Net loans Securities Bank loans Investments 
Post x Treatment  -0.0517 -0.0614 -0.0837 -0.108 -0.167 
 (0.0451) (0.0462) (0.0856) (0.0949) (0.165) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.988 0.987 0.963 0.946 0.939 
N 1,015 1,015 1,062 976 586 
Notes: In both panels, the dependent variable is Gross loans (natural logarithm of gross loans) in Column 1, Net 
loans (natural logarithm of net loans) in Column 2, Securities (natural logarithm of securities) in Column 3, Bank 
loans (natural logarithm of bank loans) in Column 4 and Investments (natural logarithm of plants and properties) 
in Column 5. The table reports fully specified regressions with fixed effects, bank-level and country-level 
controls. The main variable of interest in the multivariate models is the interaction term Post x Treatment, 
capturing the difference-in-differences effect. The interaction term Post x Treatment equals 1 for treated bank 
observations in the post treatment period 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. All regression models have standard errors 
that are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) 









Table 4.B8:  Cross-sectional findings on detailed earning assets – presence in tax haven 
country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Gross loans Net loans Securities Bank loans Investments 
Post x Treatment x Tax haven -0.153*** -0.151*** -0.0845 -0.158 -0.233 
 (0.0541) (0.0552) (0.0937) (0.106) (0.192) 
Post x Treatment x No tax haven 0.0615 0.0383 -0.0829 -0.0548 -0.0891 
 (0.0684) (0.0724) (0.102) (0.114) (0.229) 
F-test for differences [p-value] [0.0119] [0.0363] [0.9864] [0.3534] [0.5820] 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R² 0.988 0.987 0.963 0.946 0.939 
N 1,015 1,015 1,062 976 586 
Notes: The dependent variable is Gross loans (natural logarithm of gross loans) in Column 1, Net loans (natural 
logarithm of net loans) in Column 2, Securities (natural logarithm of securities) in Column 3, Bank loans (natural 
logarithm of bank loans) in Column 4 and Investments (natural logarithm of plants and properties) in Column 5. 
Regression models include an additional interaction term based on the conditional variable to assess the cross-
sectional variation in the baseline treatment effect. The following conditional variable is used: Tax haven (No 
tax haven) equals 1 for treated banks with at least one (without a) subsidiary from the financial sector 
headquartered in a tax haven. All regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-robust and 
clustered at the bank level. Reported values: coefficient (standard errors) and *** (**) (*) indicate significance 










5.1 Summary of the results and contributions 
The three empirical studies in this thesis contribute to the literature on the real effects of tax 
reforms and thereby answer the call for research on real effects of taxation (e.g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010; Dyreng and Maydew, 2018; Bruehne and Jacob, 2019). The three studies 
inform policymakers about intended and unintended consequences resulting from changes in 
taxation. In addition, they reveal heterogeneity in the reaction of companies to tax reforms. 
Finally, this thesis provides insights into the impact of taxation on the behaviour of private 
firms and financial institutions that have been rather neglected in the empirical tax research so 
far (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  
The first study uses a dividend tax increase in Germany, which only affects corporate 
shareholders owning a stake of less than 10% in the dividend-paying German corporation, to 
examine the effect of this reform on payout decisions of private firms and portfolio decisions 
of their corporate shareholders. The results show that firms do not alter their payouts after the 
dividend tax reform. This finding suggests that minority shareholders without sufficient voting 
power cannot influence the payout policy of a firm. However, corporate shareholders reduce 
their minority stakes after the dividend tax increase in 2013. This result is not apparent because 
shareholders of private firms face limitations, e.g., they cannot trade their shares on liquid 
markets and can only sell their shares to the existing owners of the firm, in general. Prior 
literature therefore identified rather stable ownership structures of private firms over time 
(Jacob and Michaely, 2017; Berzins et al., 2018).  
Cross-sectional tests reveal a larger reduction of minority stakes for corporate shareholders of 
firms with a high dividend payout and a majority shareholder. The dividend tax responsiveness 
is also larger for financially distressed corporate shareholders with minority stakes that do not 
belong to the same group as the firm in which they own a minority stake. This study adds to 
the literature on taxation and payout decisions of private firms. Further, the study is the first 
to identify a reaction of private firms’ shareholders to a dividend tax increase. By examining 
important traits at the firm, shareholder and firm-shareholder level, this study also sheds more 
light on the heterogeneity in the dividend tax responsiveness of shareholders. Finally, since 
this German dividend tax reform was passed to comply with EU law, the results inform 
policymakers about the impact of the asymmetric taxation of dividends received by corporate 






The second study investigates the impact of a change in tax depreciation rules on the 
investment decision of companies from the finance lease sector. Since 2014, a German 
administrative order has changed the applicable tax depreciation method from the previous 
more beneficial straight-line tax depreciation over the lease term to the less beneficial straight-
line tax depreciation over the longer expected useful life of the leased asset. The results show 
that finance lease companies reduce their investments after the change to the less beneficial 
tax depreciation method. Since finance lease companies are financial institutions, they are 
subject to regulatory requirements regarding liquidity and risk management. This study 
predicts and finds that the exposure to regulatory requirements affects the investment response 
of finance lease firms.  
Additional cross-sectionals tests reveal that the investment response of finance lease firms is 
also affected by their product portfolios, in particular by their product focus on mobile assets. 
This result is in line with the prediction that the investment response should be stronger for 
leased assets for which the difference between the lease term and the expected useful life of 
the leased asset is high. Further tests suggest that the results cannot be explained by a general 
decrease in the demand for leasing products. This study adds to the literature on tax 
depreciation and investment by providing novel evidence that finance lease firms, which are 
financial institutions, react to a change in tax depreciation allowances. Further, the results 
highlight that regulatory requirements affect the responsiveness of regulated firms to tax 
reforms. Like Study 1, the second study exploits a tax reform that has no political or social 
goal, but was an administrative order to comply with the administrative interpretation of the 
tax law. Therefore, this study also informs policymakers about unintended consequences 
resulting from the change in taxation.  
Using the implementation of the CbCR disclosure requirement for all banks in the EU as an 
exogenous shock, the third study investigates the effects of mandatory public disclosure of tax 
information on banks. The study finds that EU multinational banks reduce their tax avoidance 
behaviour after the CbCR disclosure requirement became effective in 2014. This result is in 
line with the prediction that the disclosure of tax information increases the cost of tax 
avoidance due to detection/enforcement risks and reputational concerns. Additional findings 
suggest that EU multinational banks reduce their economic activities after the reform, 
indicating that a decrease in tax avoidance creates real effects.  
Cross-sectional tests reveal that detection/enforcement risks and reputational concerns 






suggest that economic activities decrease because banks reduce their tax avoidance activities. 
This study adds to the literature on the real effects of public disclosures by providing evidence 
that the disclosure of tax information creates real activities. Further, the findings indicate that 
these real effects are driven by a change in the tax avoidance behaviour of banks. Compared 
to Study 1 and Study 2, the third study analyses a change in disclosure requirements of tax 
information with the social objective of increasing transparency regarding taxes paid and thus 
addressing the corporate responsibility of financial institutions towards stakeholders and 
society (EU, 2013a, Recital 52). In general, the public perceives tax avoidance as socially 
undesirable, as all taxable entities have the responsibility to pay their fair share of taxes (e.g., 
Roychowdhury et al., 2019). Since the third study shows that tax avoidance decreases after 
the disclosure of tax information, the reform seems to achieve the social goal described above. 
However, this study also reveals the unintended consequences of the reform. The decrease in 
tax avoidance is at the expense of economic activities.  
5.2 Main limitations 
As outlined in the respective chapters, the findings of this thesis are subject to several 
limitations. Since the inferences of this thesis result from a DiD approach, concerns arise if 
the assumptions of this method are not fulfilled. To avoid endogeneity (e.g., omitted variables 
or reverse causality), exploiting natural experiments requires a random assignment to the 
treatment and control group (e.g., Gow et al., 2016). When considering the tax reforms 
examined in this thesis, the advantage is that changes in taxation are imposed on firms and 
thus are exogenously given. Nevertheless, in general, firms are not randomly assigned to the 
treatment and control group because there are typically political, economic or legal reasons 
for tax reforms, which may result in selection problems (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).  
To address this concern and mitigate issues due to endogeneity, researchers are focusing on 
the assumption of parallel trends, the avoidance of confounding events and the adequacy of 
the control group (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). This thesis carefully mitigates concerns that 
endogeneity and misspecifications in the research designs weaken the validity of the findings. 
First, in each of the three studies, the parallel trend assumption is supported by plotting yearly 
treatment effects and conducting placebo tests. Although the analyses do not suggest a 
violation of the parallel trend assumption, the studies cannot completely rule out that 






Second, each study applies a fixed effects structure and thorough sample selection to mitigate 
time trends and firm-specific confounding effects (e.g., M&As in Study 1 and Study 2). 
However, Study 3 cannot completely rule out that other regulations of the CRD IV package 
(e.g., Gropp et al., 2019), anticipation effects due to the EU Directive on the disclosure of non-
financial information (Fiechter et al., 2019) or a decrease in the demand for loans impact the 
results, although placebo treatments and the choice of the control group should mitigate these 
concerns.  
Third, the choice and the adequacy of the control group can be criticised for the following 
reasons. The control group in the first study might be indirectly affected by the dividend tax 
increase. However, this concern is addressed by using an alternative control group. In the 
second study, the applied tax depreciation method of firms from the operating lease and 
finance lease sector cannot be observed. Due to this shortcoming, the study cannot fully rule 
out that the reform might also affect firms from the control group, although the characteristics 
of the business model suggest that operating lease companies are not affected by the change 
in tax depreciation allowances. Further limitations could arise because observations from the 
treatment and control group are not comparable in observable characteristics. This concern is 
addressed by employing matching approaches in each study.     
Besides the limitations regarding the quasi-experimental research design, a drawback of this 
thesis is the limited generalisability of the results. In particular, Study 1 and Study 2 examine 
German tax reforms. Although internal validity is high, external validity is limited. 
Nevertheless, the results of the first study should be generalisable for developed countries 
since Germany has well-developed institutions and a tax system that is comparable to many 
developed countries. The findings of the second study should be generalisable to European 
countries as the regulatory requirements are comparable within Europe.  
5.3 Future research 
The findings and limitations of the thesis point to additional research opportunities. First, 
researchers should be interested in generalisable results. Therefore, future research should 
challenge the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 by exploiting similar reforms for different 
periods and institutional settings. Recent literature applies this procedure by providing first 
evidence based on a single tax change and then extending the results by examining several tax 






Further, the focus of this thesis relies on the effect of taxation on corporate decisions. Future 
research should also examine tax reforms affecting natural persons. It is important to examine 
the behaviour of individuals because income taxes account for a large share of tax revenues. 
Since individuals can be customers, employees, entrepreneurs and shareholders, there are 
many tax reforms that can be exploited to shed more light on the behaviour of individuals. In 
addition, it should be investigated whether tax reforms that affect employees also have an 
impact on companies. For example, changes in the income tax rate or social security 
contributions affect the personnel costs of a company and could therefore potentially influence 
the investment decision of a company.  
With respect to the third study, future research should employ comprehensive data at the level 
of banks’ affiliates to examine where and how affiliates’ economic activities are affected by 
the CbCR disclosure requirement. Further, additional research is necessary to examine why 
the effect of CbCR on tax avoidance only appears in the short-term (e.g., Joshi et al., 2020). 
Following De Simone and Olbert (2020), it is plausible to assume that banks shift their tax 
avoidance activities to low-tax countries in Europe. In addition, it would also be worth to 
examine how the disclosure of tax information affects peers and in particular competitors. It 
could be assumed that firms learn about the tax practices of their peers via their disclosure of 
tax information (e.g., Brown and Drake, 2014; Bird et al., 2018).  
In addition, researchers should shed more light on the effects of public disclosure of tax and 
tax-related information (e.g., Dyreng and Maydew, 2018). Therefore, new “exogenous 
shocks” must be analysed. For example, the German transparency register, which discloses 
the beneficial owner of a company, might be an interesting setting to examine the reaction of 
companies and in particular of companies with a beneficial owner in a tax haven. The stream 
of research on public disclosure of tax and tax-related information is becoming increasingly 
important as different stakeholder groups and society demand that companies pay their fair 
share of taxes. This increased focus on the tax avoidance behaviour of firms is also driven by 
various initiatives of the OECD and the EU.  
Further, more research is needed on the real effects of tax avoidance (Study 3). The theoretical 
framework proposed by Dyreng et al. (2020) suggests that tax avoidance can affect labour and 
capital if the profit function of a company includes the costs and benefits of tax avoidance. 
Since prior literature in this field of research is scarce (e.g., De Vito et al., 2019), more 






Finally, prior literature on the effect of taxation on private firms (Study 1) and financial 
institutions (Study 2) is still limited. More research is required to understand how the particular 
environment in which private firms and financial institutions operate affects their responses to 
changes in taxation. For example, prior literature finds that private firms are, in general, 
financially constrained because they are unlisted (e.g., Gao et al., 2013). Further, they might 
have a closely held ownership structure (e.g., Michaely and Roberts, 2011) and managers who 
are also owners of the firm (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1994). First evidence in the literature 
indicates that these features influence the reaction of firms to changes in taxation (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2010; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). With respect to financial institutions, it is still unclear 
how regulatory requirements affect their responses to tax changes.  
Overall, there are still many unanswered questions in the empirical tax research, in particular 
regarding private firms, financial institutions and the real effects of disclosure requirements 
and tax avoidance. Researchers should look for more exogenous shocks, i.e. tax reforms, and 




“If the data were perfect, collected from  
well-designed randomized experiments, 
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